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Resumo 
 
Esta tese analisa as organizações partidárias e a distribuição do poder no interior dos partidos 
portugueses, colocando a ênfase nas estruturas partidárias existentes a nível territorial e nas 
suas relações com a liderança e com o partido a nível nacional. No caso português, este tema 
tem sido pouco estudado, o que se explica pela tendência da literatura para privilegiar a 
análise centrada nos partidos a nível nacional. Esta tese defende a importância da análise dos 
níveis inferiores da organização partidária para a compreensão do funcionamento interno 
dos partidos políticos assim como dos processos de transformação que têm sofrido.  
A literatura tem vindo a demonstrar a tendência para o enfraquecimento dos partidos 
políticos enquanto actores colectivos e enquanto organizações de militantes como reflexo  
de um processo mais amplo de erosão da dimensão colectiva da política nas sociedades 
contemporâneas. Por sua vez, esta tendência põe em causa a função de intermediação entre 
os cidadãos e o Estado que esteve na base da legitimacão da posicão central que os partidos 
políticos têm vindo a ocupar nas democracias representativas.  
Do ponto de vista da organização interna, a literatura tem demonstrado algumas 
tendências importantes. Em primeiro lugar, a emergência de processos de transformação que 
apontam para o crescente poder e autonomia dos líderes vis-à-vis os orgãos colegiais e 
intermédios. Em segundo lugar, a democratização das decisões internas através da atribuição 
de direitos de voto aos militantes. Em terceiro lugar, a adoção de uma configuração 
organizativa de tipo ‘estratárquico’, em que as diferentes componentes são cada vez mais 
autónomas e os laços internos mais flexíveis.  
Esta tese analisa o caso português, interpretando-o à luz das tendências acima 
descritas  e do seu impacto na distribuição interna do poder. Para tal, a tese foca as estruturas 
do partido para analisar em que medida é que aquelas tendências emergem a nível territorial 
e quais os factores que explicam a distribuição do poder entre os diferentes níveis.  Para esse 
efeito, foram seleccionados os dois principais partidos de governo em Portugal – o Partido 
Socialista (PS), de centro-esquerda e o Partido Social Democrata (PSD), de centro-direita. 
De acordo com a literatura, PS e PSD são partidos eleitoralistas com características do 
modelo cartel, já que, por um lado dependem em larga medida do financiamento público e 
dos recursos proporcionados pelo accesso ao poder e, por outro lado, a liderança ocupa um 
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papel proeminente na organização. A tese parte de um enquadramento comparativo que 
recorre a dados recolhidos no âmbito do projecto ‘Political Party Database’ – no qual 
colaborámos – onde se apresentam importantes características destes partidos, 
nomeadamente ao nível dos recursos, estruturas e processos decisórios.  
Depois deste enquadramento, a tese investiga as estruturas territoriais a partir de 
diferentes perspectivas. Em primeiro lugar, a partir de uma perspectiva longitudinal que 
acompanha a evolução das relações das estruturas territoriais com o nível nacional desde 
1974. O objectivo é averiguar em que medida é que houve um processo de autonomização 
das primeiras em relação ao segundo, testando, para ambos os partidos, a expectativa da 
evolução no sentido de uma configuração ‘estratárquica’ das relações. A análise longitudinal 
permite examinar de que forma é que a autonomia e a hierarquia emergem em diferentes 
fases, tendo em conta a importância crucial que a incumbêcia e a ocupação do poder têm 
para a liderança nacional nos partidos eleitoralistas. Concretamente, analisa-se de que forma 
é que é a incumbêcia e a ocupação do poder afectam o funcionamento interno, as relações 
intra-partidárias e a base do poder do líder dentro da organização. Nesta análise, são tidas 
em conta as diferentes características dos dois partidos em termos da sua origem genética e 
de decentralição-centralização e o potencial impacto que isso poderá ter sobre aquelas 
relações.  
Em segundo lugar, análise-se as estruturas territoriais, com o objectivo de verificar 
em que medida é que os processos de personalização e de democratização observados a nível 
nacinal ocorrem ao nível das estruturas territoriais. Para tal, optou-se por analisar os 
processos de seleção das liderancas ao nível intermédio da organização, ou seja, ao nível dos 
presidentes das dezanove federações do Partido Socialista e das dezanove distritas do Partido 
Social Democrata em Portugal continental. Os presidentes das estruturas intermédias 
controlam a organização burocrática no terreno e gerem a acção do partido a nível local, 
assegurando a ligação com o nível nacional e representando as instâncias das estruturas 
perante a liderança. Para além disso, desempenham um papel central em funções 
institucionais, nomeadamente no processo de elaboração das listas dos candidados à 
Assembleia da República e na coordenação dos processos eleitorias para eleições 
autárquicas. Por fim, na maior parte dos casos, os presidentes das estruturas intermédias 
ocupam cargos públicos – são frequentemente deputados nacionais ou presidentes de 
Câmaras – o que lhes proporciona um importante capital político dentro da organização. 
Ainda que estes dirigentes partidários desenvolvam um papel central no aparelho do partido  
não tem havido investigação académica sobre estes actores. Nesse sentido, esta tese oferece 
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um contributo original à literatura sobre os partidos portugueses. Argumentamos que estes 
actores têm vindo a assumir importância dentro das próprias estruturas territoriais e que essa 
posição é uma função das relações com a liderança nacional, apontando a importância de 
laços personalísticos nestes partidos. O poder de eleger estes líderes foi tranferido de 
assembleias locais para os militantes, tal como ocorreu com a eleicão dos líderes nacionais. 
Na tese, são examinadas 266 eleicões directas que tiveram lugar nas federações e nas 
distritais entre 2003 e 2017. A análise é feita a partir de uma base de dados original sobre as 
eleicões intra-partidárias, considerando a  competitividade, a renovação e as características 
dos eleitos em termos de acumulação do cargo partidário com cargos públicos. Esta análise 
serve para averiguar da emergência, a nível territorial, de um modelo de organização 
centrado nas lideranças, o grau de circulação das elites, e em que medida as dinâmicas no 
terreno são relacionadas com as diferentes fases a nível nacional (e.g. incumbência-oposição, 
estabilidade da liderança). 
O último capítulo empírico da tese trata dos mais recentes processos de 
democratização interna nos dois partidos, analisando o papel das estruturas no terreno e a 
perspectiva dos líderes territorias sobre estas reformas. No caso do PS, em particular, 
analisa-se o caso das ‘directas’ para a escolha dos candidatos às presidências de Câmara em 
2013 e as primárias abertas para o candidato a primeiro-ministro em 2014.  
O principal contributo desta tese é o de mostrar importantes aspectos do 
funcionamento dos partidos políticos portugueses a nível territorial, preenchendo uma 
lacuna identificada na literatura. Em primeiro lugar, confirma-se a relevância da posição 
institucional em modelar as relações internas. Em segundo lugar, demonstra-se a importância 
dos laços personalísticos. Os dois partidos monstarm diferenças com respeito à evolução 
para um modelo ‘estratárquico’, apontando para a necessidade de uma reformulação teórica 
desse modelo mais em termos de ‘checks and balances’ do que mútua separação.  
Os resultados monstram que há uma personalização a nível local e, do ponto de vista das 
características do aparelho, asinalam uma ausência generalizada de competitividade e 
renovação, que nalguns casos parece indicar a presença de oligarquias a nível territorial.  
De um modo geral, estas características podem contribuir para o enfraquecimento das 
organizações partidárias e da sua capacidade de estabeleçer ligações com os cidadãos. 
Palavras-chave: Portugal, partidos políticos, distribuição interna do poder, estratarquia, 
personalização, democracia intra-partidária.  
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Abstract 
This thesis analyses party organisation and internal power distribution in Portuguese parties, 
focusing on the territorial structures and their relations with the party at the national level. 
Notwithstanding the direct implications that contemporary party transformation processes 
have on territorial party strata and intermediate bodies, this is an under-researched topic in 
party literature. Thus, the purpose of this thesis is to cover this lacuna and to contribute to a 
more comprehensive understanding of Portuguese parties’ functioning and internal 
dynamics. The thesis explores the case of the two main governing parties, the Socialist Party 
(Partido Socialista – PS) and the Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Democrata – 
PSD). The research first investigates the ‘stratarchical argument’ which posits the 
replacement of hierarchical configuration, and the increasing reciprocal autonomy between 
levels, in contemporary parties. This argument is explored through a dynamic perspective 
examining the two parties in different phases, from 1974 onwards. This perspective enables 
the examination of the salience of incumbency-opposition status in influencing the relations 
between levels and the role of path dependency factors, such as the genetic origin. Checks 
and balances rather than mutual separation seem to better describe the relations.  
Then, the emergence of personalisation and democratisation processes at the territorial level 
is analysed. To this aim, an in-depth examination of intra-party contests, held between 2003 
and 2017, for selecting the federation presidents (PS) and the district presidents (PSD) is 
carried out, resorting to an original database of direct elections. The main findings indicate 
a pattern of low competitiveness and low elite renewal at this level of the organisation. 
Afterwards, the most recent intra-party democracy reforms (and reform attemps) are 
analysed, placing emphasis on their effects on the territorial structures, and the territorial 
elites’ perspective on such reforms is presented. The thesis confirms the salience of the 
institutional position in shaping internal relations in electoralist parties and supports the 
argument of the emergence of personalisation processes at the territorial level and the 
relevance of personalistic linkages in these parties.  
Keywords: Portugal, parties, internal power distribution, stratarchy, personalisation, intra-
party democracy 
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Introduction 
 
In recent decades, important processes of transformation have affected political parties 
across representative democracies. Several studies have documented that parties are 
gradually losing their reservoir of activists and members, (e.g. Mair and van Biezen, 2001; 
Whiteley, 2011; Biezen, Mair and Poguntke, 2012; Kölln, 2015; van Haute and Gauja, 
2015), that party identification is decreasing, and that public confidence towards political 
institutions is eroding, with citizens increasingly perceiving parties as self-referential and 
self-serving organisations (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000; Pharr and Putnam, 2000; Dalton 
and Weldon, 2005; Mair, 2013). Parties appear to be deeply detached from society, while 
their strength and resilience as organisations seem to be increasingly supported by state 
resources and the occupation of power (Katz and Mair, 1995; Ignazi, 2014). 
While parties as mass-membership organisations are in decline, individual actors, 
such as party leaders, are becoming more powerful and internally autonomous (Poguntke 
and Webb, 2005). Accordingly, internal power has shifted to the leaders’ benefit, to the 
detriment of parties’ intermediary structures and collective bodies, such as delegate 
conventions, local party organisations, and parliamentary party groups (Poguntke and Webb, 
2005: 9; Lobo, 2005a; McAllister, 2007; but see Loxbo 2013). Nowadays, politicians are 
increasingly able to reach out to electors and supporters without relying on traditional party 
cadres and constituency party structures (Poguntke, 2002). Party leaders seem to have 
«greater opportunities to fill the party apparatus with people they trust» (Musella, 2018: 2) 
and play a key role in influencing voting behaviour (Bittner, 2011; Lobo, 2008;  Lobo and 
Curtice, 2014). However, leaders’ centrality goes hand in hand with high vulnerability, since 
(governing) parties are increasingly dependent on the electoral performance and occupation 
of power (Poguntke and Webb, 2005).  
Concomitantly, a tendency towards internal democratisation through the inclusion of 
individual members in party decisions and the openness of organisational boundaries to non-
members is occurring (Scarrow, Webb and Farrell, 2000; Scarrow, 2015). On the one hand, 
democratisation reforms have been interpreted as a way to revitalise internal participation, 
and to respond to membership decline and diffusion of party distrust. Members are still 
considered by parties an important resource, especially in terms of public image and 
legitimacy (Scarrow, 1994; van Haute and Gauja, 2015). On the other hand, scholars have 
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posited that internal democratisation actually conceals a strategy of elite control and 
contributes to strengthen leadership’s autonomy and legitimacy vis-à-vis party intermediate 
structures (Katz and Mair, 1995; 2002; Mair, 1997; Ignazi, 2014).  
A further interesting development observed by party scholars regards the mass-party 
model’s conception of party as a monolithic entity and hierarchical system. Contemporary 
parties’ internal ties are loose, and the organisational configuration tends to be inspired on 
‘lighter’ solutions, stratarchical or network-based, apparently better suited to conciliate 
central control and autonomy of the different  components into a coherent organisation (Katz 
and Mair, 1995; Carty, 2004; Bolleyer, 2012).  
Most of the recent trends concerning party organisation suggest that the territorial 
intermediate structures have lost influence in party decisions, and that the resources ensured 
by this component, such as members’ voluntary activity and financial contribution,  have 
lost relevance. It has been argued that «local party organization is most likely not as 
important to the national political party as was hitherto the case» (Webb, 1995: 312), that a 
«physical withering of the party on the ground» is ongoing (Katz and Mair 2002: 126), and 
even that «the existence of organisational articulation at the local level is no longer a 
necessary condition that would qualify an organization to be numbered in the political party 
category» (LaPalombara, 2007: 148). More recently, it has been observed that the activity 
of the territorial and functional strata may be seriously constrained by recent trends such as 
«large-scale members’ inclusion», with the result of fostering party demobilisation and 
tighter control of the party from above (Ignazi, 2018: 8). For some scholars, this 
organisational decline of the ‘periphery’ is accompanied by the personalisation of the local 
leadership (Bardi, Bartolini and Trechsel, 2014).  
However, as a matter of fact, not much is known about party’s territorial structures. 
This is surprising given the internal multi-dimensionality of parties, their different layers, 
and their internal dynamics of cooperation and conflict. Much attention has been directed to 
membership size as indicator of organisational strength, and less is known about what parties 
do at the territorial level, how they organise, and how local structures support party goals 
(Scarrow, 2000: 95; Biezen, 2003).  
In light of the aforementioned trends of party organisational transformation, this thesis 
contends that is more important than ever to explore parties’ territorial structures and their 
role in increasing state-dependent and leader-centric, yet vulnerable, parties. This 
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perspective may tell a part of the story about leader’s power base within the party. This 
matters especially for parties in new democracies, since it has been argued that party 
leadership holds a relevant degree of autonomy in managing the organisation and its 
structures. More in general, this perspective enables to explore party functioning in a more 
complex way, as well as to understand whether, and how, distinct party components adapt 
to the pressures and challenges parties are facing and reproduce the main tendencies of 
transformation.  
Goals of the thesis 
This thesis aims to cover the lacuna identified in party literature through an in-depth analysis 
of parties’ territorial structures in a new democracy, Portugal. In particular, the study focuses 
on the two main governing parties, the centre-left Socialist Party (Partido Socialista – PS) 
and the centre-right Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Democrata – PSD).  
In the Portuguese case, political parties are the dominant actors of the democratic system. 
They played a leading role in supporting the consolidation of the democratic regime and the 
stabilisation of the party system (e.g. Bruneau and MacLeod, 1986; Maxwell, 1989;  
Morlino, 1998; Lobo, 2001; Diamandouros and Gunther, 2002; Jalali, 2007). 
The Constitution of 1976 sanctioned parties’ institutional domination through the monopoly 
of the political representation (de Sousa, 1984; Jalali, 2007; Leston-Bandeira and Tibúrcio, 
2012). From 1987 onwards, the party system has displayed a majoritarian pattern around 
these two main parties, only attenuated since 2005, until the unprecedented left–left 
cooperation emerged with the 2015 elections (Lobo, 2001; Freire, 2005; Lisi, 2016).  
As other ‘third-wave’ parties, Portuguese parties (with the partial exception of the 
Communist Party - PCP), emerged from scratch and from the outset they have been highly 
dependent on state resources and the occupation of power for compensating their weak social 
roots and sustaining the organisation (Lopes 2004; Jalali 2007). These features, coupled with 
the historical context in which these parties emerged, have contributed to foster centralising 
tendencies and leadership prominence (Biezen, 2003; Lobo, 2003).  
While party-state anchorage is rather strong, the opposite is true for party-society 
linkage. Portuguese parties appear to be weakly connected to society and their public image 
is not in good-shape. Beyond the high electoral abstentionism, citizens’ confidence towards 
parties and political elites is very low and there is plenty of evidence of widespread political 
disaffection (Magalhães, 2001, 2005; Pinto, de Sousa, Magalhães, 2013; Freire et al. 2014; 
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Torcal, 2014; Teixeira, Tsatsanis and Belchior, 2016). Moreover, Portuguese parties have 
displayed a low propensity to renewal, with only minor and instrumentally-motivated 
changes carried out in the last four decades (Lisi, 2015a).  
Given the centrality of parties for Portuguese democracy, we contend that a more 
comprehensive analysis, which considers how vertical relations are structured and how 
parties function at the lower organisational levels, is needed. This analysis matters for 
different reasons. Firstly, because in the Portuguese case this theme has not been explored 
in a systematic way. The knowledge about the territorial structures and their relation with 
the party at the national level is still limited. With few exceptions, literature has remained 
‘nationally-oriented’, focusing on party leadership, national party bodies and parliamentary 
and governmental elites, whereas an in-depth examination of the lower levels and relations 
and dynamics with the party at the national level is lacking.1  
Hence, the general goal of the present investigation is to cover this gap and thus to 
contribute to the understanding of Portuguese parties, by placing emphasis on the territorial 
structures. Secondly, since the analysis is carried out in light of the main processes of 
transformation of contemporary parties, the goal is to contribute to the comprehension of the 
trajectories that these parties are undertaking. For instance, it aims to understand whether 
and to what extent internal configuration follows a stratarchical modality, as well as whether 
personalisation processes take place at the local level, by focusing on the territorial 
leadership. More in general, this study aims to shed light on the functioning of Portuguese 
parties at the local level. This seems to be increasingly important since in local power, where 
Portuguese parties face the challenge of non-partisan lists, the two main parties are showing 
signs of weakening of the local organisation (Jalali, 2014), which may indicate a deeper 
erosion between party internal organisation and the Portuguese society. 
 
Thesis structure  
This thesis adopts the following structure. The next chapter starts reviewing the state of the 
art on party organisation and internal power distribution, to then focusing the attention on 
the most recent trends of party organisational transformation. Chapter two maps the 
investigation presenting the research questions, the hypotheses, the data and method.  
The empirical analysis begins in Chapter three. The chapter aims at illustrating in 
                                                          
1 For a critique of the ‘national-biased’ perspective in party research see Detterbeck (2012). 
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comparative perspective key features of Portuguese parties. To this aim, it resorts to the 
Political Party Database (PPDB) project, whose data for the Portuguese case we have 
contributed to collect in the last years. Chapter four examines from a diachronic perspective 
the centre-periphery relations in light of the hypothesis of the evolution towards a 
stratarchical arrangement. Chapter five directs greater attention to the territorial structures at 
intermediate level of party organisation, describing their organisation, resources and 
competences, by integrating formal rules with actual practices resorting to elite interviews. 
Chapter six and seven shift the focus to the territorial leaders, namely the PS federation 
presidents and the PSD district presidents, and analyse their selection by members drawing 
upon an original data set of internal elections we have built for this study. Chapter eight deals 
on the more recent intra-party democracy reforms, and attempts of reform, in both the PS 
and the PSD, placing the emphasis on the territorial structures. Finally, the conclusion recaps 
and discusses the findings and their implications.  
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Chapter I 
Internal power distribution and party transformation: theory and 
findings 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter we review the main studies on party organisation, focusing on the internal 
power distribution and the processes of transformation that have regarded parties in recent 
decades. As it will be shown, the relevance of the dimension analysed in this chapter is not 
circumscribed to party’s “internal life” but is tightly connected with the functions played by 
political parties in contemporary democracies, as well as with normative questions on the 
changing nature of party organisation (Gunther and Diamond, 2001; Katz, 2002; Biezen, 
2004; Krouwel, 2006, 2012; Allern and Pedersen, 2007; Scarrow, 2017). Following the 
emergence of a wide debate about party crisis and decline, party organisation has regained a 
new momentum in recent decades. The decrease in party identification and electoral turnout, 
the rise of electoral volatility, the decline of membership figures, the widespread diffusion 
of distrust and anti-party attitudes in western democracies have questioned the enduring 
vitality of party, positing the argument of a process of crisis or even organisational decline 
(e.g. Aguiar, 1990; Selle and Svåsand, 1991; Daalder, 1992; 2002; Aldrich, 1995; Webb, 
1995; Poguntke, 1996; Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000; Putman, Pharr and Dalton, 2000; Mair 
and van Biezen, 2001; Norris, 2002; Torcal, Gunther and Montero, 2002; Dalton and 
Weldon, 2005; Whiteley, 2011).  
While on the one hand the aforementioned trends identified a process of citizens’ 
distancing from politics, scholars pointed out that the argument of party decline was 
misleading, since it was built on normative conceptions of party and party functions, i.e. the 
mass party as the prevailing model of party organisation, and the representation of social 
demands as the primary party function (Ignazi, 1996; Mair, 1997; Scarrow, 2000; Schmitter, 
2001; Katz, 2013; Biezen and Poguntke, 2014). As such, the decline of the elements 
sustaining this conception of party and its organisational strength (e.g. large membership 
size) was perceived as the decline of parties as institutions. In the wake of this wide debate, 
in the early 1990s new studies have set the basis for the theorisation and analysis of party 
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organisation and internal power distribution through innovative perspectives, fostering a 
more complex analysis of party change in terms of adaptation rather than decline (e.g. Katz 
and Mair, 1992; Mair, 1997; Gunther, Montero and Linz, 2002; Scarrow, Poguntke and 
Webb, 2017).  
This chapter is structured as follows. It starts by reviewing ‘classic models’ of party 
organisation that have influenced the study of party organisation and how power is internally 
distributed. It then presents Katz and Mair’s framework of party’s internal diversification 
which set the basis for the exploration of parties as non-monolithic entities made up of 
different layers. After that, a section deals with the application to parties in new democracies 
of theories emerged with reference to parties in old established democracies. Finally, this 
chapter reviews the most recent processes of party transformation identified by literature and 
presents the main empirical findings.  
1.1 Party organisation: from cadre to cartel  
Party models are primarily ideal-types therefore they describe models that at the empirical 
level are short-live, however they also identify distinct traits of party organisation and 
processes of development that make it difficult «discussing of comparative party 
organisation without invoking the shorthand of mass, cadre and cartel party types» (Webb, 
Poguntke and Scarrow, 2017: 309). Although there is actually a tendency towards 
proliferation of typologies, research has identified different species of party organisation 
such as the ‘elite’, the ‘mass’ and the ‘electoralist’, which capture defining features of party 
organisation and internal power distribution, serving as reference for the analysis of parties 
in western established democracies, and inevitably influencing the way in which scholars 
look at party organisation in other contexts (Gunther and Diamond, 2003; Krouwel, 2006, 
2012). In this section, we review the main models emphasising the distribution of power 
entailed in each typology.  
1.1.1 From elite to mass organisations: cadre and mass party types 
The dichotomic distinction between ‘cadre’ and ‘mass’ parties was theorised by Duverger 
(1957) based on the type of party genesis, i.e. internal vis-à-vis external formation. 
Accordingly, the cadre party emerged within the parliamentary institution, in the era before 
universal suffrage, was made up of groups of notables holding public offices and relied on a 
skeletal structure of intermitted electoral committees (Schlesinger and Schlesinger, 2006: 
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59). By contrast, the mass party emerged from the social groups excluded from the 
enfranchisement, thus its original purpose was to represent and socialise the masses to 
politics. As Sartori observes, the mass party represents a conception of party that «replaces 
personalised loyalties to local notables, or even to national personages» and whose «its 
constituent units are no longer persons but impersonal agencies» (Sartori, [1976] 2005: 15). 
This type of origin and primary goals influenced the development of  a permanent extra-
legislative organisation and the set-up of an extensive network of local branches 
encapsulating a large membership, which was the main source of funding and voluntary 
labour (Gunther and Diamond, 2003). 
In such parties, the internal power distribution followed a bottom-up direction (Krouwel, 
2006). The members held accountable the party executive and the public officials through 
the delegates elected at the congress, the top party body.  However, already in the first decade 
of twentieth century, Michels (1962 [1911]) had questioned mass party’s formal power 
distribution, positing the impossibility of democracy within parties due to the inherent 
oligarchical tendency of organisation. Drawing on the observation of the German Social 
Democratic Party (SPD), Michels contended  in fact that parties were only formally led by 
the grassroots since the real locus of authority lied in the party executive.   
 
1.1.2 Catch-all and electoral-professional party types 
In the second half of the 20th century, post-industrial western societies were radically 
transformed by cultural, economic and technologic processes. Systemic factors, such as 
societal secularisation, welfare-states’ expansion and mass-media’s pervasiveness reduced 
the social stratification and loosened strong ideological identities contributing to erode the 
social and political basis that have shaped politics up to then, and thus affecting traditional 
patterns of electoral competition, party alignments as well as party organisation (e.g. 
Mazzoleni and Schulz, 1999; Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; 
Norris, 2002).  
Political scientists have tried to assess the impact of those long-term developments on 
party organisation.  In the mid-1960s, Kirchheimer (1966) posited the emergence of the 
‘catch-all’ as a new model of party organisation, resulting from the socio-economic and 
technologic transformations occurring in post-war democracies. According to Kirchheimer, 
the reduction in social stratification, fostered by the welfare policies, had triggered changes 
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in western electorates affecting partisan stability and long-term voters’ orientation. 
Therefore, parties were pressured to concentrate their efforts on conquering voters’ support 
rather than establishing a reservoir of loyal electors. The mass-media expansion enhanced 
this type of strategy enabling parties to reach out to electors without needing labour-intensive 
strategies based on activists and members’ volunteer work.  
Compared to the mass party, the formal power distribution is reversed. In the catch-all 
party it follows a top-down direction from the leadership to the membership, and party 
members do not play significant roles (Krouwel, 2006). Although scholars focused much 
attention on the sociological implications entailed in the catch-all model, i.e. the changes in 
party’s social representation with the reduction of strong ideological stances and 
identification with a classe gardée, Kirchheimer’s model entailed important elements of 
party’s organisational transformational, summarised by Panebianco as follows: i) loosening 
of tight connections with affiliated organisations and, more in general, loosen organisational 
ties, with low differentiation at both the horizontal and vertical levels; ii) higher permeability 
of parties to interest groups; iii) decline of member’s political weight within the party; iv) 
party leader’s empowerment, due to financial resources and direct linkages with the 
electorate by means of relations established with external groups; v) weak and intermittent 
party-electorate relations, due to the erosion of strong social basis and political sub-cultures 
(1982: 479–480). 
Stemming from Kirchheimer’s analysis, Panebianco identified the ‘electoral-
professional party’, emphasising the professionalisation and the replacement of party 
bureaucrats by non-partisan experts (1982: 481). For Panebianco, professionalisation 
changed the internal power balance, strengthening the position of public office-holders vis-
à-vis party officials. The former derived their legitimacy and power from the institutional 
position, i.e. extra-organisational resources, while the latter were gradually losing influence 
capacity (ibid: 486). In the ‘electoral-professional party’ human and financial resources were 
controlled by the leadership, paving the way for the formation of personalised executives in 
lieu of the collegial and impersonal executives typical of the mass parties (ibid.: 482). The 
result was increasing power centralisation and top-down direction of power and internal  
system of governance (Krowuel, 2006). 
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1.1.3 The cartel party  
In the early 1990s, Katz and Mair’s (1992) comparative study of party organisation in 
advanced western democracies paved the way for the revitalisation of academic research on 
party organisation. The study set the basis for the development of a new theoretical 
framework for assessing party change, and for the theorisation of the ‘cartel party’ as an 
emerging party model across western democracies (Katz and Mair, 1995).  
On the one hand, the cartel party thesis stressed some of the tendencies already 
posited by Kirchheimer’s ‘catch-all’ and Panebianco’s ‘electoral-professional’ models. For 
instance, building on Panebianco’s argument, Katz and Mair looked at the growing 
professionalistion as a form of “depoliticisation” of the party organisation. Accordingly, 
parties’ increasing reliance on external professionals marginalised the contribute  of intra-
party actors in gathering support for the party, with the result of allowing out the organisation 
and enhancing leadership’s internal autonomy (Katz and Mair, 2002: 125).  
On the other hand, the thesis innovated the understanding of party organisation and 
party change in several ways. First and foremost, it introduced an actor neglected by 
literature up to then, i.e. the state and its resources. The growing role assumed by public 
funding vis-à-vis private, associative and members’ fees, in financing parties and electoral 
campaigns, contributed to change internal power distribution, boosting the position of the 
leadership and the public offices-holders (Katz and Mair, 2002: 123–124; Krouwel, 2006: 
26). Mainstream parties especially benefited from state resources, due to their long 
governmental experience.2  The public resources ensured by the occupation of power served 
these parties to sustain the organisation, to offset the weakening of their social connections, 
and to generate loyalty in a context of decline of partisan and ideological attachments. In 
this respect, Katz and Mair’s model posited that the dependence on state resources affected 
inter-party dynamics by fostering the collusion (cartel) of the main governing parties to 
prevent new competitors to emerge (Blyth and Katz, 2005).3  
A second element of innovation introduced by the cartel party regarded the 
“atomistic” conception of party membership. In such parties, the leader is increasingly able 
to connect with members, bypassing intermediate layers and activists. Thus, a direct relation 
is established with the individual member, isolated from the party structures on the ground. 
                                                          
2 In this regard, the cartel thesis posits that parties’ detachment from society and mainstream parties’ low 
responsiveness would encourage the rise of anti-establishment movements challenging the ‘cartel’. 
3 However, little evidence has been found supporting this argument (see for instance Scarrow, 2006)  
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In such context, the leadership and the party at the central level more in general obviate to 
the need for local organisations and for local organisers (Mair, 1997: 114). Furthermore, 
party’s organisational boundaries become more permeable, with growing indistinction 
between members and supporters (Harmel, 2006: 129). More in general, in cartel parties 
internal organisational ties are increasingly loosened.  
A third innovative aspect deals precisely with the way the vertical relations are 
structured, namely with regard to the national leadership and the territorial organisations.  
Katz and Mair posited that between party levels a process of autonomisation takes place, 
thereby stratarchical relations replace hierarchical arrangements typically embedded in mass 
party conception (Katz and Mair, 1995, 2002; Krouwel, 2006: 258-60). 
This literature contributed to the identification of processes indicating the emergence 
of electoral-oriented, professionalised, and leader-centered organisations in contemporary 
democracies. Yet, the idea of an evolutionary trajectory according to which parties would 
converge towards a single model has been questioned by the actual variation found in party 
organisation in a wide range of contemporary representative democracies (e.g. Scarrow, 
Webb and Poguntke, 2017). We will return to this topic more in detail in chapter 3.  
 
1.2 Party’s internal diversification. The three organisational faces and the change in 
power distribution  
The cartel party thesis was built on the theoretical framework developed by Katz and Mair 
for assessing party adaption and party change and based on the assumption of parties as non-
unitary actors which could be disaggregated into three organisational faces, the party on-the-
ground (POG), the party in central office (PCO) and the party in public office (PPO) (Katz 
and Mair, 1993; Katz, 2002: 92-97). The framework matters for different reasons.  
Firstly, it has deeply influenced the way scholars look at parties’ organisational solutions 
and internal diversification, including the centre-periphery relations, paving the way for the 
emergence of new theoretical contributions which explore parties as multi-level systems 
(Bardi, Bartolini and Trechsel, 2014; Carty, 2004; Bolleyer, 2012). Secondly, parties’ 
disaggregation has enabled to examine and explain organisational changes in terms of party 
transformation and adaptation rather than decline. Finally, this model has travelled across 
different contexts, being tested in analyses of parties emerged in different polities, such as 
parties in new democracies (e.g. Szczerbiak, 2001; Biezen, 2003).  
 12 
 
The theorisation emerged as a response to the limits of classic literature adopting 
linear paradigms based on dichotomic distinctions and single ‘patterns of authority’, which  
made it difficult to assess party’s multi-dimensionality at the horizonal and vertical level, as 
well as in different fields of activities (Katz and Mair, 1993: 349; Katz and Mair, 2002). 
Such approaches were too reductionist to explain internal cooperation and conflict as well 
as changes in party’s internal structures and decision-making processes. Building on 
Weber’s conceptualisation of rational-legal authority, ‘leader-followers’ paradigm 
considered parties as rationally organised around a central group, made up of the leader and 
the party staff, vis-à-vis the mass of followers lacking resources for influencing party 
decisions (Whimster, 2008: 196). Therefore, it neglected the actual differences between 
‘followers’ which comprise individuals with different goals, resources, and perceptions. 
Duverger detected the diversity in partisan affiliation distinguishing between ‘militants’, 
‘ordinary members’, ‘supporters’ and ‘electors’ based on their degree of involvement, as 
well as empirical studies on activists and congress’ attendants demonstrated the intra-group 
diversity (Duverger, 1951; May 1973; Reif, Cayrol and Niedermayer, 1980; Kitschelt, 1989; 
Scarrow, 2015). Likewise, the separation between ‘extra-parliamentary’ and ‘parliamentary 
party’ mixed different actors under a single label, with the former including the leadership 
but also the members and the activists, and the latter members of the government as well 
parliamentarians.  
To assess in a more comprehensive way party’s multi-dimensionality, Katz and Mair’ 
framework broke up the organisation into three components, the party on-the-ground (POG), 
the party in central office (PCO) and the party in public office (PPO), each one holding its 
own internal hierarchy and pattern of authority and depending on a system of incentives and 
resources (i.e. constraints and opportunities) which affects its behaviour.  
The party on-the-ground (POG) comprises the membership organisation, and its 
basic unit is the local branch. The POG is represented in the party governing bodies through 
the delegates elected at the national congress, and its main resources are members’ fees and 
militants’ voluntary work. As such, the POG has been affected the most, due to the decline 
in membership rates and activism. Moreover, it has been threatened by organisational 
reforms such as the centralisation of the affiliation process (e.g. creation of national 
membership record) (Katz, 2002: 97).  
The central office (PCO) represents the extra-legislative party’s governing body and 
is made up of the executive committee and the party bureaucracy. Its main function consists 
in the coordination of party’s activities and resources and is the core of party’s 
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communicational network (Katz, 2002). The PCO controls the formal rules and the 
distribution of selective and collective incentives. Nevertheless, it depends on the other two 
faces to implement decisions, i.e. the POG for carrying out the electoral campaign, the PPO 
for pursuing policy decisions. A second source of constrain lies in the mixed composition of 
the party national executive, which may include in the board members of the other faces 
(Katz, 2002: 99).  
Finally, the party in public office (PPO) entails the members holding institutional 
offices, i.e. the parliamentary party group (PPG) and governors. The resources of the PPO 
consist of legal authority and the access to expertise and information, public subsidies and 
patronage, to mention the most significant. Its members are highly dependent on the electoral 
outcomes and on the responsibility of office. Consequently, the PPO is compelled to respond 
in the first place to the electorate’s interest than to the POG’s interests (Katz and Mair 1993, 
Katz 2002: 93; Katz, 2014).    
Even though the framework conceptualises the faces as analytically distinct, 
empirically they may blur due to members’ overlap. For instance, the party executive 
committee (PCO) may include members of the PPO. For Katz and Mair, members’ overlap 
ensures the PPO to prevail over the PCO and thus to control it. Members’ overlap might 
represent an important limitation in applying the framework to empirical cases, since it might 
be difficult to disentangle the type of relation of members with one or the other face.4 
Katz and Mair argue that, due to the availability of (growing) state subsidies and the 
process of professionalisation, over time the public face has prevailed on the others.  
Thus, with regard to classic party models, there has been a shift from the mass party type, 
where the party on-the-ground is the most important face, to the cartel party, where the public 
face is the most privileged component. In terms of power distribution, parties have adapted 
to changing environments by redistributing the power internally and the decline of one face 
is offset by the empowerment of the other(s).  
Such analysis has important theoretical implication because it allows to consider 
parties in terms of their relation with the state, not only with the society. The thesis of party 
decline was built precisely on this misconception. In light of this two-way perspective, the 
growing access to state resources has affected parties’ incentives to draw resources from 
society (e.g. membership fees, business and associative contributions), and more in general 
to establish contacts with citizens, thus contributing to erode party-society relations which 
                                                          
4 Other scholars have interpreted member’s overlapping in terms of party parliamentarisation (Koole, 1994: 
291) and party governmentalisation (Müller, 1994: 73). 
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were traditionally ensured by the party on ground. On the other hand, party-state linkages 
have been tightened and, with them, the party public face.  
The power redistribution has direct implications on party functions since the erosion 
of one face affects party’s capacity to perform the function traditionally exercised by that 
component. On the one hand, party’s anchoring on the state ensures parties’ organisational 
survival and the performance of institutional and procedural functions, such as candidate 
selection and policy-making (Bartolini and Mair 2001; Lawson and Poguntke 2004; Dalton 
and McAllister, 2011). On the other, the weakening of social linkages has affected parties’ 
capacity to perform representative functions and to intermediate between citizens and 
political institutions. However, as far as representative functions are the main source of party 
legitimacy, the new balance is not free from risks since it may undermine the public 
perception of parties as legitimate institutions (Torcal, 2001; Dalton and Weldon, 2005; 
Biezen, 2008; Webb, 2009; Mair, 2013; Enyedi, 2014; Ignazi 2014).   
 
1.3 Party organisation and internal power distribution in new democracies 
Katz and Mair’s analytical framework has been developed with reference to parties emerged 
in established democracies, i.e. originally mass organisations formed from social cleavages 
and mass mobilisation, and it envisioned an evolutionary trajectory that departing from mass 
party comes to the contemporary electoralist and cartel typologies. Analysing parties 
emerged in new democracies, scholars have found important differences that inevitably 
influence the travelling capacity and applicability of the theories to those context 
(Huntington, 1991; Sczerbiack, 2001; Biezen, 2003, 2005; Lobo, 2003; Webb and White, 
2007).  
Accordingly, parties in new democracies emerged primarily as institutional rather 
than social actors (Pridham, 1990). Since the outset, party-state relations have been very 
tight, thus parties’ incentives to build closer relations with society were reduced. In most 
cases, the primary goal faced by parties in new democracies concerned the definition of the 
political regime and the consolidation of democracy. Such urgency pressured the main 
parties to prioritise electoral mobilisation and voting-maximising strategies (i.e. catch-all 
strategy) than focusing on strong ideological stances and partisan attachment (Biezen 2003; 
Jalali, 2007; Webb and White, 2007). The establishment of strong linkages with social 
groups would have been less effective, more time-consuming and labour-demanding. Hence, 
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parties in new democracies emerged more as «ad hoc mobilizer rather than builders of 
structures like the German SPD or the social democrats in Scandinavia» (Puhle, 2002: 80).  
The focus on electoral performance and winning office required an efficient and 
professionalised machine, and reduced party elites’ incentives towards the expansion of the 
membership base, members’ participation and involvement, as well as towards the set-up of 
widespread networks of territorial structures (Biezen, 2003). Furthermore, the formation in 
a context of mass communication and medialisation of politics represented a breeding 
ground for the implementation of such type of strategy.  
In other words, parties in new democracies have not faced the same need to develop 
mass organisations «instead, they have shifted directly to the leader-centred professionalized 
model of parties of electoral contestation» (Webb and White, 2007: 361). In such context, 
party founders and leaders played a key role for enhancing party’s internal cohesion and 
avoiding fragmentation and factionalism, likely to emerge in a context of fragile loyalties 
and weak institutionalisation (Panebianco, 1982; Biezen, 2003). 
A key aspect for understanding the specificities of power distribution in new 
democracies deals with the resource structure. Since their formative phases, parties in new 
democracies benefited from public funding. In the case of governing parties, in particular, 
the resources ensured by the occupation of power were a key asset for building electoral and 
partisan support and for organising the consensus without needing to develop a strong 
organisation on the ground (Blondel, 2002; Kopecký and Mair, 2012; Jalali and Lisi, 2009). 
This observation is of great importance for the present research and namely for the 
understanding of the functioning of party organisation at the territorial level. For scholars, 
the aforementioned contextual and institutional factors at the time of formation, i.e. path 
dependency factors, have deeply moulded parties’ internal functioning and power 
configuration (e.g. Biezen, 2003; Lisi, 2015a).  
Exploring internal power distribution in ‘third-wave’ parties, scholars have pointed 
out distinct traits with respect to the expectations posited by the theories developed with 
reference to parties in older established democracies. Firstly, in new democracies, the party 
central office is the strongest face and the locus of power is concentrated in the extra-
legislative organisation, namely the party executive. Thus, contrary to the expectation 
positing the ascendency of the party public face, in new democracies the parliamentary face 
is subordinated to the party executive, by means of party discipline, control over the 
nominees for the parliamentary group’s leadership, and members’ overlapping (Biezen, 
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2003; Bosco and Morlino, 2006; see Lobo, 2003: 262-263, Leston-Bandeira, 2009; Teixeira, 
2009, for the Portuguese case).  
Moreover, dealing with the Portuguese case, Lobo (2003) has highlighted the 
importance of further specifying Katz and Mair’s organisational tripartition, by breaking 
down  party’s public face in a governmental and a parliamentary component.5 Accordingly,  
when the party is incumbent, power distribution shifts in favour of the party in government, 
which prevails over the organisation through the governmentalisation of the party executive, 
indicated by the extensive presence of governors in the executive body (Lobo, 2005b).  
Secondly, from the outset the party on-the-ground has been very weak. Mass party 
organisations have not truly emerged in those polities. While the form may have been 
somewhat adapted (e.g. party congress as formal top party body, dues-pay membership…) 
the substance is quite different. The party on-the-ground’s structural weakness is illustrated 
by the low membership figures, the procedural definition of member’s status with minimal 
obligations, and the absence of recruitment campaigns, as well as by the small number of 
local branches and high degree of independent candidates in local politics (Biezen, 2003; 
Bosco and Morlino, 2006). Accordingly, party elites in new democracies have not paid much 
attention to the membership organisation, except for its symbolic meaning and legitimacy 
function in terms of parties’ public image. More in general, power concentration in the 
leadership is a key feature of third-wave parties, being apparent in the central control over 
financial and organisational resources, candidate selection and policy development. For 
scholars, such power configuration plays a key role in enhancing internal cohesion in the 
case of weakly institutionalised parties with fragile loyalties and loose internal linkages 
(Biezen, 2003: 214-215). From these observations it emerged that these parties attach a 
crucial importance to winning office, indicating that external pressures, such as electoral 
competition, and internal struggles have a key role in shaping power distribution (Lisi, 
2015a).  
These features show that state dependence and weak party-society relations –  which 
in older established democracies are identified as relatively recent processes – in third-wave 
democracies are present from the outset (Katz and Mair, 1995; Mair, 1997; Biezen, 2004; 
Webb ad White, 2007; Kopecký and Mair, 2011; Svåsand, 2013; Biezen and Kopecký, 
2017). Therefore, while departing from different starting points, and differing in their 
legacies, parties in old and new democracies present common traits (Biezen, 2005). 
                                                          
5 In the Portuguese case, accumulation of parliamentary and governmental offices is forbidden. 
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However, as Biezen observes, in the case of new democracies, these features may be more 
accentuated since to «a larger degree than in the established democracies, political parties 
can be seen as encapsulated by the state» (2004: 718). This may imply that parties in new 
democracies will be particularly affected by the current trends regarding party organisation 
that we describe more in depth in the next sections.  
 
1.4 Contemporary trends in party transformation  
The return of party organisation at the centre of party politics’ analysis has paved the way 
for the emergence of a growing number of studies investigating processes of party 
transformation. The following three sections deal with three main trends, namely the rise of 
party leaders, the intra-party democratisation, and the loosening of party’s hierarchical 
configuration.  
1.4.1 The personalisation of politics and the ascendancy of party leaders 
As shown at the beginning of this chapter, the ascendancy of leaders within parties was 
already entailed in party models’ literature which highlighted the shift from the collegial and 
impersonal executives of the mass party era, to the restricted and personalised party 
executives of catch-all and electoralist parties.  
More recently, scholars have analysed the increasing prominence of leaders in the 
context of a broader process of ‘personalisation of politics’, according to which the popular 
focus on individual political actors has replaced the center stage once occupied by parties 
and collective identities (McAllister, 2007: 571; Karvonen, 2010: 4). This theme has 
attracted much attention in recent years being studied from several perspectives (e.g. Calise, 
2000; Poguntke and Webb, 2005; Lobo, 2006, 2008; McAllister, 2007; Blondel et al. 2010; 
Karvonen, 2010; Bittner, 2011; Garzia, 2011; 2012; Lobo and Curtice, 2014; Passarelli, 
2015; Rahat and Kenig, 2018). Three general causes have fostered the personalisation trend, 
namely i) the mediatization of politics, ii) party change and the erosion of party-society 
linkages, and iii) societal individualisation (Rahat and Kenig, 2018: 127). The interaction of 
these wide factors has contributed to the emphasis on individuals’ roles to the detriment of 
collective actors.  
One of the first systematic research on political personalisation processes has been 
carried out in the mid-2000s by Poguntke and Webb. Focusing on the head of government, 
Poguntke and Webb posited the emergence of a multi-faceted process of ‘presidentialisation 
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of politics’ understood «as the development of (a) increasing leadership power resources and 
autonomy within the party and the political executive respectively, and (b) increasingly 
leadership-centred electoral processes» (2005: 5). In other words, presidentialisation may 
concern the governmental, the party and the electoral arena. Accordingly, prime-minister’s 
power is increasingly based on electoral appeal rather than  «on organizational control of the 
party». As for the party facet, the presidentialisation is understood as «a shift in intra-party 
power to the benefit of the leader» vis-à-vis the party organisation (2005: 9). The adoption 
of formal rules assigning leaders more powers, the introduction of direct selection method, 
the availability of human and financial resources which ensure autonomy in drawing up 
policies, and the use of direct communication strategies are all evidences of the shift of power 
in favour of the party chairman. At the electoral level, presidentialisation is apparent in high 
media coverage on electoral leaders’ and top candidates. Electoral studies literature, in 
particular, has paid much attention on this trend analysing leader effects on electoral 
behaviour (Lobo, 2008; Karvonen, 2010; Garzia, 2012; Lobo, 2014; Lobo and Curtice, 
2014). This line of inquire has highlighted  an interesting aspect by focusing on the type of 
party organisation the leader belongs and his or her effect on voting. Analysing the impact 
of leaders in the vote for different types of parties Lobo (2006, 2008) has demonstrated that 
leader effects vary, with electors of catch-all and electorally-oriented parties being more 
sensitive to leaders than mass-parties’ electors, consistently with the greater emphasis the 
former parties attach to leader during campaign. Therefore, in these parties, electoral 
performance should have a higher impact for the leadership stability.  
An important aspect highlighted by Poguntke and Webb concerns the leader’s relation 
with the party apparatus and hence with the territorial structures. Accordingly, the privileged 
position achieved by the leader will not be aimed at controlling the party machinery, but 
rather at improving the «leader’s personal standing through coordinated planning and public 
relations activities». Although it is likely that the leader would try to consolidate his or her 
internal control over the party (for instance by means of internal rules) this is not an essential 
characteristic of the presidentialisation of party facet. At the same time, as they put it, 
leader’s vulnerability in difficult phases is high since presidentialisation: 
 
«is characterized by a shift towards personalized leadership which may be very 
strong as long as it is successful electorally, but which is likely to be vulnerable 
in times of impending or actual electoral defeat. In other words, we would expect 
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party leaders to be less likely to survive electoral defeat than has been the case 
in the past» (Poguntke and Webb, 2005: 9-10). 
 
Therefore, in such parties, leader’s stability within the organisation is highly dependent on 
his or her electoral appeal and the distribution of incentives generated by the occupation of 
power. On the one hand, incumbency protects the leader from pressures coming from the 
party. On the other hand, the potential for leadership instability is higher in the face of 
electoral defeats and during opposition status. Therefore, the higher instability experienced 
by personalised leadership is fostered precisely by the neglection of, or the reduced control 
over, the party machinery. At the opposition or in difficult times, this strategy should not be 
very feasible. In our view, it is therefore important to pay attention also to the dynamics of 
the party apparatus and the territorial organisation as leader’s power base or internal source 
of challenges. Still, this issue has not received much attention by scholars. In line with 
Astudillo (2015), the argument of the reduced salience of controlling the party machinery –  
due to the combination of presidentialisation and ascendancy of the party in public office –
deserves further examination in the case of parties in new democracies. In such contexts, in 
fact, it has been proved that the party in central office prevails over the party in public office, 
and this face has a key role in maintaining the cohesion of the organisation in a context of 
weak internal loyalties.  
 
1.4.2 Intra-party democratisation  
The introduction of reforms aimed at including ordinary members (and even party 
supporters) in intra-party decisions, namely personnel selection for party and public offices 
(i.e. leader and candidate selection) and policy decisions, is one of the most recent 
developments regarding party organisation (Scarrow, Webb and Farrell, 2000; Scarrow, 
2005; Kittilson and Scarrow, 2006; Hazan and Rahat, 2010; Gauja, 2013). By opening 
internal processes to new actors, this type of reforms affects power distribution and redefines 
internal equilibria (Cross and Katz, 2013). Likewise, the party may decide to include other 
types of affiliates, such as the sympathisers whose relation with the party is based on a lower 
commitment compared to the dues-paying members. In doing so, parties further open their 
organisational boundaries. In terms of models of party democracy, members’ inclusion 
indicates a shift from the delegative system and representative and ‘assembly-based’ model 
to a direct and ‘plebiscitary-based’ model of party democracy (Teorell, 1999; Allern and 
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Pedersen, 2007; Floridia, 2009; Invernizzi-Accetti and Wolkenstein. 2017; von dem Berge 
and Poguntke, 2017). 
However, while a longitudinal trend towards more inclusiveness, especially in 
leadership and candidate selection, has been detected, scholars point out that the expansion 
of IPD democracy tends to be overestimated (Bille, 2001; Pilet and Cross, 2014; Cross and 
Pilet, 2016). For instance, leadership selection by an assembly of delegates continues to be 
the norm in most parties and the «image of a universal and irresistible evolution towards full 
member votes or even towards open primaries is far from reality» (Pilet and Cross, 2014: 
227–228). Likewise, as for candidate selection findings are mixed. In some cases, members’ 
participation has been empowered and inclusiveness improved, in other cases central control 
over MPs lists has been tightened (e.g. De Winter, 1988; Pennings and Hazan, 2001; Rahat 
and Hazan, 2001; Krouwel, 2012).  
The democratisation trend seems to be particularly tricky for electoralist parties since 
these parties are pressured to find a balance between «leadership autonomy and procedural 
democracy» (Scarrow, Webb and Farrell, 2000: 133). One the one hand, public expectations 
and internal demands pressure these parties to expand participative opportunities, on the 
other, the leaders of electoralist parties increasingly need to retain or improve their room of 
maneuver, which may be constrained by democratisation.  
Scholars have explained in different ways this «renewed commitment to members» 
(Seyd, 1999: 385) undertaken by political parties. Building on the general theories of party 
change (e.g. Panebianco, 1982; Harmel and Janda, 1994), Barnea and Rahat (2007) have 
developed a three-tiered analytical framework that systematises the range of explanations 
driving intra-party democracy (IPD) reforms.6 Accordingly, IPD reforms result from the 
interplay of environmental and internal pressures concerning i) the political system; ii) the 
party system; iii) the political party (Barnea and Rahat, 2007: 377-378). At the political 
system level, long-term factors, such as modernisation, personalisation and democratisation, 
influence public expectations towards parties. The pervasiveness of developments such as 
membership decline, anti-party sentiments and rise of electoral abstentionism, indicates the 
erosion of party-society linkages and citizens’ perception towards party legitimacy. 
The introduction of new incentives to members’ participation could be explained as an effort 
to improve the public image as well as to enhance organisational strength by stimulating new 
                                                          
6 Although Barnea and Rahat’s framework refers specifically to candidate selection reforms it has been re-
adapted and applied to other IPD reforms as well as party reform more in general (Lisi, 2010a; Gauja, 2017; 
Astudillo and Detterbeck, 2018). 
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enrollments (Scarrow, 2006; Gauja, 2014; Ignazi, 2014). In this regard, the political system 
level contributes to explain the ‘direction’ of the reform, i.e. more inclusion.  
At the party system level, parties may be pushed to make the organisation more 
inclusive, due to pressures coming from their national competitors, i.e. isomorphism, or from 
electoral defeats and electoral competition, opposition status, and political scandals. The 
specificities and dynamics of the context in which individual parties operate shape the 
structure of opportunity for them to innovate in that sense. This range of explanations 
contributes to explain the ‘timing’ of reform, i.e. when is more likely that a party carries out 
IPD reforms.  
Political and party system factors regard the environment in which parties operate, 
the third set of explanations concerns the political party as unit of analysis (e.g. intra-party 
groups and individual politicians) and internal dynamics. Accordingly leadership changes, 
intra-party struggles, the degree of stability of the dominant coalition and party mergers are 
key factors in encouraging change of party rules (Panebianco, 1982). Internal factors 
contribute to explain the ‘evolution’ and the ‘outcome’ of the reform and how the rules 
governing the process are shaped.  
At the empirical level, scholars have investigated the role of these factors in 
influencing IPD reforms, especially in leadership and candidate selection. In a study on 
Westminster countries, Cross and Blais (2012) found that the decision to open leadership 
selection to members is likely to be adopted when the party is in opposition or after an 
electoral defeat. In such contexts, parties are particularly pressured to innovate and project 
the image of a modern and inclusive party. Likewise, contagion effect matters since newer, 
smaller, and left-wing parties are more likely to adopt such reform first, and to be then 
followed by the other parties in the system (see also Lisi, Freire and Barberà, 2016). The 
interplay of external and internal factors takes place when, after an electoral defeat, the 
power balance shifts from party elites to the party on-the-ground. In this case, the rank-and-
file have more voice to ask for internal reforms which withdraw powers from party elites 
(Cross and Blais, 2012). However, rather than as an immediate reaction to electoral defeat, 
the direct election is likely to be undertaken when the party is in opposition, i.e. as a strategy 
to rebrand the party in view of the next election (Chiru et al., 2016: 49). Interestingly, they 
found that the reforms may be implemented by a recently elected leader in order to 
consolidate his or her internal power. Likewise, in the case of Portugal, Lisi (2010a) has 
shown that instrumental motivations play a key role behind the adoption of this innovation 
by the main governing parties which are highly pressured both by electoral competition and 
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internal struggles. The decision to reform appears instrumentally directed at consolidating 
leader’s internal power and improving party image in view of the electoral competition.  
Cartel theorists place special emphasis on internal factors, since this line of research 
judges IPD reforms a strategy of elite control aimed at strengthening leadership’s autonomy 
vis-à-vis intermediate strata and collective bodies (Katz and Mair, 1995, 2009; Mair, 1997). 
This argument lies in the membership atomisation inherent in cartel parties. Voting rights 
empower individual members  at the expenses of the organised party on-the-ground, made 
up of middle-level elites and activists.7 Concurrently, parties use the reforms to respond to 
the developments at the political system level, and to «defend themselves against accusations 
of elitism and detachment from society» (Katz and Mair, 1995: 18). The result is the apparent 
paradox of IPD reforms that “encourage participation without ceding control” (Cross and 
Katz, 2013: 10).  
Empirical findings support Katz and Mair’s theoretical assumptions observing that 
the shift towards members’ inclusion in candidate selection has not necessarily reduced 
national or subnational elites’ capacity to retain control (Hopkin, 2001; Katz, 2001; Cross, 
2016; Detterbeck, 2016). Rather, behind the appearance of a more inclusive process, power 
concentration may be enhanced. This finding is explained due to the fact that inclusive 
selectorates marginalise «alternative centres of internal power, such as parties’ intermediate 
structures» (Hopkin, 2001: 358). In fact, the organised work carried out by the intermediate 
structures’ on behalf of rival leaders is crucial in making the selection process competitive. 
Expanding the selectorate to ordinary members, that organised work is weakened and loses 
relevance. A similar mechanism appears to take place in leadership selection. As Kenig 
(2009) demonstrates, while inclusive selectorate do attract more candidates to leadership, 
the competitiveness of the contests is lower. In other words, while more candidates run, few 
of them are truly competitive. This finding indicates a tendency towards outcomes which are 
potentially more favorable to whoever controls the rules governing the process (i.e. the 
dominant coalition), rather than outsider candidates or minor factions. Cross and Blais’ 
(2012) findings go in the same direction, with slight increase of aspirant candidates and 
lower competitiveness of the contests, compared to more exclusive selectorates. Such results 
have been then confirmed by studies regarding other countries (Pilet and Cross, 2014). 
Similarly, Schumacher and Giger, (2017) demonstrate that wider selectorates do foster party 
                                                          
7 Katz and Mair’s argument was based on the May’s Law of Curvilinear Disparity (1973) and the experience 
of the UK Labour.  
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leader’s domination. Therefore, members’ inclusion appears to be mainly used to «solicit a 
plebiscitary confirmation» of the leader rather than «by competing minority factions 
intended to show the leadership’s lack of consensus in the rank and file» (Ignazi, 2018: 4).  
In this regard, democratisation should be seen as a factor contributing to foster 
personalisation tendencies and parties’ leadership-centeredness.  
At the same time, scholars have shown that leaders who are selected by party 
members tend to have a shorter tenure than those selected by more exclusive methods and 
appear to be more vulnerable after losing an election (Ennser-Jedenastik and Schumacher, 
2016). In our view, this finding is particularly interesting because confirms that leaders 
elected without the support of the on-the-ground organised work of the party structures, but 
only by means of plebiscitary appeal to individual members, may be highly autonomous 
when in power but their vulnerability and instability is even higher in difficult times (and 
are therefore more easily replaced). As such, it demonstrates the importance of looking at 
the internal dynamics in more detail and at the relation of the leadership with the party 
apparatus.  
 
1.4.3 The loosening of hierarchical relations and the stratarchical configuration  
The third trend of organisational transformation concerns in a more direct way the territorial 
structures, since it deals with the loosening of hierarchical relations and organisational 
linkages within contemporary parties, and the reciprocal autonomisation between the party 
at the national level and the peripheral structures. However, compared to the trends of party 
transformation described in the former sections, few empirical studies have analysed this 
argument to date. For the present analysis, this argument is particularly relevant since it seeks 
to explain the functioning and organisation of electoralist parties without neglecting the 
lower organisational layers.  
The replacement of party’s hierarchical configuration has been firstly postulated by 
Katz and Mair with regard to the organisational dimension of the cartel party. In Mair’s 
word, this process mirrors «the erosion of a sense of linkage even inside party itself» (1997: 
152). Drawing on the concept of ‘stratarchy’ applied by Eldersveld (1964) to American 
parties, Katz and Mair posited the coexistence within the (cartel) party of mutually 
autonomous levels, each with distinct competences (Katz and Mair, 1995, 2009). This 
argument is based on the assumption that the party-on-the-ground cannot be completely 
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marginalised, mainly due to its legitimacy function. At the same time, this component may 
constrain leader’s room for manoeuvre. Hence, by encouraging autonomy in local affairs, 
the national leadership is free to manage party policies and strategies, while concomitantly 
it keeps lower strata active and improves party image since autonomous structures would 
attract participation and enrolments.8 In other words, stratarchical arrangements serve to 
conciliate party leadership’s autonomy with party cohesion (Katz and Mair, 1995; 2009).  
Yet, the idea of division of competences was initially criticised at theoretical level. 
In this regard, scholars pointed out the difficulty in considering that local officers would not 
try to influence national leadership’s decisions given that the politics and the image projected 
by the party at the national level have direct implications on local elections (Koole, 1996). 
Likewise, the argument that party’s national elite is made up of professionals without local 
ties, and that delegates from lower strata are not present in national bodies, was considered 
implausible (Koole, 1996: 518; Detterbeck, 2005).  
In this respect an important point needs to be specified. Although the model describes 
a relation of mutual autonomy, this does not imply that the relations are somewhat balanced.  
The leadership still keeps the upper hand since: «local leaders will always be discouraged 
from intervening in national affairs by the knowledge that the national leadership, if 
challenged, can appeal directly to the individual members» (Mair, 1997: 114). In cartel 
parties, in fact, the leadership ceases to be held accountable by the internal delegative system,  
but the leader’s primary source of legitimacy has been transferred to individual (atomised) 
members and to the electorate more in general (Floridia, 2009). 
Building on Katz and Mair’s theorisation a more recent strand of research has 
developed new approaches looking at parties as ‘multi-level’ organisations challenging the 
conception of parties as hierarchical systems where power is concentrated in a single place 
(Carty, 2004; van Hauten, 2009; Bolleyer, 2012).9 One of the first contribution in that sense 
                                                          
8 «Parties do of course still need and want local office-holders, and these might be troublesome for the central 
party were they to advocate policies or strategies which ran counter to those advanced by the national 
leadership. […] As far as local matters are concerned, on the other hand, both sides have an interest in 
encouraging local autonomy. From the local office-holders' point of view, a relatively free hand is always 
desirable, while from the central party side an autonomous local party is more likely to encourage involvement 
and participation and is more likely to make the party attractive to potential members and supporters. Each side 
is therefore encouraged to allow the other a free hand. The result is stratarchy» (Mair, 1997: 114-115). 
9 This perspective has influenced an important line of inquiry on parties in countries experiencing 
decentralisation reforms (e.g. Spain, Italy, United Kingdom), and how they have internally adapted or resisted 
to the changes in the external environment demonstrating that internal structure and power distribution are two 
different dimensions. Put it simple, they showed that decentralisation and creation of new party echelons to 
adapt to the new state setting may not necessarily foster power decentralisation within the party. Although this 
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has been developed by Carty (2004), who maintains that stratarchical configuration is an 
‘organisational imperative’ of contemporary parties. Accordingly, contemporary parties 
resemble the business model of ‘franchise systems’ whereby the national leadership manages 
the ‘brand’ (i.e. policies) and the local organisations are in charge of distributing the 
‘electoral product’ (Carty, 2004: 13). This arrangement provides the national and local levels 
with reciprocal autonomy while ensuring the coherency of the organisation. For Carty, this 
configuration enables to explain «the puzzle of increased exit at a time of enhanced voice» 
(2004: 16), i.e. membership decline and individual members’ empowerment. Depending on 
the organisational “contract” bargained by the centre with the peripheral structures, parties 
manage the flow of information, resources, personnel, as well as local autonomy through 
different solutions (Bardi, Bartolini and Trechsel, 2014). In other words, the centre-periphery 
arrangements are to be ascertained empirically: 
«Decision-making on policy and programmatic issues is a matter for central 
party organization to ensure that the party is providing a consistent message to 
its supporters and the electorate» […] «Critical personnel decisions can be made 
at various levels in stratarchical parties: candidates can be selected by local 
electoral district associations, by state level organizational bosses or by the 
national leadership, leaders by grassroots members or national conferences. As 
these are among the most important decisions made by parties, the power to do 
so is jealously guarded and fought over» (Carty, 2004:16).  
Stemming from Katz and Mair’s and Carty’s contributions, Bolleyer (2012) classified 
parties’ internal diversification across levels according to three typologies, i.e. ‘party 
hierarchies’, ‘party stratarchies’  and ‘party federations’, understood as a continuum of 
structures shifting from the most power-concentrated (hierarchy) to the most power-
dispersed (federation). The dimensions that capture these typologies are i) the  «way 
competences and resources (e.g. candidate selection, conflict resolution, finances) are 
allocated to the national and regional or local level», and (ii) «the extent to which national 
interest representation follows territorial lines (composition of central party organs)» 
(Bolleyer, 2012: 319). Party stratarchy is located in the middle of the concentration-
dispersion continuum because in stratarchies entail hierarchical elements since the national 
                                                          
strand of research matters since it show that parties are active agents and that centre-periphery relations are not 
merely influenced by structural factors as state setting (e.g. Duverger, 1957), the present thesis does not 
dialogue with this literature (see for instance: Biezen and Hopkin, 2006; Fabre, 2008). 
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party holds means for exercising control over the local structures, such as retaining powers 
in conflict resolution, finances distribution and centralised control over membership. 
Applying the typologies to empirical cases, Bolleyer finds variation rather than convergence 
towards one model: party hierarchies tend to be less diffuse, and to be ideologically rooted 
in right-wing parties. Beyond ideology, the institutional setting matters as well, since party 
federations tend to proliferate in federal systems while stratarchies in unitary settings. As far 
as party origin is concerned, Bolleyer finds that hierarchical elements of stratarchies tend to 
be pronounced in parties formed from a ‘top-down’ process, whereas in parties built from 
‘bottom-up’, the peripheral structures tend to retain more autonomy and resist to centralising 
attempts (Bolleyer, 2012: 318).  
Therefore, Bolleyer’s analysis shows that party characteristics, institutional factors, 
and path dependency contribute to shape the arrangements and pattern of relations that the 
party at the central level establishes with the peripheral structures. However, since her 
empirical analysis only regards non-governing (and relatively small) parties, it presents 
important limitations in the understanding of how governing parties arrange their relations 
with the local levels, and whether they follow patterns of autonomisation.  
 
Beyond Bolleyer’s research, to date few investigations have explored at the empirical 
level the argument of stratarchy. In addition, their findings are mixed. While the concept is 
theoretically relevant since it maintains that power within parties is not entirely hierarchical 
or devolved, little evidence seems to support the idea that parties converge towards a pattern 
of mutual autonomy (Cross, 2016). Perhaps, one of the problems lies in the difficulty to 
operationalise the concept of stratarchy and to find empirical indicators (Crotty, 1991). 
Moreover, as Katz and Mair (2009) also acknowledged, it is still not clear how the concept 
of stratarchy, developed with reference to American and Canadian parties, may be adapted 
to the diversity of European institutional and political systems (Wolinetz, 2015). 
Evidence of stratarchical arrangements between central and peripheral structures has 
been found in some cases, namely in the Italian and Spanish parties (Wilson, 2016). In the 
Italian case, stratarchical tendencies have received much attention due to the combination of 
the party system’s collapse after 1992 and the institutional reforms of decentralisation (e.g. 
Ignazi, Bardi and Massari, 2010, 2013; Ignazi and Pizzimenti, 2014; Calossi and Pizzimenti, 
2015). Ignazi and Pizzimenti (2014) test the stratarchical argument assessing the changes in 
formal power distribution and resources’ allocation between the party at the central level and 
the peripheral structures, contrasting stratarchy to ‘power verticalisation’ conceived as 
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reinforcement of the central level to the detriment of the peripheral structures (Deschouwer, 
2003: 215). While they find in centre-left parties some evidence of increased local autonomy 
over time, verticalisation tendencies better characterise centre-periphery relations in centre-
right parties.  
Their analysis highlights two interesting aspects. Firstly, even if local autonomy is 
improved, significant disparities in terms of access to key resources persist, and 
consequently potential for conflict. Secondly, local autonomy is limited since it does not 
regard strategic resources or decisional processes, such as financing or candidate selection 
which by contrast are retained by the party at the national level. Hence, the fact that local 
autonomy (i.e. stratarchical configuration) regards non-strategic resources should be 
interpreted as indicator of central party’s disregard of the organisation on the ground, in 
favour of the control of resources originated outside the organisation (i.e. state resources). 
In the Scandinavian case, Allern and Saglie (2012) have explored the formal and 
informal links established between the central organisation, the regional and the municipal 
branches and have investigated stratarchical relations in the case of  Norwegian parties. Their 
results are mixed. Although they find elements of non-hierarchical arrangements, there is 
not the convergence towards a single model of relations across levels, such as posited by the 
stratarchical argument. However, Allern and Saglie’s focus is quite narrow, being 
circumscribed to policy-making in-between elections and to communication channels. Still, 
it has the advantage of showing the complexities of centre-periphery relations in unitary 
countries (2012: 952).  
Likewise, a recent comparative study on Westminster countries questions the 
assumption of mutual autonomy between the central and peripheral structures (Cross, 2016). 
Investigating the allocation of powers in policy development, and leadership and candidate 
selection, Cross concludes that the thesis «of individual areas of authority parceled out to 
different levels of the party» is not supported. Rather than separation of powers, the relations 
resemble a sort of «checks-and-balances form of power-sharing» whereby «both local and 
central party personnel play an important role in each of the key areas of intraparty decision-
making» (2016: 4). Consequently, Cross suggests that actually parties adapt and calibrate 
their internal power-sharing to reflect their contextual circumstances, such as the shift to the 
opposition or an electoral defeat and, under specific circumstances the national-local 
‘bargain’ may be re-negotiated, or recalibrated, by the actors involved (Cross, 2016: 22). 
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These findings highlight that centre-periphery relations are not static, but different dynamics 
may emerge in this dimension. This argument matters precisely because one of the main 
limitations of the stratarchical argument lies in the fact that it has been conceived and studied 
as a static organisational model. For Carty, «once institutionalized, all elements must 
recognize their part and accept the power and role trade-offs as a necessary part of the 
bargain for making the party, as a whole, successful» (2004: 12). As such, it underestimates 
the potential changes pushed by external factors, such as party’s shift from government to 
opposition, or electoral defeats, which imply a destabilising effect on the internal relations 
in parties highly dependent on the occupation of power.  
However, few studies have adopted a more dynamic perspective which allows to consider 
the conjunctural phases faced by parties. For instance, Bolleyer’s analysis (2009) on the case 
of the Irish Fiánna Fail, an ideal-typically cartel party, suggests the relevance of 
governmental position in shaping the relations across levels. Likewise, in the Portuguese 
case, Lisi (2009: 294-300) maintains the advantage of adopting a dynamic approach for 
analysing intra-party relations observing parties in government and in opposition. While in 
some parties the arrangement between the central and the peripheral structures may be more 
or less static, this seems not to be the case for those parties highly dependent on the resources 
embedded in the access to government. As mentioned, in such parties the national leadership 
is relatively strong but, at the same time, under specific circumstances, such as electoral 
defeats and opposition status, is more vulnerable. In such case, the territorial organisation 
may regain voice or its control may be crucial. 
 
An important aspect of stratarchical configuration which has not received much attention, is 
the role of the actors controlling the party organisation at the territorial level. Indeed, 
scholars often describe stratarchical arrangements in terms of personalised relations 
involving the national leadership and the sub-national elites. For instance, analysing patterns 
of party patronage, Biezen and Kopecký (2014) find support for stratarchy as predicted by 
the cartel party thesis, whereby «sub-national notables offering the national leaders an 
organisational base for national political competition in exchange for a lack of interference 
in their own local operations and their use of local public resources» (Biezen and Kopecký, 
2014: 10). Likewise, Wilson shows that Italian regional presidents and mayors use their 
«position to develop a personalised control over their regional party» (2016: 76). From this 
perspective, the autonomy entailed in stratarchical relations may reflect the desire of the 
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national party to find balances in terms of «power relations among the party elites at various 
levels, and not to better respond to citizens’ demands and expectations» (Bardi, Bartolini, 
and Trechsel, 2014: 8). On the other hand, an important implication may be that the national 
leadership loses control over the local organisation and the selection of the party personnel 
in the periphery (Floridia, 2009). In such case, it may become difficult for the national 
leadership to impose decisions, such as to remove local politicians with personalised 
consensus on the ground. In this respect, stratarchical arrangements may be interpreted as a 
sort of «return to the system of local notables» updated to a post-ideological and mediatic 
age (Mencacci, 2017: 61).  
Of course, these observations add a new perspective to the stratarchy originally 
understood by Katz and Mair, i.e. as a solution found by contemporary parties for 
maintaining active the party on the ground since an autonomous local party attracts 
participation and involvement and enhances party legitimacy. At the same time, they 
underline the relevance of looking at the party territorial organisation placing special 
emphasis on the local elites.  
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Chapter II 
The roadmap of the research 
 
Introduction 
This thesis analyses party organisation and the internal power distribution in the Portuguese 
case. The study pays special attention to the territorial party structures and their relationship 
with the party at the central level.10 Building on the assumption that parties are not 
‘monolithic entities’ (Daalder, 1983; Bolleyer, 2012: 315) this research contends that the 
analysis of the parties’ lower echelons sheds light on intra-party functioning and thus 
contributes to understanding the processes of organisational change, or the lack of thereof, 
within Portuguese parties.  
The processes of transformation identified by party research in the last decades, and 
discussed in chapter 1, cannot be fully understood without an in-depth analysis of the parties’ 
territorial organisation. Indeed, this component is directly affected by those processes, such 
as the empowerment of the leadership vis-à-vis the collective and intermediate bodies; the 
rise of personalisation; the presidentialisation of the party structures; the atomisation of the 
membership; and the replacement of party hierarchical ties with looser arrangements and 
leadership-oriented networks.11 These trends may affect the internal mechanisms of 
accountability and the mediating role of the party organisation and its structures, fostering 
the demobilisation of the territorial (and functional) party strata, and thus further eroding 
parties’ capacity to build connections and channel societal demands into the political realm 
(Ignazi, 2018: 8).  
The goal of this thesis is twofold. Firstly, it aims to contribute to the knowledge of 
the party territorial organisation, filling the existing gap in the literature on Portuguese 
parties. Secondly, by placing the Portuguese case in the context of party transformations 
identified by literature in recent decades, it aims to explore through an in-depth empirical 
                                                          
10 The central level is understood as the national party leadership and the party executive. Throughout the thesis 
the expressions ‘central party/peripheral structures’ and ‘national party/territorial party structures’ are used to 
indicate the same concept.   
11 Moreover, due to the expansion of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) some scholars 
envision the emergence of ‘cyber-parties’ structured on digital platforms, and the substitution of  territorially-
based model of party organisation structured on local ‘branches’ and ‘associations’ (Margetts, 2006). 
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analysis whether and to what extent this case is representative of the processes of changes 
that affect power distribution within parties in contemporary representative democracies. 
 
2.1 The peripheral party structures: an uncharted territory 
This section discusses the relevance of the analysis in light of the existing works on the 
theme and presents the research questions that drive the study. In the Portuguese case, the 
territorial apparatus of the party organisation is an under-researched topic. Party research 
has mainly focused on the national level, such as the party leadership and the national bodies 
(e.g. Lobo, 2003, 2005a; Lisi, 2011, 2015a), the governmentalisation of the party executive 
(e.g. Lobo, 2005b), as well as parliamentary elites (e.g. Freire, 2001; Belchior, 2008; Freire 
and Viegas, 2015). As for the party organisation on the ground, systematic studies have 
explored key dimensions, such as the longitudinal evolution of the membership figures (e.g. 
Bosco and Morlino, 2006; Correia, 2017; Fazendeiro, 2017), and the opinion structure of 
delegates and members (e.g. Stock and Rosa, 1985; Jalali and Lobo, 2007; Lisi, 2015b; Lisi 
and Espírito-Santo, 2017). To be fair, the territorial party structures, at the district and local 
level, have been addressed in relation to specific dimensions, namely party models (Lopes, 
2002), candidate selection (e.g. Freire, 2003; Teixeira, 2009; Freire and Teixeira 2011), local 
power (e.g. Almeida, 2008; Teles, 2012; Tavares et al., 2015), as well as patterns of party 
patronage (e.g. Jalali and Lisi, 2009). 
In the case of new democracies, like Portugal, the scant attention paid to the territorial 
organisation may be explained due to the perception of the irrelevance of this component in 
parties characterised since their formative years by large availability of public funding, and 
power concentration in party leadership and national executives (Biezen, 2003: 167). 
 As the new-institutionalist approach contends, the main features of party 
organisational development in new democracies result from the interplay of environmental 
and institutional factors with the strategic choices and behaviours of party elites (Biezen, 
2003). As such, party elites held few incentives to invest in the territorial structure and, more 
generally, in the organisational penetration on the ground. Hence, they privileged a strategy 
based on the resources provided by the access to power (e.g. patronage, appointments), and 
the clientelist networks, for building societal connections and setting their organisational 
presence at the territorial level (Morlino, 1998; Kopecký and Mair, 2007, 2011). Yet, it is 
precisely for this reason that it is important to study the territorial organization of parties in 
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third wave democracies, for understanding the intra-party dynamics and party functioning 
on the ground (and in local power) in absence of a strong organisation.  
 
On 25 April 1974, at the outbreak of the “Carnation Revolution” that paved the way 
for the Portuguese transition to democracy and inaugurated the “third wave of 
democratisation” (Huntington, 1991), only the Portuguese Communist Party (Partido 
Comunista Português – PCP), held a mass-based organisation, built clandestinely during the 
dictatorship. By contrast, the Socialist Party (Partido Socialista – PS) had been founded only 
one year before, in 1973, while the Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Democrata – 
PSD) and the Democratic and Social Centre (Centro Democrático-Social – CDS), were 
formed from scratch immediately after the revolution (Stock, 1985; Lopes and Freire, 
2002).12 The revolutionary context and the political radicalism of 1974-1975 (Schmitter, 
1999; Cerezales, 2003), made the definition of the political regime the main cleavage of 
party competition, with on the one hand, the PS, PSD and CDS supporting the liberal 
democracy and, on the other, the PCP and minor groups of extreme-left promoting the 
construction of a socialist regime (Jalali, 2007). Hence, building a broader social support 
was more effective than establishing deep-rooted connections with specific groups or 
classes. The new parties preferred a “catch-all” strategy, based on loose and vague 
ideological stances, and the development of a flexible and electorally more efficient 
organisational structure (Kirchheimer, 1966; Jalali, 2007). Furthermore, the formation in a 
context of wide public funding availability and mass-media diffusion, coupled with a 
political culture of distrust and apathy (Pridham, 1990; Bacalhau, 1994), removed the party 
elites’ incentives in building strong societal linkages and reinforced tendencies towards 
centralisation, leadership prominence and personalism (Lobo, 2000; Biezen, 2003: 41).  
As Jalali (2007: 129) observes in the Portuguese case, national and local power 
worked as a transmission belt compensating the weakness of parties’ societal roots and 
enhancing their organisational structure. The parties’ entrenchment in local power served to 
shore up the (weak) party organisation and build support and consensus on the ground (Jalali 
and Lisi, 2009). As such, the cartelisation features and dynamics that connotate the main 
Portuguese governing parties (de Sousa, 2004; Lopes, 2004: 130; Jalali, 2007; Magone, 
2007; Lisi, 2015a) are also present at the local level (Jalali, 2014).  
                                                          
12 Hereafter referred to as PCP, PS, PSD and CDS. The PPD-PSD was officially registered after the formation 
of the first provisional government, and party founders’ participation to the government.  
 33 
 
 
2.1.2 What we know about parties’ territorial organisation?  
 
In the Portuguese case party literature has initially described the centre-periphery relations 
as hierarchically-based (Bruneau and MacLeod, 1986; Bruneau, 1997). Accordingly, the 
centre exercises a tight control over the peripheral structures and the intra-party dynamics 
more in general. Several factors support this assessment, namely the unitary structure of the 
state encouraging party centralisation (Duverger, 1954), the electoral system based on 
proportional representation and closed lists, the party financing regime, the centralisation of 
key party decisions, and the prominence of the leadership, especially when it is strongly 
personalised (Teixeira, 2009: 319-320). 13 
However, more recent studies on party change suggest that the relation between the 
national party and the territorial structures is not linear and variations to the hierarchical 
paradigm emerge, especially in the case of the main governing parties, the PS and the PSD 
(Bosco and Morlino, 2006; Jalali, 2006, 2007; Lisi, 2009). Jalali (2007) contends that the 
relation between levels is based on an informal pact of mutual autonomy and division of 
competences, resembling the stratarchical equilibrium (Katz and Mair, 1995; Carty, 2004). 
As such, «local leaders provide organizations entrenched in local power (or in a part of it) 
and their mobilization to the national leadership in change of non-interference in their 
provincial interests» (Jalali, 2007: 169). In return, the leadership holds free rein in party’s 
national policies and strategic choices. The entrenchment of the territorial structures in the 
local power and the ascendancy of local leaders to the party’s national bodies encouraged 
the autonomy held by the periphery in local issues. This balance would be disrupted when 
local interests are threatened by measures defended or implemented by the national level, 
causing intra-party conflicts (idem). 
The degree of autonomy and power retained by some local politicians and structures 
in local affairs suggests that the party periphery manages to control resources of the external 
environment, i.e. local power, as well organisational resources, i.e. members and allocation 
of party posts (Ruivo, 1993; Lopes, 2005). Lopes (2005: 367) observes the presence of 
“structural incoherency” within the PS, with some territorial structures capable to obtain 
resources from the environment to be used as an exchange resource in intra-party dynamics 
and explains this feature with the low degree of party institutionalisation (Panebianco, 1982). 
                                                          
13 As Teixeira highlights the increase in public funding vis-à-vis private contributions enhances national party’s 
dominance due to its control over the subsidies resources allocated to parties by the state. 
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Hence, the different political weight of the structures may also affect the national-local 
balance of power (Teixeira, 2009: 335). However, scholars also observe that the practices 
and the reforms undertaken by the PS in the early 2000s (e.g. organisational measures and 
more space to independents) were aimed at counteracting this phenomenon, by reducing the 
influence capacity of the sub-national units (Lopes, 2005). 
Analysing the PS, Lisi (2009) argues that since the end of the 1980s organisational 
reforms have enhanced the powers of the party subunits: the party federations started to play 
an important role in candidate selection and electoral mobilisation, and the local structures 
in the coordination of the local politics, suggesting a process of autonomisation. This process 
would have been improved and consolidated during the subsequent phase in government, in 
the second half of the 1990s (Lisi, 2009: 294-300). Central efforts to counteract the process 
seemed to emerge during the brief time in opposition (Lisi, 2009). For this scholar, in the 
case of the PS this trend seems to indicate the proximity to the stratarchical configuration 
described by Carty (2004), at least during the long period in government experienced by the 
party (1995-2001). 
 Likewise, Jalali (2006) argues that the establishment of reciprocal spheres of 
autonomy between the national and local elites, i.e. ‘stratarchy’, characterises the PSD, 
becoming this arrangement more apparent when the party shifted to the opposition after the 
long incumbency, first in coalition and then alone, only few years after party formation. For 
Jalali, in the case of the PSD, path dependency seems to play an important role in this 
configuration, with the tendency towards the autonomy of the periphery following from the 
specificities of the party origin. Thus, party features interact with more conjunctural factors 
(i.e. weak and non-charismatic leadership, opposition status) making it more difficult the 
aggregation of consensus and enhancing the position of the peripheral structures vis-à-vis 
the national leadership (Lopes 2002: 63; Jalali, 2006).  
 
These studies highlight two issues. Firstly, they suggest that centre-periphery 
relations are complex and cannot be assessed only resorting to the assumption of static and 
hierarchically-based relations. Accordingly, it is important to pay attention to both long-term 
and short-term factors and external and internal factors, i.e. party and institutional features, 
government-opposition status and party leadership stability (with the latter often being 
influenced by the former). In fact, the vulnerability that is likely to characterise leaders of 
state-dependent parties, and that constrain their capacity to build internal consensus, in the 
case of parties in new democracies is fuelled by the lack of strong loyalties and tendency 
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towards personalistic factionalism. It is important to understand the role of the territorial 
organisation in sustaining the leader power base, in consolidating internal power and 
legitimacy, or in being a source of internal challenges and pressures. This also matters since, 
as Lisi (2015a) maintains, internal pressures and power struggles are an important yet 
overlooked factor for explaining party change (or inertia) in the Portuguese case, and in new 
democracies more in general. The second issue regards the capacity of sub-national leaders 
to control, with large degree of autonomy from the centre, the resources derived from their 
access to local power and from the party organisation at local level (e.g. membership, party 
posts) (Bosco and Morlino, 2006: 19; Jalali, 2007: 166; Lisi, 2006, 2011: 236). This feature 
may foster the emergency of relations based around personalist and individual linkages vis-
à-vis impersonal and organisational ties.  
The studies examined in this section deal with the territorial organisation mainly in 
terms of centre-periphery relations. Our purpose is broader: we argue that it is important to 
narrow the focus and to also look at the dynamics, structures, resources, and actors related 
with the territorial organisation. This perspective would allow us to explore to what extent 
the party structures are affected and reproduce at the territorial level the trends of 
organisational transformation identified by scholars and what factors explain the internal 
balance of power.  
 
Hence, building on the above discussion, this analysis seeks to respond to the following 
research questions: 
RQ1. To what extent has the relationship between the national and the local level evolved 
towards a stratarchical configuration? 
RQ2. What factors explain the internal balance of power between these party components 
in the PS and the PSD? 
RQ3. To what extent has the personalisation of Portuguese parties emerged also at the 
territorial level? 
RQ4.  To what extent has the democratisation of Portuguese parties emerged also at the 
territorial level? 
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2.2 The pathway of the empirical research 
In this section we set out the operationalisation of the empirical research and define the case 
selection, the hypotheses, the collected data and the methods applied in order to respond to 
the research questions that drive the thesis. 
2.2.1 Case selection  
We have selected the two main Portuguese parties, the PS and PSD. Different reasons drove 
the choice for these parties. Firstly, the PS and the PSD are the only two parties displaying 
a high degree of ‘nationalisation’, they have a wide-national organisational coverage and an 
institutional presence at local level (Martins, 2004; Freire, 2005; Silva, 2005; Jalali, 2007; 
Lisi, 2011). Secondly, they share elements associated to the main trends of transformation 
identified by literature, namely cartelisation and personalisation tendencies. Scholars have 
shown that they extensively resort to public funding (Biezen, 2000b; de Sousa, 2004; 
Martins, 2005); the party leader occupies a prominent position and is increasingly relevant 
in influencing voting behavior (Lobo, 2005a, 2006; Lobo and Silva, 2018). The third reason 
lies in the salience of party’s institutional position and the relevance for the intra-party 
relations to be in or outside office (Lobo, 2005b; Lisi, 2006; 2015a). Both the PS and PSD 
are governing parties therefore they are allegedly pressured by similar external factors. 
Finally, they have undertaken democratisation reforms (the most important being the direct 
election of the leader by ordinary members) and introduced mechanisms to improve the 
participation of independents in intra-party activities (Lisi, 2010a; 2015a; Lisi and Freire, 
2014; Sanches and Razzuoli, 2017).  
On the other hand, the PS and PSD display important differences. Firstly, the nature 
of party formation is characterised by penetration from the centre and top-down direction in 
the case of the PS, vis-à-vis the more locally-based formation in the case of the PSD 
(Panebianco, 1982; Corkill, 1995: 75; Frain, 1997; Lopes, 2004; Stock, 2005; Jalali, 2007). 
In the latter case, in fact, the co-optation of local elites has been carried out without control 
from the centre, fostered the formation of factions around personalities and local and 
regional notables (Frain, 1997: 88). Thus, the PSD’s origin seems more a sort of hybrid 
between a process of penetration and one of diffusion. Then, in terms of ideological 
spectrum: the PS is a centre-left party while the PSD is a centre-right party. Finally, these 
two parties present different degrees of decentralisation-centralisation in key functions, such 
as candidate selection, with the PSD displaying a higher degree of decentralisation (Freire, 
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2003; Teixeira, 2009). In light of these differences, the comparison of the PS and PSD may 
contribute to illustrate the role of different party features in shaping intra-party relations.  
The choice of analysing parties in a single country allows us to control for the state 
structure as an institutional factor influencing party’s internal articulation and centre-
periphery relations (Duverger, 1954; Panebianco, 1982; Bolleyer, 2012). We have decided 
to exclude from the analysis the party structures in the autonomous regions of Madeira and 
Azores’ archipelagos, due to their special status within the organisation (e.g. representation 
in the party national bodies), and the different structure of political competition (i.e. regional 
government) the parties face in those contexts.  
 
2.2.2 Hypotheses and operationalisation  
Following the above discussion and with the purpose of responding to the research questions, 
this section specifies the hypotheses of investigation and the operationsalisation of the 
empirical research. We first test the stratarchy argument which posits the evolution towards 
mutual autonomy between the national and the local levels in cartel parties (Katz and Mair, 
1995). Following this argument: 
1) We expect to find an increasing degree of reciprocal autonomy between the national and 
the local level in both the PS and the PSD over time. 
We analyse this argument through a dynamic perspective, in terms of a process that may 
present variations over time and space, not as a static organisational configuration.  
This perspective stems from the conception of hierarchy and stratarchy as a continuum rather 
than two opposite internal configurations (Carty, 2004; Bolleyer, 2012; Cross, 2016).  
More precisely, this approach lies in the salience of party institutional position in affecting 
internal dynamics and leader’s power in electoralist parties. Literature suggests that being in 
government and in opposition changes the leverage of national leadership. 
While incumbency brings stability, opposition increases pressures from within and affects 
the leader’s capacity to build internal consensus. Accordingly, this factor shapes intra-party 
dynamics and the need of the leadership to reinforce the cohesion and the control over the 
party organisation. As Bolleyer (2009: 17) puts it: «In times of opposition the relationship 
between the leadership and the party as organisation changes since the infrastructure 
becomes a core source of control». This implies the adoption of measures that ensure control, 
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included the interference in local processes. By contrast, being in government, especially for 
long periods, allows the national leadership to neglect the organisation. Therefore:  
2) Stratarchical features (reciprocal autonomy) characterise the relations between the 
national and the territorial levels when the party is incumbent, while attempts to reinforce 
hierarchical control are expected under opposition status.  
This expectation is based on the assumption that the two parties would converge, regardless 
of party characteristics and structural factors, since they are pressured by the same conditions 
and by the different resources provided by the institutional position.  
However, a counter-argument emerges in the role of long-term factors and party 
characteristics in affecting party organisational modalities and the propensity of parties to 
change their internal configuration (Duverger, 1954; Panebianco, 1982). As such, genetic 
origin may exercise path dependency effects on the stratarchical/hierarchical continuum 
(Bolleyer, 2012). 
Hence, our expectation is that:  
3) Parties formed by a top-down process tend to maintain hierarchical features, whereas a 
decentralised origin fosters local autonomy and resistance to hierarchical attempts.  
To test these hypotheses, we examine the patterns of relation from a diachronic perspective. 
From 1974 onwards, the PS and PSD have undergone different phases, alternating periods 
in opposition and in government, and have been led by different leaders with distinct 
leadership styles and longevity in office. Hence, this perspective enables us to observe 
whether variations in patterns of power relations and internal functioning do emerge. We 
believe that the rationale behind a shift towards a hierarchical direction lies in the need (and 
pressure) of the leadership to generate support and reinforce internal cohesion outside office.  
Building on the analysis developed by Bolleyer (2009: 9), we provide a longitudinal account 
of the dynamics that have characterised the national leadership and the territorial structures, 
focusing on the cycles of reform and reform attempts. We examine whether efforts of the 
centre to strengthen the control over the periphery emerged or are intensified in opposition, 
i.e. in absence of the resources ensured by the occupation of power.   
To this aim, we seek to identify the adoption of «intra-organizational means of control» 
(ibid.), which comprise a set of measures indicating (1) the attempt of the national leadership 
to tighten the control over the territorial structures and their activities. In practice, we try to 
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detect the national intervention in areas of competences of the local structures. Thus, we 
look especially at the cycles of reforms and reforms attempts that regard the membership 
affiliation and members’ fees, the organisational boundaries and the candidate selection 
process at national and local level. The indicators examined regard the 
centralising/tightening of control of membership recruitment and fees’ payment; the revision 
of membership procedures (rights/duties) and the rules that govern the territorial 
organisation; the update of the membership registers; the reform of candidate selection (CS) 
rules, the interference in the selection processes; efforts to enhance the compliance with 
rules. Similarly, we pay attention to measures indicating (2) the efforts to establish a more 
integrated and bounded internal organisation vis-à-vis the looser ties embedded in the 
stratarchical configuration, and to revitalise the organisation and enhance internal cohesion 
by appealing to members. Potential indicators of this strategy are detected in measures aimed 
at reinforcing the “infrastructure” (e.g. creation of new posts, staff renewal) and establishing 
collective and participative incentives (ibid.). This analysis is carried out in chapter 4 of the 
thesis.  
In Chapter 5 we shift from the diachronic-dynamic approach to a synchronic-static 
one. Our units of analysis are the territorial structures, namely the middle-level echelon, i.e. 
the nineteen PS federations and the nineteen PSD district-structures. We provide a 
descriptive analysis of their organisation, resources and competences. These dimensions 
have been investigated in studies that focused on the regional party organisations and the 
relation with the party at the national level (e.g. Fabre, 2010; Ignazi and Pizzimenti, 2014; 
Calossi and Pizzimenti, 2015). The analysis carried out in this chapter serves to frame the  
territorial organisation of the two parties and to introduce the following steps of the analysis. 
The examination of these dimensions, based on the formal rules, is complemented with the 
information collected through the elite interviews about unwritten practices and actual 
procedures of intra-party functioning.  
Thus, we look at the processes of party transformation towards personalisation and 
democratisation experienced by parties, hypothesising that they are reproduced at the local 
level. Hence, our fourth hypothesis states that: 
4) Territorial party structures have experienced a growing personalisation in both the PS 
and the PSD over time. 
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To test this hypothesis, we further narrow the analysis by focusing on the territorial 
structures’ leaders, the federation presidents (PS) and the district presidents (PSD). The 
leaders of this layer, placed at the intersection of the national and local levels, control the 
bureaucratic organisation and play a key role in the chain of command and coordination that 
links the national party to the party on the ground (van Houten, 2009; Allern and Saglie, 
2012; Aarebrot and Saglie, 2013). These actors are in charge of representing and 
communicating the instances of the party’s backbone to the highest levels and ensuring to 
the party leader the mobilisation of the party machine. Moreover, they are involved in key 
functions, namely the MPs candidate selection, the coordination of the local elections’ 
campaign and the relations with the party in local power. Finally, when their role overlaps 
with national or local public offices, they hold additional resources and political capital.  
In the second half of the 1990s, both the PS and the PSD changed the selection method of 
these sub-national leaders, which had been based until then on the “assembly-based” election 
shifting to the direct election by members.14 This measure withdrew the power from the 
assembly bodies in favour of ordinary members.  
The empirical analysis focuses on the internal elections for the selection of these 
actors, held between 2003 and 2017, and the dynamics of the disputes in terms of (1) process 
and (2) outcome. While there is a lot of research on the national leadership selection (e.g. 
Lisi, 2010; 2015a; Lisi and Freire, 2014), to our best knowledge these disputes have not been 
systematically analysed in the Portuguese case. The analysis is based on the most recent 
studies on party leadership selection (e.g. Cross and Blais, 2012; Pilet and Cross, 2014; Cross 
and Pilet, 2016; Kenig, Rahat and Tuttnauer, 2016). It focuses on the dimensions of (1) 
competition and competitiveness, measured in terms of number of candidates and margins 
of victory between the top two finishers, (2) turnover rates, and (3) characteristics of the 
winners (i.e. overlap with elective public offices). Due to the lack of availability of data, it 
is not possible to carry out a systematic analysis of the participation rates. Still, we are able 
to make some observations on the general trends. 
Through this analysis we seek to explore different aspects: to what extent the 
selections are disputed, to what extent elites’ circulation takes place, whether the elected 
leaders also occupy position in public offices at different levels, whether significant 
differences within and between the PS and the PSD can be detected. Finally, we see whether, 
                                                          
14 The first direct elections have been held in 1997 in the PSD and in 1998 in the PS. 
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if any, relation can be established with the party institutional status and/or the party 
leadership (in)stability.  
We contend that the analysis of these dynamics at the territorial level matters for 
different reasons. The extent of party’s renewal, or its absence, in the leading bodies may be 
an indicator of a personalised and leader-oriented control of the party organisation at the 
territorial level. In particular, due to the district-structures’ role in selecting candidates for 
national and local public offices, the renewal, or the lack of thereof, has direct implications 
on the institutional representation. More in general, rotation should provide new stimulus 
and different perspectives, thus enhancing parties’ capacity to adapt and respond to changing 
instances of society. Likewise, competitiveness, or the lack of thereof, reveals the autonomy 
of the territorial elites in controlling the organisation on the ground. Moreover, it is directly 
related to members’ participation to party life, that is whether members are called to rubber-
stamp the election of a single-candidate or are presented with alternative candidacies (and 
thus alternative proposals). The analysis of the PS and the PSD is carried out in chapter 6 
and chapter 7 respectively. 
The last hypothesis regards the democratisation processes involving the territorial structures, 
stating that:  
5) Territorial party structures have experienced a growing democratisation in both the PS 
and the PSD over time. 
This expectation is examined by considering the reforms carried out by the party at the 
national level that regard members’ involvement in intra-party processes. It has been 
explored in the longitudinal chapter, as well as in chapter 6 and 7. More in general, we still 
know little about the most recent intra-party democracy (IPD) reforms in both parties, to 
what extent the PS and PSD are undertaking different trajectories. Therefore, beyond the 
longitudinal analysis and the examination of intra-party elections, we also look at the most 
recent reforms (and reform attempts) of IPD experienced since 2010s in both parties to see 
to what extent the territorial structures are affected by these processes. In particular, the 
democratisation measures experimented by the PS in the recent years (2013-2015) provide 
the opportunity to observe and discuss the territorial structures’ involvement. Chapter 8 
examines the closed primaries that took place in 2013 for selecting the PS mayoral 
candidates, and the unprecedented open primaries for selecting the prime ministerial 
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candidate, held in 2014. As for the PSD, the analysis focuses on the (failed) attempts of 
innovation and the territorial leaders’ perception towards this type of reforms.  
2.2.3 Data and methods 
Different types of data from primary and secondary sources have been collected. The 
triangulation of such data enables us to explore and compare the selected parties in a 
comprehensive way using qualitative and quantitative methods. 
 Firstly, an important source of data derives from the unique opportunity to participate to the 
data collection for the “Political Party Database” (PPDB). The PPDB is an international 
collaborative project that involves several scholars from different countries (Poguntke, 
Scarrow, Webb et al., 2016).15 From 2011 onwards, the project surveyed 122 party 
organisations across 19 parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies. Drawing on Katz 
and Mair’s Party Organisation Database (1992), the PPDB has started to collect a remarkable 
amount of information on parties’ formal rules and empirical data in key organisational 
dimensions, namely resources, structures and internal decision-making processes. As such, 
it is one of the most important projects within the renewed academic interest in party 
organisation (Borz and Janda, 2018). The data gathered in the context of the project are used 
in chapter 3 as starting point of the analysis in order to frame the Portuguese case in 
comparative perspective and to present the main organisational features of the PS and the 
PSD resorting to original data.   
Secondly, party statutes and regulations constitute the principal source of data in 
order to assess the formal allocation of competences and power distribution. Besides, this 
type of resource provides insights «into a party’s normative vision of its organisation and 
function» (Gauja and Smith: 2012: 757) and «into its internal conception of organisational 
power, authority and legitimacy» (Katz and Mair, 1992: 7). As for the PS, we resort to the 
statutes approved in 2015. However, at the time of the writing the PS was discussing the 
statutory revision’s proposals. Whenever possible the thesis makes references to the 
novelties introduced by the latest statutes (2018). As for the PSD, we rely on the most recent 
version of the statutes (2012), although also this party is debating their revision. The statutes 
                                                          
15 The project’s website is https://www.politicalpartydb.org/. In Portugal the PPDB is coordinated by Dr. 
Marina Costa Lobo. The 1 round of data collection concerned the following Portuguese parliamentary parties: 
the Democratic and Social Centre–People’s Party (Centro Democrático Social–Partido Popular – CDS-PP), 
the Ecologist Party “The Greens” (Partido Ecologista Os Verdes – PEV), the Left Bloc (Bloco de Esquerda – 
BE), the Portuguese Communist Party (Partido Comunista Português – PCP), the Socialist Party (Partido 
Socialista – PS), the Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Democrata – PSD). 
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are used to evaluate the changes from a diachronic perspective in both parties. However, 
following Panebianco (1982: 82) on the relevance of controlling the uncertainty zones, we 
know that the application of the formal rules may be tacitly unobserved or manipulated by 
the dominant coalition. As such, party constitutions are not more than «a point of departure 
for the organisational analysis of a political party» (ibid.).16 Therefore, this source is 
complemented with information collected from other sources, especially elite interviews, 
articles from the press and from an in-depth examination of secondary literature. Party 
constitutions have been complemented with other official documents, namely congressional 
motions and regulation of intra-party elections. For the oldest periods party documents 
digitalised by the ‘Fundação Mário Soares’, the ‘Biblioteca e Arquivo de José Pacheco 
Pereira’, and the ‘Instituto Francisco Sá Carneiro’ have been retrieved.17  
Finally, several editions of party press published between 1974 and the end of the 1990s 
have been examined at the ‘Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal’.18 
A third source of original data is made up of a set of thirteen face-to-face semi-
structured interviews conducted, between July 2013 and November 2016, with the presidents 
of the PS federations and PSD district-structures, and with members of the national bodies 
in office. Variation in the structures’ geographical distribution and membership size has been 
the main criterium guiding the selection of the actors to be interviewed. The duration varies 
from a minimum of 25 minutes to a maximum of 1 hour and 30 minutes. The elite 
interviewing was needed to collect data on the internal dynamics, namely regarding the 
relations with the party at the national level, the actual practices in decision-making 
processes, and the perception about the intra-party democracy reforms. Beyond information 
collection, elite interviewing allowed us to evaluate discrepancies with the formal rules set 
in party statutes and regulations. In the Portuguese case, in fact, informal rules and practices 
play a significant role in internal dynamics (Lisi, 2011). The content of the interviews is 
presented in its English translation. The list of the interviewees is presented in Annex 1. 
Last but not least, we collected and built an original dataset of intra-party elections 
for the leadership of the nineteen PS federations and the nineteen PSD district-level 
structures. We have built this dataset gathering information on 133 internal elections in the 
case of the PS and 133 in the case of the PSD, held between 2003 and 2017. The large 
                                                          
16 Panebianco identifies six “uncertainty zones”: competence, communication, relation with the environment, 
formal rules, financing, recruitment (1982: 79-85).  
17 1) casacomum.org; 2) ephemerajpp.com; 3) institutosacarneiro.pt 
18 In particular, the PSD’s official journal, i.e. “Povo Livre”. 
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number of cases enabled us to analyse the elections through a quantitative approach. 
Building the dataset has been the most time-consuming part of the data collection phase. It 
has been hard to collect complete and consistent information on this internal process, due to 
the scarce publicity about intra-party elections at this level of party organisation. 
Unfortunately, the fragmented and inconsistent information gathered has hindered the 
analysis of the earlier contests, those held in 1998 and 2000 in the case of the PS, and those 
held between 1997 and 2003/2004 in the case of the PSD. To collect the data, we have drawn 
upon different types of sources, namely: official party press, i.e. Acção Socialista (PS), and 
Povo Livre (PSD), the party websites, and the territorial structures’ websites.19 Beyond party 
sources, we have extensively examined the main national and local newspapers. This latter 
source has been particularly crucial for understanding the dynamics behind intra-party 
elections (e.g. public conflicts). Finally, our ambition is to keep the database regularly 
updated and to provide a source of data to be used by scholars in other analyses applying 
different approaches and methods.  
                                                          
19 Note that in several cases the party structures do not have websites, or they are either inactive or out-of-date.  
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Chapter III 
Contemporary party organisations: Portugal in comparative perspective 
 
Introduction  
This chapter presents an overview of parties’ organisational features building on the Political 
Party Database (PPDB) and on the recent analyses using the data collected by the project 
(Poguntke, Scarrow, Webb, et al., 2016). The chapter provides insights on the trends of party 
transformation discussed in Chapter 1 and places the Portuguese case, and namely the PS 
and the PSD, in comparative perspective.  
To study party organisation and party change, the PPDB brings forward an approach 
based on “organisational dimensions”, namely structures, resources, and representative 
strategies, questioning the approaches based on party typologies. Accordingly, 
contemporary parties present too much variation to be fully assessed by single party types, 
limiting the understanding of the role played by party characteristics and national 
contingencies in shaping organisational choices and strategies (Scarrow and Webb, 2017: 
15). While parties show substantial similarity regarding the organisational structure, being 
the wide majority of them based on the enrolment of dues-paying members, holding a 
congress or a convention, an executive body, and a leadership, there are significant cross-
national variations in the extent of party resources, such as money, members and staff 
(Poguntke, Scarrow, Webb, et al., 2016). The aforementioned organisational dimensions 
may be singled out in several sub-dimensions measured through indexes built with the 
different variables belonging to the different dimensions.20 As such, this approach enables 
the examination and comparison of empirical variations, overcoming the limits of party 
typologies. However, it is worth noting that there are some parties that more than others 
share features associated to a specific party type and that may be somewhat clustered 
accordingly. This is exactly the case of the PS and the PSD which appear to fit rather well 
under the cartel party typology.21 
                                                          
20 Examples of sub-dimensions are: 1) financial strength-weakness; 2) resource diversification-concentration; 
3) state autonomy-dependence; 4) bureaucratic strength-weakness; 5) volunteer strength-weakness; 6) 
leadership autonomy-restriction; 7) centralisation-localisation; 8) coordination-entropy; 9) territorial 
concentration-dispersion. (Poguntke, Scarrow, Webb, et al., 2016).   
21 However, we argue that some variables could have been overestimated and need for a little recalibration.  
The other (cartel) parties are the Portuguese CDS; the Italian PD, the Spanish PSOE, the Belgian ‘Reform 
Movement’, the ‘Democrat Humanist Centre’, the ‘Flemish Interest’ and the Irish ‘Labour’, i.e.  9 out of 81 
parties with valid data and 11%. (Webb, Poguntke, and Scarrow, 2017: 310-315).  
 46 
 
Relying on the approach developed by the project, this chapter examines in comparative 
perspective the case of the PS and the PSD. The PPDB data illustrates important aspects of 
the nature of these parties and thus serves as a starting point for the analysis carried out in 
this thesis.  
 
3.1 Organisational resources: money and members 
  
This section presents in broad outline the resource dimension by focusing on “financial 
resources” and “membership”. Due to data unavailability for the Portuguese case it has not 
been possible to include in the analysis the third type of resources, i.e. the party staff. 
3.1.2 Financial resources  
Parties may resort to different sources of funding, members’ fees and individual donations, 
business contribution and public funding. Among the different types of donors, the state has 
assumed in recent decades a dominant role in political funding (e.g. Pierre et al. 2000; 
Scarrow, 2006; Nassmacher, 2003). Observing this change scholars have posited the 
transformation of parties in increasingly state-dependent organisations (e.g. Katz and Mair, 
1995; Biezen and Kopecký, 2007). In this section, we examine to what extent the 
aforementioned sources contribute to parties’ income in the different PPDB countries, and 
how Portuguese parties perform comparatively. We then consider how parties spend their 
financial resources, namely by looking at the data on electoral expenses for the calendar year 
(2011).   
Party income  
Measuring the income of 113 parties in 2011 (calendar year), the PPDB data confirms 
the relevance of the state as source of financing, with an average of 57,5% of the income 
made up of state subsidies (table 3.1). In line with earlier findings (Biezen, 2003), the data 
shows that in new democracies the state plays a major role, i.e. on average 65% of party 
income originates from this source (Biezen and Kopecký, 2017). In old democracies the state 
contributes for a lower value, 54.7%, which however represents more than half of the total 
income, thus signalling the relevance of this source also in these polities. 
The PPDB data confirms Portuguese parties’ high state dependence: on average 74% of party 
income comes from public funding, being this value higher than new democracies’ average. 
Except for the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), which seems still capable to draw most 
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of its income from societal revenues, the share of state subsidies for the other five parties 
surveyed is comprised between 66% and 93%, whereas members’ dues and individual 
contributions are a marginal share of party income.  
 
Table 3.1 Party income, PS and PSD compared, 2011 
 
 
Party income 
National head 
offices 
(118) 
Party income 
per GDP 
(billion euros) 
 (118) 
Party income 
per registered 
voter  
(111) 
Party income 
from state 
subsidies % 
(113) 
PPDB   14,177,811 21,069 0,94 57.5 
Portugal (6) 7,102,583 41,164 0,74 74.17 
PSD 14,994,335 - 1,56 66 
PS 11,492,326 - 1.20 80 
Source: own elaboration based on PPDB (Round 1, 2011) and Poguntke, Scarrow, Webb et al., (2016: 664). 
Figures in parentheses refer to the number of parties. Note: our mean value for the party income per registered 
voter in Portugal is higher than that calculated by the authors. (0.35). Number of registered voters in Portugal: 
9.624.354 (2011, IDEA). 
 
Considering the aggregate values of party income and the value per registered voter in 
comparative perspective, Portuguese parties are not among the wealthiest (Poguntke, 
Scarrow, Webb, et al., 2016). For instance, the average income of Spanish parties is 
considerably higher. Nonetheless, Portuguese parties are among the wealthiest relative to the 
size of the national economy (i.e. the GDP), only behind the Czech and Spanish parties.  
Shifting to the party-level analysis, it emerges that 80% of the PS income in 2011 
came from the state, whereas this value totals 66% for the PSD. Although the PSD fits below 
the average, it is reasonable to assume that the PSD’s share of public funding should have 
grown after 2011, due to the direct relation of state subsidies with the electoral results and 
the share of votes. As for the relation of the income with the size of the electorate, the PS 
and the PSD present values considerably higher in comparison to the PPDB average. The PS 
and PSD’s incomes are also significantly higher than the national average. On these two 
indicators, the two parties are in line with the average values of their ideological families, 
the Social Democrats (PS) and the Conservatives (PSD), which reflects the systemic 
dominance of these party families in European party systems to date (Webb and Keith, 2017: 
38).  
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Electoral spending  
Round 1 of PPDB data collection has also gathered information on parties’ electoral 
spending. As table 3.2. shows,  in comparison, Portugal presents low values of electoral 
spending both in absolute terms and in relation to the size of the electorate. Portugal scores 
the lowest figure of spending per voter (0,09), positioning itself at the bottom of the PPDB 
listed countries.22 On the other hand, with reference to  the size of the national economy, 
campaign spending per GDP is above the PPDB average.  
 
Table 3.2 Campaign expenditure, PS and PSD compared, 2011 
 
 
Average total 
spending 
 
 Spending per 
GDP  
(billion euros) 
Spending per 
registered voter 
PPDB (88) 5,674,918 8,471 0,35 
Portugal (6)  1,757,778 10,188 0,09 
PSD 3,828,382 - 0,39 
PS 4,132,885 - 0,43 
Source: PPDB (Round 1, 2011) and Webb and Keith (2017: 39). Own calculation for the PS and the PSD 
spending per voter. Figures in parentheses refer to the number of parties. Number of registered voters in 
Portugal: 9.624.354 (2011, IDEA). 
 
 
As for the PS and the PSD, campaign expenditures are significantly higher than the country 
average, both in absolute terms and per voter, reflecting the size of the two main governing 
parties. Nevertheless, it appears that compared to the PSD, the PS has allocated a larger share 
of income in electoral campaigning. However, we find that the PS and the PSD have spent 
only a moderate share of their income on campaigning. This finding is in line with Webb 
and Keith’s findings for the overall PPDB countries and may be explained due to the limits 
on electoral spending set by the financing regimes. At the same time, these values indicate 
that parties still devote an important part of their income in non-electoral expenses (e.g. party 
staff, infrastructures…) (Webb and Keith, 2017: 39). 
                                                          
22 Four countries are missing: Austria, Belgium, France and Sweden.  
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In conclusion, both the nature and low diversification of Portuguese parties’ financial 
resources (and of the PS and PSD in particular) confirm their high state dependence and 
financial concentration in one major donor.  
In Portugal public funding has been institutionalised relatively early (1977), thus 
enabling the recently formed parties to draw financial resources from the state since the very 
beginning (Biezen, 2000). Over time, political financing reforms have reduced and then 
abolished corporate financing and have limited private donations (de Sousa, 2004; Martins, 
2011). Cyclic reforms aimed at offsetting the effects of electoral abstentionism on parties’ 
pockets have encouraged the growth of state subsidies for parties’ routine activities and  
electoral campaigns (Martins, 2011). 23 The characteristics of the financing regime have thus 
concurred to the low diversification of the financial sources from which parties draw funding 
increasing the relevance of public funding. Moreover, the fact that subsidies’ allocation 
depends on the number of votes received represents an incentive for parties highly dependent 
on the state to adopt electoralist and vote-seeking strategies to the detriment of other 
functions and strategies. Clearly, cartel-behaviour may be detected, since the architects of 
the political financing reforms were the (ruling) parties themselves (de Sousa, 2004; Guedes, 
2006).  
For the analysis developed in this thesis, an important feature deals with way the 
resources are distributed across parties’ organisational echelons. This parameter concerns 
the degree of  “centralisation-localisation”  within parties and the financial autonomy held 
by the sub-units. Given the state subsidies’ relevance for party income compared to other 
sources, it is interesting to understand whether subnational structures directly receive state 
subsidies, i.e. whether they are highly dependent on central party’s financial supply or if they 
hold some degree of financial autonomy. This indicator reveals important aspects of power 
distribution within the party organisation, especially in contexts characterised by low 
financial diversification and low membership size, such as Portugal. The PPDB dataset 
provides information on the direction of the state subsidies and the receiver of funding, 
according to each country’s legal framework. Given that this is an aspect of the political 
financing regime, cross-national variations are expected.  
In nine countries of the PPDB dataset is the national party the exclusive receiver of the state 
subsidies, whereas in the other ten also subnational levels are entitled to receive public 
                                                          
23 In 2010, the Law on Party Financing established the reduction of 10% of the subsidies until the end of 2016.  
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funding. Together with Australia, France, Hungary, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands and Poland,  
Portugal fits in the former category, since state subsidies are directly assigned to the national 
party headquarters which decides on their distribution according to party rules.24  
Therefore, this characteristic of the regime financing affects lower levels’ autonomy, thus 
creating a significant asymmetry of power relations between the national (executive body) 
and the local units. We return on this issue in chapter 5, discussing party financing at local 
level. 
 
3.1.3 Members 
Like money, members are of one the most important organisational resource for 
parties. They define they primary nature of parties as membership-based organisations, and 
serve parties in multiple ways, they provide volunteer work, financial contribution, as well 
as symbolic resources as legitimacy (Scarrow, 1994). Moreover, members are a key resource 
in intra-party battles (ibid.). Yet, parties are increasingly in short supply of this resource, as 
extensively documented by the shrinking of membership figures over time (e.g. Mair and 
van Biezen, 2001; Scarrow and Gezgor, 2010; Biezen, Mair and Poguntke, 2012; Delwit, 
2011; Whiteley, 2011;  Kölln 2015; van Haute and Gauja, 2015). Perhaps this is the most 
apparent indicator of parties’ organisational transformation. As observed in chapter 1, this 
trend has been interpreted as an indicator of the erosion of party-society linkage and 
therefore of parties’ capacity to intermediate between the citizens and the state. Furthermore, 
cartel theorists have connected the decline in membership rate to the expansion of public 
financing and the reduced relevance of members as source of volunteers and financial donors 
(Katz and Mair, 1995; Biezen and Kopecký, 2014).  
PPDB data shows that at the aggregate level  members/electorate ratio (M/E) in the 
early 2010s is 3.45% confirming the low magnitude of party membership in contemporary 
parties (Poguntke, Scarrow, Webb, et al., 2016: 667; Webb and Keith, 2017: 33). Aggregate 
data shows that Portuguese parties stand below the PPDB average, displaying a M/E ratio of 
nearly 3%, which is lower than other South European countries, namely Italy and Spain, and 
only slightly higher than Central-East European new democracies. This finding is not 
surprising and is in line with previous studies (Biezen, 2003; Bosco and Morlino, 2006; Lisi, 
                                                          
24 The ten countries assigning public funding also to parties’ sub-national organisations are Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, the Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Spain, and the United Kingdom.  
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2015a). Longitudinal analyses have shown that in Portugal membership figures started to 
decline in the mid-1990s, reaching an average of 3.82% M/E ratio in the 2000-2008 period25 
(Lisi 2015: 70; Correia, 2017; Fazendeiro, 2017). Hence, at the beginning of the 2010s this 
pattern has neither been reversed nor arrested.26  
 
Table 3.3 Membership, PS and PSD compared, 2011 
Membership as share of national electorate (M/E) 
PPDB  3.45 
Portugal (6)  2.92 
PSD 1.10 
PS 0.85 
Christian Democrats/Conservatives (27) 0.93 
Social Democrats (23) 0.76 
Sources: Own elaboration based on PPDB Round 1 and Webb and Keith (2017: 33). Portugal, national 
electorate in 2011: 9,624,354 (IDEA); PS membership 78,152 (2010); PSD membership: 106,619 (2011). 
 
Disaggregating the M/E by party, the PS and PSD display a M/E ratio of 0.85 and 1.10 
respectively. In the case of the PSD, this value is consistent with the 1.11 average of the 
1975-2009 period, whereas the PS ratio seems to have further decreased in the early 2010s 
from the 1.10% of 1975-2009, documented by longitudinal analyses (Lisi, 2011: 82). 
Considering Webb and Keith’s calculations (2017: 34) by party family, the two main 
Portuguese parties are in line with the PPDB averages, albeit with slightly higher values.  
A final note regards different typologies of membership offered by parties. In this way 
parties may try to replace the membership decline and maintain some of the advantages of 
having a volunteers’ base mobilised on the ground (Scarrow, 2015; Pedersen, Scarrow and 
van Haute, 2017). The PPDB data set shows that nearly 33% of the surveyed parties is 
offering some form of membership with reduced obligations. As for Portugal, only the PS 
envisions this form of enrolment, having the party “sympathiser” a formal status. In chapter 
8, we discuss more in detail this organisational innovation.  
                                                          
25  Note that the M/E figures for the 2000-2008 period do not include the ‘Ecologist Party’ (PEV), which is 
included in the PPDB. However, PEV is a very small party which only holds few thousand members 
(approximately 3,000).    
26 In the Portuguese case membership figures are frequently inflated due to strategic considerations, thus when 
dealing with this type of data a note of caution regarding their reliability is needed. 
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3.2 Organisational structures: basic units 
 
Basic units are the lowest structures of parties’ organisational infrastructure, they contribute 
to party local presence and play functions such as members’ mobilisation and recruitment of 
local candidates. Scholars consider the number of basic units as an indicator of party’s 
organisational strength and party’s capacity to reach the largest number of members and 
electors (Scarrow, 2000; Gabrow, 2001; Tavits, 2013). The presence of an extensive network 
of local branches has been typically associated to the mass party type (Duverger, 1954; 
Sartori, 2005). However, recent studies show that setting-up local branches is an important 
strategy to sustain the electoral breakthrough of new parties (Bolleyer, 2013), and that it may 
improve the electoral performance of organisationally weak parties, like those emerged in 
Central and Eastern European countries (Tavits, 2013).  
The PPDB’s findings show that parties with highest coverage’s ranking average are found 
in Austria, Germany, Ireland and the Czech Republic, which for Webb and Keith (2017) 
may be due to country size and institutional features, such as federal system. More in general, 
the results indicate that country factors, rather than party family, account more for variation 
(Webb and Keith, 2017).  
Following Webb and Keith’s approach (2017: 46), we have measured the number of basic 
units held by the PS and the PSD according to (1) the number of legislative seats, (2) the 
membership rate and (3) the number of registered electors. These three indicators assess  
different aspects of party territorial extensiveness: firstly, with respect to the system of 
political representation, secondly, with respect to the party’s efforts to have a local presence 
for reaching the major number of electors, and thirdly with respect to the organisation and 
mobilisation of the grassroots as wider as possible. In other words, the lower the number of 
electors and members per basic unit, the higher the party territorial extensiveness.  
In table 3.4 we present the result and the Portuguese averages.  
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Table 3.4 Number of basic units, PS and PSD compared, 2011 
 Basic units per 
seat in lower 
house 
(92) 
Number of 
registered electors 
by basic unit  
(93) 
Number of 
members by basic 
unit  
(91) 
PPDB mean 3.10 150,456 181 
Portugal mean (5) 2.07 91,748 148 
PSD (300) 2.77 32,000 355 
PS (680)  9.2 14,153 115 
Source: PPDB (Round 1, 2011) and Webb and Keith (2017). Own calculation for the PS and the PSD. Numbers 
in parentheses refer to the number of parties, and to the number of basic units for the PS and the PSD. Number 
of registered voters in Portugal: 9.624.354 (2011, IDEA). 
 
Party-level data shows that while both the PS and the PSD rank high with respect to the 
country average, thus confirming the higher territorial extensiveness of the two main 
governing parties. Still, the PS and the PSD diverge. The former displays a higher level of 
branch offices’ diffusion, thus territorial dispersion, than the PSD. Suggesting a higher 
degree of nationalisation of the PS compared to the PSD. Accordingly, the more extensive 
local presence would serve as a key asset and allow the former to reach, via local presence, 
a comparatively higher number of electors and members.27 
 
3.3 Leadership strength  
The present section deals with the formal prerogatives held by leaders across contemporary 
parties and serves to assess leaders’ degree of “autonomy-restriction” relative to the party 
organisation. Powerful leaders hold significant prerogatives and are relatively free from 
being accountable before the party. As stated in chapter 1, these features foster a  tendency 
towards presidentialisation (or personalisation) of the party structures.  
Based on the information present in the PPDB data set regarding party formal rules, 
Poguntke, Scarrow, Webb, et al. (2016: 669) have built an “Index of Leadership Strength” 
(ILS), made up of 1-9 items, which enables to measure party leaders’ statutory 
                                                          
27 The difference may due to the fact that this PPDB’s variable refers to the lowest units that get representation 
at the highest level by electing delegates. In the PSD this only regards the council-level units, whereas the sub-
municipal units (parish level), which however are present only in few councils, do not elect delegates.  
A limitation of the quantitative analysis regards the fact that it could not respond to questions such as to what 
extent are local branches active or exist only “on paper used by local leaders to have some power through the 
election of delegates. These are informal (and rather diffuse) practices that would require a different analysis. 
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prerogatives.28 The score of each PPDB country and the overall average are listed in table 
3.5.  
 
Table 3.5 Index of Leadership Strength, selected countries, 2011 
Country Leadership Strength  
Index (0= none; 9= high) 
Italy (1) 7 
Spain (5) 5.40 
Portugal (5) 5.0 
Hungary (4) 4.50 
Canada (5) 4.80 
Belgium (9) 4.44 
Ireland (4) 3.50 
Norway (6) 3.50 
United Kingdom (7) 3.29 
Sweden (8) 3.13 
Czech Republic (5) 3 
Denmark (8) 3 
Germany (6) 2.50 
Netherlands (2) 2.50 
Australia (4) 2.25 
Average  (79) 3.70 
Source: Poguntke, Scarrow, Webb, et al. (2016: 669).  
 
As the table shows, Portugal achieves one of the highest scores (5.0), following Spain (5.40) 
and Italy (7).29 Therefore, in terms of formal prerogatives, Spanish, Portuguese and Italian 
party leaders are comparatively stronger and hold more autonomy than leaders in other 
                                                          
28 The additive index is built on the following  items: (1) Leader may help select deputy leader; (2) may summon 
party officials; (3) may summon party congress; (4) may attend party executive; (5) may attend party congress; 
(6) may appoint at least one member of party executive; (7) must consent to coalition agreements; (8) is 
designated party’s ‘external representative’; (9) is expressly accountable to party congress. «Each ‘right’ is 
coded 1; where the leader does not have a right, it is coded 0. Note that where a leader is not statutorily 
accountable to party congress it is coded 1. The index has a theoretical range running from 0 to 9, although 
empirically it only runs from 1 to 7» (Poguntke, Scarrow, Webb et al., 2016: 377). 
29 However, the Italian case it is only referred to one party, the centre-left Partito Democratico (PD). 
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PPDB countries, suggesting a South-European pattern in party leadership strength.  
Building on the Poguntke, Scarrow, Webb’s index, we have shifted the analysis to the party 
level, comparing the PS and the PSD with the two largest (in terms of parliamentary seats) 
social democrats and conservatives parties by country. Thus, 35% of the sample (28 out of 
79 parties) has been selected and the ILS index measured. Table 3.6 presents the results.  
 
Table 3.6 Index of Leadership Strength, PS and PSD compared, 2011  
Country Party Leadership Strength  
Index (0= none; 9= high) 
Italy PD 7 
Portugal PS 7 
Spain PP 7 
Spain PSOE 7 
Hungary Fidesz 6 
Portugal PSD 6 
Canada Conservative Party 5 
Canada New Democratic 
Party 
5 
Ireland Labour Party 5 
Belgium Socialist Party 4 
Czech Republic CD 4 
Denmark Social Democrats 4 
Hungary SP 4 
UK Conservative Party 4 
Australia  Liberal Party 3 
Czech Republic SDP 3 
Denmark Conservatives 3 
Germany CDU 3 
Ireland Fine Gael 3 
Netherlands Labour Party 3 
Norway Conservative 3 
Norway Labour Party 3 
Sweden Moderates 3 
Sweden Social Democrats 3 
UK Labour Party 3 
Australia  Labor Party 2 
Belgium Christian-Democrat 
& Flemish 
2 
Germany SDP 2 
Source: PPDB (Round 1, 2011). Own calculation. 
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As table 3.6 shows, both the PS and the PSD score high on the index. The PS belongs to the 
top tiers together with the Italian Partito Democratico (PD) and the Spanish Partido Popular 
(PP) and Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE). The PSD follows, getting the second-
best score, alongside the Hungarian Fidesz. Hence, the leaders of the PS and the PSD appear 
to be stronger than most of the leaders of social-democrat and conservative parties in the 
countries surveyed. Once again this seems to indicate the relevance of country factors. In 
our view, this finding is interesting especially in light of the fact that – as we show in the 
next section – both the PS and the PSD have adopted the direct election of the leader by 
members. As such, the leader’s position within the party is further enhanced by the selection 
method.  
 
3.4 Patterns of intra-party democracy: assembly-based and plebiscitary-based IPD 
In this section we rely on the PPDB data in order to explore the patterns of intra-party 
democracy (IPD) in decision-making processes, focusing on crucial party decisions, namely 
leadership and candidate selection and policy decisions, and present the case of the PS and 
the PSD in comparative perspective. This dimension is explored by adopting the 
conceptualisation of intra-party democracy developed by von dem Berge and Poguntke 
(2017). Accordingly, IPD has two underlying logics, i.e. the assembly-based (AIPD) and the 
plebiscitary-based (PIPD) which are described as follows: «AIPD is based on discussion 
within party bodies and assemblies […] and it requires the temporal coincidence of 
discussion and decision»,  whereas PIPD «disconnects the process of discussion and 
deliberation from the actual decision which is eventually taken by the lone party member» 
(idem: 144).30 AIPD and PIPD are not mutually exclusive, and a combination of both models 
can exist within the same party.  
As shown in chapter 1, parties are increasingly adopting the plebiscitary form of IPD, with 
the purpose of expanding ordinary members’ participation in intra-party life. As mentioned, 
this organisational change is fuelled by different rationales, such as promoting party 
legitimacy and image, attract new members, as well as by strategic considerations fostered 
                                                          
30 Note that von dem Berge and Poguntke (2017) consider three analytical components of IPD. Beyond the 
program and personnel selection, they consider the “organisational structure”. Given that parties’ 
organisational structure may be more or less inclusive but is by definition assembly-based, we have excluded 
this component from the analysis.   
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by the external competition and the internal pressures (e.g. Scarrow, Webb and Farrell, 2000; 
Barnea and Rahat, 2007; Cross and Katz, 2013; Ignazi, 2014). The preliminary findings of 
the PPDB shows that “assembly-based” procedures  are the norm in most parties and that 
some forms of “plebiscitary-based” practices are present in nearly 55% of the sample, 
whereas they are completely absent in the remaining 45%, and that cross-national differences 
and, to a lesser extent, ideological orientations are found in the way parties apply the two 
variants of IPD (Poguntke, Scarrow, Webb et al., 2016; Bolin et al., 2017).  
 
3.4.1 Leadership selection  
We begin analysing one of the most important party decisions, the choice of the party 
chairman. As for leadership selection, most of the parties listed in the PPDB specify in the 
statutes the procedures governing this process. Except for the cases for which information is 
missing, some parties are silent on this dimension since their organisational structure is based 
on collective leadership (e.g. some Greens parties).31 They are a minority though. Thus, the 
final sample includes nearly 74% of the PPDB parties (90 out of 122). Table 3.7 lists, by 
country, the number of parties which involve ordinary members in the leadership selection, 
i.e. those adopting plebiscitary IPD.  
 
Table 3.7 Parties applying direct leadership selection, selected countries, 2011 
Country                                       Parties coded total Parties applying direct leadership 
selection 
Australia  4 1 
Belgium  12 8 
Canada  5 5 
Czech Republic  1 – 
Denmark  7 1 
Germany  7 – 
Hungary  3 – 
Ireland  4 1 
Israel  5 4 
Italy  1 – 
Netherlands  9 5 
Norway  7 – 
                                                          
31 Data on Austrian, French and Polish parties are missing, as well as most of the Italian, Czechs and Israeli 
parties.  
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Portugal  5 2 
Spain  5 – 
Sweden  8 – 
United Kingdom  7 7 
N 90 34 
Percentage - 38% 
Source: PPDB (Round 1, 2011). Own elaboration. Note, however, that in more recent years other parties have 
moved towards the direct selection, such as the case of the Spanish PSOE.  
 
The table shows that within the sample, the leader is directly selected by members in nearly 
38% of the cases. Yet, in this value we have included those parties which weight members’ 
vote with other internal groups’ vote, and the few parties calling the members to vote in run-
off contests between the two top finishers. When these “mixed” cases are excluded, the share 
of parties adopting fully direct election decreases to less than 34% of the sample. While 
members’ ballot for choosing the party chairman is rather common in some countries (e.g. 
Canada, UK and Belgium), it is completely absent in others (e.g. Germany, Norway, and 
Sweden).32 This finding suggests country-factors’ role in influencing the type of IPD 
modality, assembly or plebiscitary, adopted by parties for selecting party officials. For 
instance, Party Law may shape this type of decisions. This is best exemplified by the German 
Party Law (1967, art.9.4) which establishes that party leader is chosen by delegates to party 
conventions (Detterbeck and Rohlfing, 2014).  
As for Portuguese parties, the direct election has been adopted only by the two main 
governing parties, the PS and the PSD, which thus belong to the 34% of the cases.  
Except for the CDS, which has experienced the direct election of the leader between 2005-
2011 but it then re-established the election by the congress, the other Portuguese parties have 
resisted convergence (Lisi and Freire, 2014; Lisi, 2015a; Sanches and Razzuoli, 2017). In 
chapters 4 and 8 we discuss more in detail the shift from the assembly-based to the 
plebiscitary-based selection in the two parties. 
Table 3.8 shows the data disaggregated by party family.  
 
 
                                                          
32Although data on Austrian parties are missing, other studies show that in those parties the leader is generally 
selected through an assembly-based system, namely by the congress (Ennser-Jedenastik and Muller, 2014) 
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Table 3.8 Direct leadership selection by party family, 2011 
Party Family Parties applying direct leadership 
selection % 
Christian Democratic/Conservatives (21)  6 (28.5%) 
Social Democrats parties (19) 13 (68%) 
Liberal (19) 8 (42%) 
Green parties (10) 4 (40%) 
Left Socialists (7) - 
Far Right parties (9) 3 (33%) 
Unclassified parties (4) 1 (25%) 
Source: PPDB (Round1, 2011). Own elaboration. Figures in parentheses refer to the number of parties. 
 
The results indicate that the direct selection by members tends to be more popular among 
social-democratic parties, since 68% in the sample rely on this method vis-à-vis 28.5% of 
the centre-right and conservative parties.33  As for the Portuguese case, this finding matters 
since shows the different path undertaken by the PSD from its ideological family, and the 
convergence towards its national competitor, the PS. Therefore, national context, party 
system’s pressures and strategic considerations seems to matter more than ideological factors 
for explaining this organisational change in the PSD. At the same time, the finding may 
contribute to explain the internal dissent towards the direct election, which in the PSD is still 
a controversial issue. In Chapter 8 we deal with this aspect in more detail.  
In conclusion, the findings show that “assembly-based” systems continue to be the norm for 
selecting party chairman across contemporary democracies. More in general, the finding is 
in line with longitudinal cross-country studies which highlight that there is an overestimation 
of the trend towards the direct leadership selection (Pilet and Cross, 2014). To date the 
“plebiscitary-based” leadership selection has been only introduced by a minority of parties, 
including the cases analysed in this thesis, the PS and the PSD.  
 
 
 
                                                          
33 Parties for which we have data about the rules for selecting the party leader.  
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3.4.2 Candidate Selection  
While leader selection regards the most important internal office (often coinciding with the 
electoral leader), Candidate Selection (CS) concerns the selection of personnel for 
competing in elections under the party label. As such, is one of the main functions carried 
out by parties, and it has been used by scholars as indicator of internal power distribution 
and degree of centralisation-decentralisation (e.g. Gallagher and Marsh, 1988; Scarrow, 
Webb and Farrell, 2000; Lundell, 2004; Hazan and Rahat, 2010).  
As referred in chapter 1, there is not an unilinear trend towards the adoption of more 
inclusive procedures and findings are mixed. In this section we take a snapshot of the CS 
processes across contemporary parties in the first half of the 2010s. Only after the next 
rounds of PPDB data collection will it be possible to explore whether parties have moved 
towards more exclusive or inclusive process and which actors have benefited from the 
changes.  
The PPDB provides information on the formal rules applied by 112 parties for selecting 
parliamentary candidates.34 The variables concern the formal role played by a wide range of 
actors in the process, namely: supporters, members, sub-national and national party bodies.  
In Table 3.9 PPDB parties are listed according to the actor with the main role in the process. 
The table has been built following Bille (2001: 366). Since the PPDB data deals with formal 
rules, the table may not be exhaustive, depending on the degree of informal practices through 
which each party carries out the process (Norris and Lovenduski, 1995). The second column 
from the left lists the number of parties, by country, that adopt “plebiscitary-based” 
decisions, i.e. individual members are the final selectors. The other columns classify the 
parties that select their candidates resorting to an “assembly-based” procedure, which may 
involve the sub-national or/and the national bodies. For the sake of simplicity, we have 
aggregated constituency/regional/state levels under the “sub-national” label.   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
34 Missing countries: Czech Republic. Missing parties: Danish People’s Party, the Israeli “Shas”, the Irish Sin 
Fein, the Polish “Law and Justice”, the Portuguese “Ecologist Party - PEV”.  
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Table 3.9 Candidate Selection and patterns of IPD, selected countries, 2011 
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Australia  3*   1   
Austria    3 1 1* 
Belgium  4* 2 1 1 3 1* 
Canada  5      
Denmark   6   1  
France     1  1 
Germany   7     
Hungary      4*  
Ireland  1 3*    1* 
Israel  3     6* 
Italy      2* 3* 
Netherlands  1  2  1 6 
Norway   7     
Poland     2 1 2* 
Portugal      3* 2* 
Spain     1 3 1 
Sweden   8     
UK  5  1   1* 
N= 112 
% 
22  
19.6% 
33  
29.4% 
4 
 3.6% 
9  
8% 
19  
17% 
25 
22.3% 
Source: PPDB Round 1 (2011). Own elaboration.  
 
Table 3.9 shows that full membership ballot in candidate selection is applied by nearly 20% 
of the parties in the sample (22 out of 112). Moreover, in some cases the national bodies 
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(leaders or electoral committees) may exercise veto powers over members’ decisions. 
Membership ballot is more often applied in Westminster countries (Canada and Australia) 
and in the UK, but also in some Israeli and Belgian parties.  
Conversely, more than 80% of the parties (n= 90) surveyed selects their MP candidates 
within the party bodies at different levels (columns 3-7), thus by means of “assembly-based” 
intra-party democracy. Of course, important variations exist for the same variable there: 
“national body” includes both the congress, which in the case of small parties may be open 
to all the members (e.g. Dutch green parties), may be the leader’s inner circle (e.g. the Italian 
People of Freedom, some Israeli parties), or the executive body.  
In nearly 30% of the sample, the sub-national organisations control the process. This pattern 
characterises almost all parties in Scandinavian countries and all German parties, suggesting 
the importance of institutional-level factors (e.g. the aforementioned German Electoral 
Law).  
Finally, in one quarter of the sample, the CS is shared by the national and sub-national 
organisations, with a varying degree of influence and involvement across levels. According 
to some scholars, inclusiveness tends to overlap with decentralisation since it is argued that 
the more decentralised the decision, the larger the number of people potentially involved 
(Bille, 2001: 365; von dem Berge and Poguntke, 2017: 140, but see, Scarrow, 2005 for a 
critique).35 Therefore, when the selection is undertaken at the local level it potentially 
involves more participants, being thus more inclusive that one undertaken at the national 
level.  
Overall, the findings suggest that members’ direct participation in candidate selection is still 
rather limited and most common in a few countries. Assembly-based decisions, rather than 
plebiscitary ones, are the norm in the majority of the parties surveyed. Therefore, the CS 
process is still broadly controlled by party structures and their elites, although at different 
levels and at different degrees.  
Table 3.9 shows that in Portuguese parties the national level has a prominent role both in 
terms of list fulfilment and final approval.36 Both the PS and the PSD statutes prescribe the 
sub-national levels’ involvement in the process, formally as proponents of candidacies 
                                                          
35 Building the index of assembly-based IPD (AIPD), von dem Berge and Poguntke (2017) assign the highest 
score (0.75) when local unit has the main role in the CS, (0.5) for the regional, and 0.25 for the national.  
36 Note that Portuguese electoral system is based on proportional representation (D’Hondt method) and closed-
lists.  
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although informal practices vary, and variations are also found between sub-national units 
(see chapter 5). Final ratification belongs to the national deliberative bodies.  
As it will be explored in further depth in the present research (chapter 8), the PS and the 
PSD, follows most of the PPDB parties since they both have resisted giving ordinary 
members voting rights in candidate selection. As such, this competence remains one of the 
main reasons for differences in power relations between the national party and the territorial 
structures.  
 
3.4.3 Policy development 
Beyond decisional procedures on personnel selection, intra-party democracy also deals with 
policy decisions. Yet, parties may adopt different forms of membership participation in 
policy development, such as direct participation, delegation, representation and consultation, 
thus making rather complex evaluating this process is terms of membership inclusion (Gauja, 
2013). In this section we consider the case of the electoral programme and a typical 
instrument of plebiscitary IPD, the party referendum.  
The electoral programme  
The PPDB survey allows us to look at the development of one of the most relevant policy 
issues, the electoral programme, by the actors who are involved, according to the statutory 
rules. In most of PPDB parties, the drafting and approval of the electoral manifesto compete 
to the national bodies, which encompass different actors, from the party congress to the 
single leader. There is therefore large variance across parties, whose description goes beyond 
the scope of this chapter.37 As for parties that resort to some form of plebiscitary IPD, thus 
assigning the final approval to ordinary members, data shows that only 16% (14 out of 88) 
adopt this practice, while only one party, the Belgian “Reform Movement”, opens it also to 
party supporters.38 Overall, members’ participation is found only in some Belgian and Dutch 
parties, and in the German “Pirate Party”, which seems consistent with their internal 
participative culture and their small size as well. Furthermore, in most of the cases members’ 
power is shared with the national bodies. In the other cases, rank-and-file are represented in 
                                                          
37 For descriptive findings, see Hennl and Franzmann (2017: 267–270).  
38 Missing countries: Austria, France, Israel and Poland.  
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the process via the party congress, and the role of this body may vary being only involved 
in the drafting or in the final enactment.  
To be fair, in recent years both the PS and the PSD have tried to involve members and 
general supporters in the drafting stage of the electoral programme with proposals, either 
individually (i.e. on-line participation), or during assembly meetings at the branch level, if 
not in the national party congress (e.g. the PS Congress of 2016). Nevertheless, these 
initiatives regard informal input and seem to be more part of a narrative of openness towards 
civil society, which may conceal a strategy for improving party image. In both parties, in 
fact, policy development remains an elite-driven affair, increasingly professionalised, and in 
which the party congress and the activists seem to carry out the function of ritual ratification 
of the guide-lines.  
 
The party referendum 
Parties may also adopt intra-party ballots for deciding on policy issues, notably the 
internal referendum. Intra-party ballots belong, by definition, to the plebiscitary variant of 
IPD. Party referendum is included in the statutes of one-quarter of the PPDB parties, i.e. 
26% (26 out of 99); and only in one case is the referendum open to registered supporters, i.e. 
the Spanish “United Left”.39 Overall, the referendum is found in most of the German and 
Scandinavian parties, whereas in the other countries it is mainly adopted by greens and leftist 
parties.40  
As for the Portuguese case, party referendum is included in the statutes of both the PS and 
the PSD, as well as the CDS. Still, this feature is not a recent introduction linked to the wave 
of party democratisation, but it was already entailed the first  versions of their statutes, 
possibly due to the influence of Scandinavian and German social-democratic in the parties’ 
formative phase. The presence of party referendum has thus increased the score achieved by 
these parties in the PIPD index, and thus their “cartelness”.41 However, this could be an 
overestimation induced by the approach based on the “official story”. To our best 
knowledge, in fact, both the PS and the PSD have used the referendum only once.42 
                                                          
39 Missing countries: Austria, France, Poland.  
40 In the Portuguese case, the referendum has been recently adopted by the Left Bloc (BE).  
41 In the PIPD index (0-1) the PS and the PSD score 0.5, vis-à-vis the national average of 0.25.  
42 In 1983, by the PS for consulting the militants on the governmental agreement, and in 2005 by the PSD-
Azores’ regional structure. 
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Yet, there is a key difference in the way the two parties rule this instrument of direct 
democracy. In the PS, the power to propose a consultative referendum for auditing the 
members is prerogative of the secretary-general. This specificity suggests the “strategic” 
nature of the referendum, which may be used by the leadership to reinforce legitimacy 
against internal opposition. By contrast, the PSD statutes rule the referendum through an ad 
hoc article (2012, art. 66), prescribing that the ballot can only be called by the National 
Council, or by 1/20 of members regarding «any great political or strategic option». 
Depending on the deliberation of the deliberative body, the National Council, the referendum 
may be binding or advisory.  
 
Conclusion  
This chapter has presented important features of the Portuguese parties, namely the PS and 
the PSD in  comparative perspective. It started off by presenting the main traits of 
contemporary parties in advanced representative democracies, by summarising the main 
findings of the PPDB data set. According to PPDB, parties have been characterised on three 
organisational dimensions, namely resources, structures, and representative strategies 
(Poguntke, Scarrow, Webb et al., 2016). Once the overall characterisation was presented, 
we then proceeded to place both the PS and the PSD in this context. We have found that they 
draw most of their financial resources from one major donor, the state. Thus, they show a 
resource structure characterised by high financial concentration and state-dependence. These 
features confirm Portuguese parties’ state dependence, documented by previous studies 
(Martins, 2005; Biezen, 2000). However, except for the PCP, the relevance of state resources 
vis-à-vis societal ones characterises all the Portuguese parties surveyed, not only the PS and 
the PSD. Comparatively, the share of public funding for party income is higher than the 
PPDB average, which is rather high though. With regard to internal power distribution, such 
type of resource structure has important impacts since dependence on a single donor fosters 
centralisation and power concentration (Panebianco, 1982; Nassmacher, 2003). 
Furthermore, state subsidies’ allocation to the party in central office fosters the peripheral 
structures’ dependence on the centre.  
While the two main parties are comparatively poor, they are rich relative the national 
economy. On the other hand, their volunteers’ base is weak, as suggested by the low 
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membership size. Still, they share this feature with most parties across contemporary 
democracies. PPDB data shows that only a small minority of parties, including the PS, has 
adopted a ‘multi-speed’ membership model by including sympathisers as a formal category 
of affiliation, which may contribute to cope with the shortage of volunteers (Scarrow, 2015).  
An important aspect that emerges from the data, and that contributes to typify the PS 
and the PSD as ‘cartel parties’, regards the ‘leadership strength’ variable. Leaders are 
comparatively stronger in terms of statutory prerogatives and internal accountability, with 
the PS leader slightly stronger than the PSD one. Comparatively, the PS and the PSD 
combine leader’s powerful position with a (plebiscitary) selection method that arguably 
reinforces her or his autonomy from internal groups. In particular, the findings show that 
this combination is rather exceptional across PPDB parties, at least when the largest social-
democratic and conservative parties are considered.  
Some of these organisational features characterise these parties since the beginning, 
namely the low membership figures and the relevance of public funding, the latter being 
further increased by reforms introduced by the parties themselves. Likewise, leader’s central 
position has been reinforced by organisational reforms over time, notably the direct election 
by the members, embedded in a plebiscitary model of intra-party democracy (PIPD). In this 
respect both the PS and the PSD combine a relatively high leadership autonomy with the 
direct election, we found this feature to be rather rare across parties surveyed. Therefore, the 
picture is that of leader-centric parties with a strong anchorage on the state and weakly 
organised on the ground. Electoral goals and the mediatisation of politics may have then also 
contributed to the empowerment of the leadership position, even more crucial for enhancing 
party cohesion in a context of weakly rooted organisation. 
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Chapter IV 
 
 A stratarchical model? The centre-periphery relations in the PS and the 
PSD. A longitudinal overview  (1974-2017) 
 
Introduction  
Adopting a longitudinal perspective, this chapter examines the centre-periphery in the PS 
and the PSD over time. The goal is to explore the hypothesis of a convergence towards 
stratarchical configuration in the Portuguese case, and to identify evidences regarding the 
establishment of relations of mutual autonomy between the national and the local levels of 
party organisation (Katz and Mair, 1995; Mair, 1997; Carty, 2004). Building on the idea of 
stratarchy-hierarchy as a continuum with different configurations emerging across space and 
time, the chapter analyses whether under different phases the pattern of relations varies. 
It examines whether national leadership’s efforts to strengthen control over the territorial 
structures, understood as the reinforcement of the hierarchical relations, emerge or are 
intensified in opposition, whereas autonomy, understood as stratarchy, better defines the 
relations when the party is in government. This argument stems from the idea that 
incumbency is salient in shaping internal relations and influencing party leader’s leverage 
and stability in governing parties, especially those emerged in new democracies, such as the 
PS and the PSD. Outside office the national leadership would be pressured to reinforce top-
down control, as well as to generate cohesion and internal support by resorting to 
organisational measures and resources. By contrast, incumbency makes it easier for the 
national leadership to generate support by means provided by the access to power and to 
neglect the organisation. In this second scenario, the hierarchical configuration could be 
loosened in favour of autonomisation.  
This chapter revisits extensively the evolution of the centre-periphery relations in the 
PS and the PSD from 1974 onwards, focusing on the reforms and reform attempts carried 
out by the national leadership and singling out the institutional status and leadership changes 
experienced by the two parties. At the same time, given the differences of the PS and the 
PSD in terms of origins and formative dynamics, variations are expected. In particular, due 
to the PSD’s less centralised origin, in this party the territorial structures should be able to 
retain and possibly increase their autonomy. 
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 Building on Bolleyer’s analysis (2009), we examine the main measures indicating 
efforts to control territorial structures’ powers and resources, and thus to restrict autonomy 
(i.e. hierarchy). These measures may comprise: intervention on membership recruitment and 
fees’ payment; revision of membership procedures (rights/duties); update of the membership 
register; closing “paper” sections; revision of the rules regarding the territorial party bodies; 
reform of candidate selection rules and pre-selection phase used to filter candidates; informal 
interference in processes; comply with rules and enact internal transparency. Measures that 
do not directly regard the territorial structures, but which suggest the effort to establish a 
more integrated organisation, vis-à-vis the looser configuration of stratarchy, are examined 
as well. These may include: creation of new posts and staff renewal and the establishment 
of collective incentives for militants.  
 
The Socialist Party (PS) 
4.1 The PS. The formative phase and Soares’ leadership 
The PS was founded by Mário Soares in the West Germany in 1973, building on the Acção 
Socialista Portuguesa (Portuguese Socialist Action – ASP), a political association 
comprising different intellectual traditions of the socialist movement. Scholars highlight that 
the “external” roots of the party and the personalisation of the leadership around the 
charismatic party founder strongly influenced the formative phase, reinforcing 
centralisation, internal coherence, and discipline (Stock 1985, 2005). The party structure was 
influenced by the Scandinavian and German social-democratic parties, based on the mass-
party vertical articulation, party members encapsulated in local and sectional units and 
represented by the delegates elected at the national congress, the top party body (Sablosky, 
2005; Stock, 2005). Between 1974 and 1975, more than 90,000 members joined the party’s 
still incipient organisational structure.  
After two years in office in the I and II constitutional governments, the PS shifted to 
the opposition in 1979 after having also lost the 1978 local elections and suffering a 
significant loss of voters in two consecutive elections. In this phase, efforts for improving 
the organisational building and territorial implantation were undertaken. The party executive 
drew up a global plan of party restructuration which indicated the efforts to build a more 
coherent organisation and to counteract the heterogeneity and asymmetries within the 
territorial organisation (i.e. hierarchy). The measures concerned several aspects, namely  
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infrastructure, material resources and internal coordination, and were aimed at improving 
the territorial apparatus, by enhancing the communication between the centre and the 
grassroots, through the federations and the local branches as well as the flow of regular party 
information, and by strengthening the horizontal linkages between the representatives of the 
party in public office and the party bodies at both the national and local level.  
From the official documents of the National Secretariat for the Organisation 
(Secretariado Nacional da Organização – SNO) and the departments in charge of the 
relations with the federations the overall weakness of the structures on the ground becomes 
clear: local sections suffered from severe financial problems, with a very low share of 
members regularly paying their fees, and lacking human and material resources. Moreover, 
the party territorial coverage was far from complete, with inactive sections especially in the 
northern interior districts (e.g. Guarda, Vila Real, Viseu). The restructuration plan comprised 
several measures, such as the paying-off of sections’ debts, the survey of the members 
enrolled, the renewal of the local party bodies, the holding of regular meetings, the 
recruitment of experts and intellectuals, and the improvement of the party implantation, 
notably in the rural communities by resorting to the cooperatives’ network. Beyond that, the 
territorial organisation was characterised by coordination problems between the federations 
and the local sections and between the party officials and the local office-holders. In some 
cases, the coordination was created thanks to the initiative of some of the larger local 
sections, such as Vila Nova de Gaia and Gondomar in the Porto Federation, which 
established ‘municipal coordination units’ (coordenadoras concelhias) functioning at 
informal level. 
In this phase, the party was weakened by factional struggles between the party 
founder, Soares, and the group of the ex-Secretariat (ex-Secretariado) for the control of the 
party (Stock, 1985; Gallagher, 1989). The national struggle was reflected at the local level, 
with lists competing for the federation executives made up in several cases of representatives 
of the two factions. The conflict, which eventually led Soares to resign from the leadership, 
was then resolved at the 4th Congress (1981), when the founder father of the PS regained 
the control of the party executive keeping it until 1986. Concomitantly, Soares’ control over 
the territorial apparatus was ensured by the victory of lists supporting his leadership in most 
of the party federations.  
The motion Novo Rumo para o PS (“New Path for the PS”) presented by Soares at 
the congress set specific measures for coping with the coordination problems faced at the 
territorial level and for holding the territorial structures accountable. Firstly, to ensure the 
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coordination of the local sections with the federations, the motion proposed the creation of 
an ad hoc organ at council level (i.e. coordenadora municipal) that included party officials 
and public local office-holders. A second type of measures regarded the need for the party 
executive to hold the federations accountable. As such, the federations’ competences were 
to be clearly specified and their financial autonomy enhanced. Consequently, the new 
statutes set the right of the federations to receive a share of the party funds annually. The 
distributional criteria and the amount to be transferred to each federation was set by the 
national committee (the permanent deliberative body). The flow of resources from the 
central party to the federation depended on the transfer of a share of members’ fees which 
were collected by the local sections. The measure was aimed at enforcing the control over 
the local branches relative the number of members they declared, which enabled them to get 
delegates at the party bodies. Third, Soares defended that the  federation secretaries’ position 
(secretários coordenadores) within the federation secretariat was to be reinforced. As such, 
this party official headed the executive body holding enforced voting rights over the rest of 
the executive board. In addition, the status enabled the secretaries to take part to the national 
committee as ex-officio, and to represent the federations at the meetings of the national 
political committee.   
In this phase, the party leader controlled the relations with the territorial structures 
by means of direct linkages between the restricted executive body and the federations’ 
coordinating body (Organismo Coordenador das Federações) (Stock, 1985; Lisi, 2009). 
The hierarchic modality set up in this initial phase responded to the need of ensuring the 
party’s cohesive action across the country and hampering the emergence of centrifugal 
tendencies. At the same time, it was shaped by the personalised leadership embodied by 
Soares. Concomitantly, the plan of reforms envisaged measures aimed at reinforcing the 
intermediate leadership in order to ensure control over the local structures. 
 
4.2 The second half of the 1980s. Loosening hierarchy  
After a brief period in government with the PSD under the Bloco Central (Central Bloc) 
coalition (1983-1985), the PS returned to opposition which was followed by the election of 
Soares as President of the Republic in 1986.43 The second half of the 1980s inaugurated the 
                                                          
43 The “Central Bloc” was formed to face the economic crisis and the second intervention of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). In 1985, Portugal signed the Treaty of Accession to the European Community. 
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long phase of dominance of the PSD in both national and local power (Frain, 1996), while 
the PS had suffered an electoral erosion after the 1985 legislative elections, triggered by the 
(ephemeral) emergence of the Partido Renovador Democrático (PRD).44  
The leadership change was characterised by internal strains concluded with the 
election of Vítor Constâncio as Secretary-General at the 6th Congress (1986). Constâncio 
succeeded the charismatic leadership of Soares after factional struggles, thus the 
consolidation of his internal power was the new leader priority. To this aim, the generation 
of internal incentives was crucial. The new leader defended the revision of the party 
functioning, the adoption of a more collegial decisional system and the improvement of the 
federations’ competences.45 The reforms were followed by the revision of the party statutes 
in 1988.  
This phase is characterised by the adoption of measures aimed at loosening the 
hierarchic relations experienced during the party’s formative phase under Soares’ leadership. 
Organisational measures aimed at adjusting the territorial infrastructure were undertaken. 
The lowest local units, the (nucleus) were extinguished and incorporated into the sections 
(secções).46 A new organ at the council level, the comissão política concelhia, – (CPC) 
(council-level political committee) was created. The new body was coordinated by a 
secretariat, with executive functions, and by a secretary-coordinator and was elected directly 
by the members.  
The creation of the council bodies represented a response to the intra-party 
coordination problems experienced at the territorial level since the formative phase and was 
primarily oriented towards the improvement of the party electoral performance in local 
power. Indeed, this reform enhanced the role of the structures in local power assigning to 
the council-level political committee competences in coordinating the local office-holders 
and managing the candidate selection for the local elections. Since then, these functions 
assumed a key relevance for the party activity at local level, to the detriment of members’ 
mobilisation and internal participation (Lisi, 2009).  
                                                          
44 The PRD’s emergence was backed by the then PR, R. Eanes. It opposed the austerity policies carried out by 
the Central Bloc, being able to elect 45 MPs in the 1985 legislative elections, to the detriment of the PS. 
Still, only two years after the PRD elected only 7 MPs.  
45 “Acção Socialista” n° 395, 1986. 
46 Initially at the local level the PS was based on two types of sub-units: the nucleus (núcleo), the lowest basic 
structure, and the section (secção) The minimum number of members required to form a unit has frequently 
changed, reflecting the ongoing process of party institutionalization. In 1974 a minimum of 5 to a maximum 
of 20 members for the nucleus, from 9 to 500 members for the sections. In 1981, 5 to 50 members for the 
nucleus while more than 50 for the sections. In 1984, 15 to 99 members (nucleus), at least 100 members 
(sections). Finally, in 1986 the nuclei were extinguished.  
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In this phase, the supervision of the party activity at the local level was delegated to 
the federations. As for the intermediate level, the reform established the formal involvement 
of the federations in the selection of parliamentary candidates, by enabling these structures 
to submit their list to the National Political Committee, the body in charge of approving the 
final lists, and to eventually appeal before the National Committee in case of adverse 
decisions. The measure attenuated the concentration of power at the national level in this 
key function indicating a shift towards a more autonomous role of the federations. At the 
same time, the vertical relations were improved through the institutionalisation of regular 
meetings between the party executive, the National Secretariat, with the federation 
secretaries, and between the latter and the local secretariats. Hence, the (partial) autonomy 
is provided in a context of coordination where the national party supervises the lower levels.  
Alongside the reorganisation of the territorial structures, other internal measures 
providing symbolic incentives were adopted. The collegial system of decision-making was 
improved by the extension of the national bodies’ boards (e.g. the national committee) and 
the reinforcement of the representation of the affiliated organisations, namely the Socialist 
Youth (Juventude Socialista – JS). In addition, a campaign for recruitment of new members 
was launched following the cleaning of the membership registers which led to a decrease of 
nearly 35,000 members, from 124,611 to 80,717 (Coelho, 2012: 105). 
The organisational reforms undertaken by the PS in this opposition phase had two 
main objectives. The first was the improvement of the party image among voters as a viable 
alternative to the PSD. The reorganisation of the territorial structures, with the improvement 
of the electoral-oriented functions and the attachment of powers and autonomy, belonged 
precisely to this strategy. The second regarded the consolidation of the new leader’s position 
within the party and the enhancement of internal support (Frain, 1996: 998). 
4.3 The organisational reforms in the 1990s and Guterres’ leadership  
After the second absolute majority won by the PSD in the 1991 elections, the party leadership 
was contested during the 10th congress (1992). The incumbent leader and Mayor of Lisbon, 
Jorge Sampaio, who had been elected leader after the resignation of Constâncio, was 
challenged by António Guterres, member of the former national secretariat.47  
Sampaio’s proposal appealed to the grassroots and supporters by defending the direct 
                                                          
47 Guterres had been in charge of the National Secretariat’s department for the Organisation under Constâncio. 
According to Cunha (2013), that experience gave Guterres a deep knowledge of the party apparatus which was 
crucial for his ascendancy to party leadership.   
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election of the national and federation bodies by the members, and primaries open to non-
members for the selection of candidates to the national and local public offices.48  
The incumbent leader bound his leadership bid to the condition of this radical proposal being 
approved by the congress.  
By contrast, Guterres postponed the statutory revision by proposing it to occur in the 
context of a national convention held for the purpose. However, his candidacy’s motion 
already advanced the chief points of his strategy for the territorial structures. The first goal 
was to revitalise the linkages between the national party and the federations, namely through 
the National Secretariat’s department for the Organisation, and through the Council of the 
federations’ coordinators (Conselho de Coordenadores das Federações). Secondly, Guterres 
defended the establishment of regular meetings aimed at circulating information, 
coordinating common actions, and adapting the party strategy to the different local 
specificities. To these aims, the autonomy and competences of the structures were to be 
strenghtened through providing their leaders with more powers. In Guterres’ words: «we 
will strengthen the power and the autonomy of the regional, district and local structures, 
setting the conditions for a real leading role of their leaders».49  
Beyond organisational issues, Sampaio and Guterres diverged in terms of electoral 
strategy. In contrast to Sampaio’s more left-wing stance, Guterres advocated a more 
electoralist orientation and the shift of the party towards the centre for appealing to the 
moderate-floating electorate. The rejection of the Sampaio’ proposal by the congress forced 
the incumbent to step down and paved the way for Guterres’ election.50 
The statutory reform carried out by Guterres radically transformed the party 
organisation, at both the national and the federation level, and attempted to improve the 
leader-membership linkage by revitalising members’ participation (Biezen, 2003: 71). 
Accordingly, the ordinary members elected the national committee which in turn elected the 
other national bodies: namely, the Secretary-General, the Political Committee, the Party 
President, and the Jurisdictional and Financial Committees. On proposal of the secretary-
                                                          
48 Sampaio’s motion «Reformar com coragem. Diectas já. O PS aos militantes» (Reforming with courage. 
Direct elections now. The PS to the militants). The national bodies to be directly elected were, the president, 
which substituted the secretary-general, and the National Committee; at the federation level: the federations 
secretaries and the federations’ political committees. “Acção Socialista”, 23/1/1992, p. 3. 
49 Guterres: «Vamos reforçar os poderes e a autonomia das estruturas regionais, distritais e concelhias dando 
condições por um verdadeiro protagonismo político dos seus dirigentes». Guterres’ motion: «Mudar para 
ganhar. A vontade de transformar» (Change to win. The willingness to transform). “Acção Socialista”, 
23/1/1992, p. 4. 
50 Guterres contested the leadership with a minor candidate, A. Beleza, and won with nearly 82,5% of the votes. 
“Acção Socialista”, n°681, 27-2-1992, p.4-8. 
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general the Political Committee elected the National Secretariat, the executive body. On the 
other hand, the Congress was extinguished and replaced by a Convention, made up of ex-
officio members in charge of party and public offices.51 The delegates elected by the local 
branches only took part in the Convention to vote on alterations to the party statutes and 
principles. Concomitantly, the limit to the size of the Secretariat was abolished, and the 
number of members of both the National Committee and the National Political Committee 
expanded. The reform, which served to distribute incentives to the careerists, reduced the 
efficiency of the Secretariat and fostered the power concentration in the leader and the 
restricted executive body (i.e. the Permanent Committee) (Lisi, 2006).  
The new national format and the members’ voting rights were replicated at the 
federation level. Thus, the congresses were replaced by the conventions of ex-officio 
members.52 The members directly elected the political committee, which elected the 
federation president and, on the latter’s proposal, the secretariat. The erstwhile “coordinating 
secretary” (Secretário-Coordenador da Federação) was replaced by the “federation 
president” (Presidente da Federação) as one-person office, holding the political 
coordination of the party activities at the local level, and with the right to take part as full 
member (i.e. voting rights) to the lower level’s meetings. The reform reinforced the 
federation leaders, whose position of leadership over the structure was strengthened, setting 
the basis for a leader-centered functioning of the territorial structures. Likewise, the local 
leaders’ position and legitimacy were enhanced through the introduction of the “president of 
the local political committee” (Presidente da Comissão Política Concelhia) as a unipersonal 
body.53 
The new status of the federation presidents was accompanied by the reform of the 
candidate selection process. The reform specified the power-sharing between the national 
and the federation level. Accordingly, the national political committee fulfilled 30% of the 
seats and decided the position, while the rest of the list was kept by the federation. The 
reform reduced the discretional powers exercised by the national executive over the lists, 
specifying the federations’ competences between the national and the intermediate structures 
                                                          
 51 Ex-officio: the members of the other national bodies, the members of the parliamentary party group at 
national, European and regional level, the federation presidents, the federation secretariats and the local party 
and public officials, at least 40 members of the youth organisation (JS) and members of the sectorial and of the 
women organisations (art. 59, 1992).  
52 Ex-officio members: the presidents of the concelhias, the local and sectorial sections’ secretaries, the 
executive members of the youth organisation, the local public office holders, and the members of the national 
bodies and MPs enrolled in the federation.  
53 Interview with MP, Miguel Coelho, former leader of the PS Lisbon’s council structure.   
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in this key function. However, the decentralisation of a share of decision-power was counter-
weighted by the powers retained by the national level in the pre-selective stage and in the 
final approval of the lists.  
As such, in this phase powers from the national level to the peripheral structures were 
transferred. This shift was accompanied by the reinforcement of the individual actors leading 
the territorial structures. Therefore, the decentralisation from the centre to the periphery 
occurs alongside the new legitimacy and autonomy achieved by the territorial leaders, which 
are the main actors benefited by the reforms. As the following section will show, the role 
acquired by the federation leaders in the network set up by Guterres indicates that the reforms 
taking place in this phase, and the autonomy achieved in some party functions, was 
functional to the control and mobilisation of the apparatus in support of the government and, 
thus, on behalf of the national leadership.  
 
4.4 The PS in government. The reform of the secretary-general’s and the federation 
presidents’ selection  
The election of Guterres at the congress represented a turning point in the party’s 
programmatic orientation. Influenced by the “third way” inaugurated by the Blair’s New 
Labour, Guterres moved the party positions towards the centre (Lobo and Magalhães, 2004). 
The preparation of the electoral program for the legislatives of 1995 was drawn up with the 
involvement of societal sectors and envisioned a wide plan of state modernisation, openness 
and transparency.54 The PS won the legislative elections, obtaining its best electoral result 
so far (nearly 44%) and only four seats from winning the absolute majority (idem).  
The principles of the electoral program were applied to the party internal functioning and 
mechanisms. The party’s openness to society was emphasised through the creation of 
“working groups” opened to independents and sympathisers, together with the efforts to 
counteract mechanisms of closeness for the control of power positions within the party, 
especially in the functioning of the party at the local level. Hence, there is in this phase a 
step forward towards the loosening of the party’s organisational boundaries.  
During the first governmental term (1995-1999), the party organisational model set up in 
1992 was reviewed. The wide criticism regarding the convention system made up of ex-
                                                          
54 PS, Electoral Program, 1995, «Estados Gerais para uma nova maioria» (Estados Gerais for a new majority).  
 76 
 
officio members to the detriment of the elective delegates, coupled with the failed attempt to 
enhance the members’ mobilisation, led in 1998 to a statutory revision (Biezen, 2003; Lisi, 
2009). The congress was reintroduced but without regaining the powers of electing the 
secretary-general. In fact, the leader became henceforth elected directly by the members. 
This momentous innovation was aimed at democratising the party functioning by giving the 
members a direct say in a key decisional process. As such, the reform changed the power 
balance making the party formally more inclusive, whereas it withdrew influence capacity 
from the structures on the ground by ending the congressional delegates’ role in electing the 
leader. The flow of powers from the middle-level elites (organised membership) to the 
individual member (atomised) increased leader’s legitimacy and autonomy within the 
organisation (Lisi, 2009). In chapter 8 we discuss this aspect more in detail drawing upon 
the elite interviews. 
Likewise, at the territorial level the federation presidents were elected directly by the 
members. Hence, the reform had similar effects of empowerment of the territorial leaders’ 
autonomy and legitimacy within the territorial organisation, fostering the reproduction of 
leader-centric features at the local level. The relevance acquired by those actors during this 
phase enhanced their role in the management of the relations with the national leadership.  
It is worth stressing that the federation presidents’ empowerment was the result of 
the national leadership’s strategy, not the “struggle” of the party’s periphery against the 
centre for more autonomy. In fact, Guterres included most of the federation presidents in the 
main national bodies, such as the secretariat and the political committee, therefore they 
belonged to the dominant coalition (Lisi, 2009). This position fostered the establishment of 
personal linkages with the national leader. This aspect, coupled with the empowerment 
within the territorial strictures provided by the direct election, set the conditions for them to 
assume a key role in the intra-party relations.  
Party governmentalisation characterised the Guterres’ administrations whereby 
several members of the government occupied positions in the party executive body (Lisi, 
2009). This process, together with the practice of appointing independents in ministerial 
offices, reinforced the power concentration in the prime minister and party leader (Lobo, 
2005b; Lisi, 2009). On the other hand, the deliberative bodies were demobilised and their 
influence capacity significantly reduced, since the party’s decisional centre was concentrated 
in the party in government. Although internal dissatisfaction, due to the difficulties in 
influencing the government did arise, no significant conflicts emerged in this phase, 
 77 
 
confirming the powerful role of incumbency in fostering party cohesion and avoiding public 
conflicts to emerge (Canas, 2005: 19-20; Lobo, 2005b; Lopes, 2005; Lisi, 2009: 143).  
The management of the territorial organisation was carried out by the party leader 
through an informal network of actors, comprising the federation presidents, the secretary 
for the organisation and the coordinator of the permanent committee (Lisi, 2009: 143). All 
those actors were connected through a system of regular meetings and contacts functioning 
in the context of the “council of the federation presidents” (idem).55 The federation 
presidents were in charge of mobilising the structures in support of the government and 
aggregating the consensus on the ground. As such, as observed by Lisi (2009), the pattern 
of relations resembled the stratarchical configuration or the franchise-model as predicted by 
Carty (2004). There is not tight hierarchical control and direction from above, but rather the 
leadership resorts to loyal and empowered actors which ensure the mobilisation on the 
ground of the party apparatus in favour of the government. The national leadership leads the 
party in government and the policies autonomously from the organisation. On the other hand, 
the autonomy of the local level seems more to reward the elites of the peripheral structures’ 
elites rather than the local organisations as collective entities. In fact, the model is based 
more on personal rather than organisational ties in a context of hollowing out of the 
organisation and its collective bodies, and high room of maneuver of the party leader for 
managing the party in office.  
 
4.5 Strengthening top-down control. The opposition years and Ferro Rodrigues’ 
leadership  
The second socialist government (1999-2001) ended early with Guterres’ resignation after 
the party’s defeat in the local elections (December 2001). The President of the Republic, 
Jorge Sampaio, dissolved the Parliament and called for fresh elections (March 2002). The 
electoral campaign was led by the new Secretary-General, Eduardo Ferro Rodrigues, 
member of the former party executive and minister in the outgoing government, elected 
(without competition) after the Guterres’ resignation from the leadership. The elections 
brought the PSD back to government in a coalition with the right-wing CDS-PP as junior 
partner. 
                                                          
55 The erstwhile Council of the Federation Coordinators.  
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The new leadership carried out important organisational reforms. Two wide goals 
were set, firstly, the renovation of the party’s leading bodies, and secondly, the party 
modernisation through efforts to open the party to civil society.56 The statutory revision was 
preceded by the update of the members’ register, which had been carried out last time in 
1986. The update could be identified as an indicator of central efforts to tighten the control 
over the peripheral structures. The goal was in fact to clear out those cases of local structures 
holding an inflated number of members, which enabled them to get over-representation in 
the party’s bodies.57 The local control of the membership recruitment allowed local leaders 
(i.e. caciques) to control pockets of votes for allotting posts in the party bodies and increasing 
the influence in local power (Lopes, 2005: 367-368). Furthermore, those practices fostered 
the local structures’ closeness and strategically hampered the internal renovation functioning 
as entry barriers to potential challengers. A measure dealing with the affiliation system was 
the attempt to centralise the collection of the member’s fees. The fees, so far collected by 
the sections, were to be paid directly to the party central office, which would have then 
transferred the funds to the local units. The then party spokesperson explained the measure 
due to the accountability requirements demanded by the new legislation on party funding 
and with internal transparency.58 At the same time, such type of measure implied the 
establishment of a more effective hierarchical control. In fact, the measure triggered conflicts 
between the party leadership and the local structures, with the latter being backed by the 
federation presidents. This prevented the full institutionalisation of the measure, which was 
withdrawn by the national committee, and the payment of the fees at the local level 
reestablished (Lopes, 2005; Lisi, 2006). This was achieved thanks to the pressures of 
powerful federations which wanted to counteract the centralising efforts carried out by the 
new leader (Lopes, 2005: 367-368).  
This episode of conflict is indicative of two aspects: firstly, the strategic importance for the 
local units to exercise control over the affiliations, and secondly the perception that the issue 
belonged to an area of domain where the national leadership could not impose authoritative 
decisions without facing resistance, especially in a context of opposition status and with a 
leadership which is still consolidating its power internally.  
Other aspects dealing with the territorial organisation were reformed.  
In particular, two measures were aimed at constraining the federation presidents’ power, 
                                                          
56  Ferro Rodrigues’ motion at the Congress: “Fazer bem pelo futuro” (Doing well for the future).  
57 “Público” online: «Convenção. Ferro Rodrigues admite processo de refiliação após as eleições», 13/1/2002.  
58 Paulo Pedroso, “Acção Socialista”, n° 1183, 2003. 
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increased during the Guterres’ leadership (Lopes, 2005; Lisi, 2009). As it will be discussed 
more in detail in chapter 6, the new statutes introduced the term limit for the federation 
president’s office and forbade the office accumulation with mandates in other executive 
party bodies. The aim was to push the renovation of the leading bodies and the elites’ 
circulation, while it attempted to hamper the expansion of the federation leaders’ autonomy 
and influence capacity at the national level.  
The reform of the national bodies indicated the effort to foster the central control 
over the party by extinguishing the permanent committee and resorting the secretariat as the 
highest executive body with its size considerably reduced (from 48 to 11) (Lisi, 2011: 149). 
Other measures pointed towards the renovation, such as the reduction of the ex-officio 
component of both the national and federation congresses and the introduction of a gender 
quota for the lists to the party bodies (at least 1/3 women). 
The second goal of the new directorate was aimed at enhancing the party-society 
linkage by introducing incentives for the involvement of passive members and draw 
supporters closer to the party. This was best exemplified by the introduction of a new form 
of affiliation, the “sympathizer”, and the introduction of informal groups for incentivising 
non-members to participate. At the same time, they were part of a marketing strategy for 
improving the unpopular image of the party after the electoral defeat and the return to 
opposition after the long period of incumbency. From an organisational perspective, this 
type of measures indicates the loosening of the organisational boundaries and the blurring 
of the distinction between members and supporters, identified as an organisational feature 
of the cartel parties (Katz and Mair, 1995). However, no substantive powers were actually 
attached to the grassroots and sympathisers through these measures. Furthermore, the re-
organisation of the party coincided with the emergence of a scandal directly involving 
prominent members, with the result of affecting the implementation of the innovations.59 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
59 Jurisdictional investigation named “Casa Pia”.  
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4.6 The PS in government. The leader’s autonomisation from the party under José 
Sócrates 
The leadership change was then triggered by the political developments within the centre-
right government, and namely by the decision of the President of the Republic, Jorge 
Sampaio, not to dissolve the Parliament, causing Ferro Rodrigues’ resignation.60 
For the first time the direct elections for the leadership were contested, with the race 
receiving an extensive media coverage. Three candidates ran: José Sócrates, Manuel Alegre 
and João Soares. Sócrates, Minister of the former socialist government and member of the 
outgoing party executive, who relied on wide internal support. Conversely, Alegre and 
Soares tried to appeal to the apathetic members by criticising the territorial elites’ grip on 
the party structures (Lisi, 2009: 155).  
Sócrates, who in the event was elected secretary-general by a large margin, endorsed 
a program of party modernisation and openness to civil society, Novas Fronteiras (New 
Frontiers), which was influenced by Guterres’ Estados Gerais. Initially aimed at involving 
civil society participation in the elaboration of the electoral program, the New Frontiers 
served as a “platform” for presenting the governmental policies.  A few months later the PS 
won its first absolute majority in the early elections of February 2005 (Freire and Lobo, 
2006). In this phase, the main features of the intra-party relations, experienced under the 
Guterres’ governments, reemerged. Beyond the overlap between the prime ministerial and 
party leadership offices, the party executive was governmentalised (Lobo, 2005b; Lopes, 
2005; Lisi, 2009: 134). The deliberative bodies were hollowed out, with the congressional 
meetings playing a “cheerleading” role, and internal criticism was almost absent.61 As 
mentioned, the policies carried out by the government were presented “outside” the 
traditional organisational boundaries in the context of the New Frontiers’ platform. The 
relations with the party organisation were managed by the permanent committee, made up 
of the members of the national secretariat outside the government. This body was initially 
led by Jorge Coelho and then headed by Sócrates himself, to be then dissolved on the latter’s 
proposal.62 
                                                          
60 The Prime Minister, Durão Barroso, had been nominated President of the European Commission. Pedro 
Santana Lopes, vice-president of the PSD, was nominated PM in substitution of Barroso by the PR Sampaio.  
61 For instance, “Público” online titled: “15th Congresso do Partido Socialista: PS: Partido Sócrates”, 9, 2006. 
Ana Gomes was among the few voices of dissent.  
62 Sócrates’ motion: “O Rumo do PS: Modernizar Portugal” (The path of the PS: Modernising Portugal), 15th 
Congress (2006). 
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In this phase leader’s autonomy and power were very high, as demonstrated by the 
Sócrates’ opposition to the proposals of appointing a deputy secretary-general in charge of 
the organisation, and thus refusing to separate the governmental functions from the party 
ones.63 The autonomy achieved by the leader is apparent in the capacity to impose decisions 
regarding the candidate selection processes, such as the (unexpected) prohibition of the 
“simultaneous candidacy” for the 2009 elections, i.e. the practice of MP candidates running 
also for the mayoral office (both elections were scheduled in 2009). The unnegotiated 
decision affected directly several members who had already announced their mayoral 
candidacy and that relied on the MP office as a fallback strategy in case of being defeated at 
the local elections.64 Likewise, the leadership personalisation is a defining feature of this 
phase, with strong emphasis on the leader in the electoral campaigns’ strategy.65 
The pattern of relations built with the territorial structures seemed to follow the 
network-model experimented during the Guterres’ administrations, built through personal 
linkages involving the party leader, the permanent committee’s coordinator, the national 
secretary for the organisation and the federation presidents, in charge of activating the 
structures on the ground in support of the government (Lisi, 2009: 143).66 Nevertheless, this 
model seemed not to work regularly, especially after Coelho’s resignation from the 
permanent committee, and the extinction of the body. These developments apparently 
loosened the linkages of the government with the territorial structures, as well as with the 
federation presidents who complained about the absence of regular meetings with the leader. 
To enhance the government-party relations, the transmission of informative notes to 
communicate to MPs and local branches the visit of members of the government to a district 
were then established.67 The establishment of these practices, however, indicates the 
disregard of the territorial organisation, and its instrumental mobilisation for showing 
support towards the government.  
In March 2011, Sócrates was re-selected leader for a fourth term in office. However, the 
term lasted only a few months as the political crisis due to the failed attempt of the socialist 
                                                          
63 Sócrates’ declaration to the press presenting his motion to the 2006 Congress: «There could not be a PS 
inside the government and a PS outside the government». 
64 The decision to prohibit the double candidacy had been already announced by the PSD. This fact could have 
influenced the subsequent decision of Sócrates.  
65 “Público” online: «Sócrates é o one-man show do primeiro site da campanha», 3/3/2009.  
66 For instance, the MP R. Sampaio (PS-Porto), very close to Sócrates, as well as F. Serrasqueiro (PS-Castelo 
Branco) and A. Simões (PS-Vila Real) who were then included in the National Secretariat.  
67 Interview with the PS-Aveiro federation president, MP Pedro Nuno Santos, 2013. 
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government to approve the forth austerity package (PEC IV) provoked the prime-minister’s 
resignation and Parliament’s dissolution. The resounding defeat of the PS at the early 
elections was then followed by the leader’s resignation.    
 
4.7 Back in opposition. Seguro’s attempts of reinvigorating the organisation and the 
rise of internal conflicts 
The leadership was contested by Francisco Assis, member of the outgoing party executive 
and former parliamentary leader, and António José Seguro, minister under the Guterres’ 
administration, who held large support within the territorial structures. As will be shown in 
chapter 8, this leadership campaign was focused on intra-party democracy reforms and 
party’s openness towards society.  
Seguro’s win represented a change in the dominant coalition leading the PS. The 
reform efforts of the new leadership aimed at reinvigorating the party now in opposition, 
with the organisation hollowed out during the years in office. To this aim, regular meetings 
of the national bodies were reintroduced and for the first time they were held in different 
districts rather than just in Lisbon. After a six-months debate new statutes were approved 
and important measures for the intra-party relations at both the horizontal and vertical level 
were introduced. Firstly, a new party office, the deputy secretary-general (Secretário-Geral 
Adjunto), in charge of supervising and coordinating the organisation when the party was 
incumbent, was created. The measure aimed at counteracting the problems that emerged 
during Guterres and, above all, Sócrates’ administrations with the hollowing out of the 
organisation. Secondly, the terms’ length of the national and federation bodies were 
extended to 4 years to coincide with the national legislature.68 The measure aimed at 
enhancing party cohesion and avoiding the emergence of internal disputes in the middle of 
a legislative term. To enhance the horizontal coordination between the party in central and 
public office, the parliamentary group’s leader was included as ex-officio member in the 
party executive. At the same time, such measures enhanced the central control over the 
parliamentary party, which in the PS (and PSD) is de facto subordinated to the party 
executive (Lobo, 2003).  
Other measures provided participative incentives to the ordinary members, through 
the attachment of voting rights in the candidate selection for both the national and local 
                                                          
68 “Público”, «Seguro quer sincronizar mandatos internos do PS com os ciclos eleitorais», 23/3/2012, p. 16. 
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public offices, whose implementation is analysed in detail in chapter 8.  
 As for the internal electoral processes, stricter provisions were adopted by the new 
directorate. The reforms potentially affected local structures’ autonomy in the management 
of these processes and tightened the central control. The seniority requirement for exercising 
voting rights was extended from 6 to 12 months. The final deadline for the member to pay 
the membership fees, and thus to be entitled to vote, was set until thirty days before the 
electoral act. The new provision allowed the blocking of the electoral registers and thus 
enabled the national party to know in advance the size of the selectorate. Other measures 
regarded the affiliation process by imposing a minimum staying period. More generally, 
these measures aimed at enhancing internal transparency targeting local practices such as 
the mass payment of members’ dues or the strategic transfer of members from a structure to 
another.69 In addition, the reform established organisational incentives, by rewarding with 
one additional delegate the local structures in case of successful electoral performance of the 
party in their area. Hence, for the first time the party introduced an additional criterium, 
beyond the membership ratio, to allocate party posts.  
Seguro’s decision-making system was based on a formal network of advisors, both 
partisans and independents, with expertise in different policy areas and with a strong 
emphasis on collegiality. The system was an attempt to approximate the party to society and 
to improve the policy development by relying on external actors. The national secretariat’s 
department in charge of the organisation was initially divided in two sectors coordinated by 
two secretaries. However, the system complicated the coherence of the internal processes 
and was then reversed.  
Since 2012, criticism from members close to the Lisbon Mayor, António Costa, 
targeted the leadership’s opposition strategy against the PSD/CDS-PP government, for being 
too weak.70 Still, the upcoming local elections pushed the two parts to postpone a full-blown 
                                                          
69 Interview with the National Secretary in charge of the Organisation and MP, Miguel Laranjeiro (2014): 
«Other little measures, whose goals were transparency and rigour, were the obligation for new members to 
present, beyond the  document for applying, the copy of the identity card and the certificate of residence in 
order to testify that he or she lived there. Before, it was not necessary, the candidate only needed the application 
document and two members as proponents. It seems to be a little change and for some citizens it does not 
matter, but it matters…There have been public cases of twenty members having the same residence. We also 
did another thing, we ask for the certificate of residence for cases in which some problem was detected and we 
argued that the residence would have been testified. When it was not testified, the members were kept in a 
suspended record. It is a detail for explaining that all the measures were undertaken with the purposes of clarity, 
transparency and rigour». 
70 “Público”: «Direcção do PS exige apoio a Seguro, críticos defended mais combate a Cavaco e juízes», 
24/3/2012. It is worth noting that, in this phase, a large part of the PS parliamentary group comprised MPs 
selected under the former leadership.  
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confrontation and the incumbent leader to negotiate with the costista personalised “faction”.  
Dissatisfaction reemerged after the European elections of 2014, exacerbated by the PS’s 
weak performance in the opinion polls.  
The territorial structures entered the conflict by playing an active role in the whole 
phase of leadership instability, with some of them publicly endorsing Costa and with some 
federations even approving motions requiring an extraordinary congress.71  
The conflict was then moved forward by Seguro who threw down the gauntlet by proposing 
open primaries to select the prime ministerial candidate in the 2015 elections.72 The elections 
for the federations, held immediately before the primaries, reflected the national conflict and 
the support the two challengers could count on within the territorial apparatus. These 
developments are discussed more in detail in chapters 6 and 8.  
Costa’s victory in these primaries paved the way for his selection as Secretary-
General in December 2014. The change was followed by the approval of new statutes that 
revised most of the Seguro’s innovations, namely those related with the internal processes, 
loosening the rules.73 At the same time, the elective component of the national secretariat 
was extended (from 11 to 16) to include members linked to the former leader and thus to 
reinforce internal unity. In the 2015 elections the new leader managed to bring the PS back 
to government, thanks to the negotiation of an unprecedented agreement by the PS with the 
radical left parties, i.e. BE, PCP and PEV, who supported in parliament Costa’s minority 
cabinet (De Giorgi and Santana-Pereira, 2016; Lisi, 2016).  
The goal of the new directive was to keep the party active by separating the party in 
government and the parliamentary group from the organisation.74 To this aim, substantial 
powers to manage the organisation were assigned to the deputy secretary-general, supported 
by the permanent committee, made up of members without governmental offices. In this 
regard, a different approach seems to be adopted by the new leadership, compared to the 
former experiences of the PS in government.  
                                                          
71 “Público” online: «Aparelho socialista afasta-se de Seguro. Distrital a distrital», 7/6/2014. 
72 “Público”: «Eleições primárias foram a surpresa na ‘batalha de Vimeiro» 1/6/2014, 4-9.  
73 Costa re-established the six-months seniority and extended the deadline from thirty to fifteen days before the 
internal contest. 
74 Party website: «Um partido para além do governo». Ana Catarina Mendes, Deputy Secretary-General, 
7/6/2016.  
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Furthermore, Costa’s motion presented at the 2016 Congress clearly envisioned  for the party 
a network-model articulation, open to society, with changes in the system based on dues-
paying membership and territorially structures.75  
 
Summary  
The previous sections have examined the PS under different phases. Different patterns of 
relation have been detected. During the party’s formative years hierarchy was the dominant 
pattern and the national leadership controlled the main decisional processes and the vertical 
organisational ties. During the party development’s phase this configuration responded to 
the need of ensuring a homogenous action across the country and to avoid the high risk of 
fragmentation. Reforms aimed at holding the territorial structures fully accountable and at 
reinforcing the federations’ competences in the supervision and coordination of the local 
sections were enacted by Soares after his return to leadership.  
This pattern started to change in the second half of the 1980s when the party was 
experiencing a long period in opposition and electoral erosion across the country. The 
measures adopted in this phase by Constâncio’s directorate attenuated power concentration 
in the national level by attaching formal powers to the federations in MPs candidate 
selection. Furthermore, the local structures’ organisation was revised to enhance the vertical 
and horizontal linkages to improve party performance in local power by introducing a 
coordinating body at council level. However, the devolution of power in this phase was 
undertaken by the leadership’s initiative and responded to the organisational necessity of 
improving the electoral implantation in a difficult phase and fostering internal cohesion.  
In the early 1990s, under Guterres’ leadership the PS undertook a new course moving 
ideologically towards the centre and emphasising the openness towards civil society. During 
the years in government (1995-2001), the reform of the leadership selection increased the 
secretary-general’s autonomy from the structures’ influence due to the direct election by 
                                                          
75 «Instead of a hierarchic party model, closed in its directorate, we want a model of network organization open 
to participation and in permanent contact with society […] An openness less centred in the party bodies, and 
more in the activities; less led by the party structures and more made in the participative forum […].There is 
space for renewal: we will propose to the National Committee to start a process of renewal of the party 
structures and of the model of linkages with the party. Traditional models of linkages, based on the financial 
contribution, as the dues-payment, and the exercise of party offices, produce well-known perverse effects, 
which are important to challenge» (Costa: “Cumprir a Alternativa, Consolidar a Esperança” (Accomplish the 
alternative, consolidate the hope (2016: 29-30). 
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members. This system was replicated at the federation level and fostered the autonomy and 
legitimacy of the federation presidents. While the party leader was in charge of the 
government and controlled the party through the governmentalisation of the party executive, 
the presidents ensured the linkages with the territorial apparatus and its mobilisation in 
support of the government when necessary.  
The shift to the opposition indicated attempts to constrain the power of the federation 
presidents and to tighten the control over the local structures intervening on their 
prerogatives regarding the affiliation processes and members’ fees. The rationales driving 
the organisational reforms enacted by Ferro Rodrigues regarded party’s renewal, 
transparency and modernisation. Most of the measures were resisted or were less effective 
in their practical implementation. With the return to government a few years later under 
Sócrates, the features characterising intra-party relations under Guterres’ leadership were 
reproduced,  with the difference that, due to the party enjoying its first ever absolute majority, 
there was even a stronger leadership personalisation. In this regard, Costa’s leadership seems 
to diverge as demonstrated by the attempts to keep the apparatus active during the 
incumbency through the deputy secretary-general and to avoid the governmentalisation of 
the party. By contrast, in opposition, the new leaders tried to revitalise the organisation by 
seeking to generate incentives of participation, revitalising party image, as well as 
consolidating their internal position. These goals entailed the adoption of measures directed 
to reinforce the top-down control. 
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The Social Democratic Party (PSD) 
The second part of this chapter focuses on the PSD analysing the relations between national 
and peripheral structures under four different phases: the formative phase, the long period in 
power under Cavaco Silva’s majority governments (1987-1991; 1991-1995), the long 
opposition phase, only interrupted by few years in power in the early 2000s, and the most 
recent governmental experience under Passos Coelho (2011-2015).  
4.8 The PSD. The formative phase and the organisational development 
The PSD was founded by the initiative of Francisco Sá Carneiro, Francisco Pinto Balsemão 
and Joaquim Magalhães Mota on May 1974.76 Only a few days after being formed, the PSD 
entered the first provisional government, with Sá Carneiro and Magalhães Mota being 
appointed ministers. Soon after, Sá Carneiro left the government to work on the party’s 
organisational development (Sá Carneiro, 2010: 74). Beyond the turbulent nature of the 
Portuguese transition, the organisational building and territorial implantation of the PSD was 
constrained by severe financial problems. Although fundraising campaigns were carried out 
in this phase, the main sources originated from the founders’ personal wealth and from the 
contribution of the northern industrial and bank sectors (Frain, 1997).77 The supply of 
funding from external entities was constrained by the weak linkages of the PSD with the 
European parties (with the partial exception of the German SPD), and its exclusion from 
transnational party associations, namely the Socialist International (Frain, 1997:81; Sá 
Carneiro: 2010: 179).  
In such context, the party was pressured to establish strong national ties. The process of 
organisational implantation was formally coordinated from the centre through the Secretariat 
for Regionalisation (Secretariado da Regionalização). Yet, as several scholars highlight,  the 
organisational building developed mainly from the periphery to centre, contributing to shape 
the more decentralised character of the party compared to the PS (e.g. Lopes, 2002; Jalali, 
2007). As de Sousa put it, the party was built «from the outside in Lisbon» (2000: 10). The 
party established an interstitial presence relying on opinion leaders in each town, especially 
in the northern ones. In such areas the PSD resorted to the co-optation of local elites and 
clientelist networks (Bruneau and Macleod, 1986; Corkill, 1995). Likewise, in the Azores 
                                                          
76 The original name was Partido Popular Democrático – PPD (Popular Democratic Party). The name was 
changed in October 1976. The three founders were independent MPs of the “liberal wing” during the 
liberalisation phase carried out by Marcelo Caetano. They resigned in 1973. 
77 “Povo Livre”, n° 52, 2/7/1975,  p. 12.  
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and Madeira regions, it resorted to pre-existent political organisations, formed by powerful  
barons, to create the PSD-Açores and the PSD-Madeira (Frain, 1997). However, the party 
needed to expand its coverage in areas where it was more difficult for it to gather support, 
namely the Setúbal industrial district and the rural districts of the Alentejo, which were both 
regions dominated by the communists. Building a local presence in these areas was crucial 
for not remaining a party territorially concentrated in the north (Frain, 1997: 38-44).78 
The success of the implantation varied from region to region. Most of the enrollments were 
done in the coastal districts of the north, and in the Azores and Madeira regions. Still, in a 
short period the party managed to establish some form of local presence, with delegations or 
representatives, in a large percentage of the councils (ibid.). Like the PS, the PSD followed 
the mass model configuration based on sections at the parish and council levels, as well as 
shop-floor sections which, however, were extinguished during the 1980s. The grassroots’ 
representation in the national bodies was ensured by the congress, which was made up of 
delegates elected on a local basis, while the ex-officio component was lower if compared to 
that of the PS (Corkill, 1995: 69-70). At the intermediate level, district-level organisations 
in the mainland and regional organisations (in the Azores and Madeira’s regions) were 
constituted. The intermediate level was more complex than the PS federations at the time 
(Stock, 1985).  
After the 1976 elections, the party remained in opposition until 1979. During those years, 
the organisational functioning was improved. First, by separating the political and the 
administrative tasks within the party executive. Then, the congresses held during those years 
set pluralism and decentralisation as important criteria governing the internal functioning, 
with the introduction of the principle of proportional representation for the National Council, 
the permanent deliberative body (Sá Carneiro, 1979: 128; Corkill, 1995:75; Frain, 1997). 
This choice was aimed at avoiding party splits and fragmentation (Frain, 1997). However, 
Sá Carneiro’s opposition prevented the system to be applied to the other national bodies. 
Likewise, while pluralism was emphasised, the right of tendency was expressly forbidden.  
The statutes approved in 1976 were aimed at increasing the decentralisation and enhancing 
the local units’ functioning. The party rules established the formal involvement of the district 
                                                          
78 The party rejected the attempts of some groups to impose a reinforced representation to the norther area (e.g. 
the Grupo do Porto at the 1976 Congress). 
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structures in candidate selection. Therefore, the PSD intermediate structures held from the 
outset formal powers in this process.  
The following revision of the statutes in 1978 aimed at approximating and involving the 
militants by establishing annual congresses and reducing the mandates of the party bodies to 
one year, and widening the powers held by the national council. The goals set by Sá Carneiro 
for the organisation entailed the enhancement of the internal cohesion, discipline, and 
functioning of the different components, as well as the improvement of the territorial 
penetration of the party. Party discipline over public stances taken by national and regional 
bodies’ members was tightened. These measures reveal attempts to strengthen the hierarchic 
control over the party and to consolidate the leadership’s internal position. Concomitantly, 
the vertical coordination between the district and local units, and the horizontal coordination 
between the local party and the local office-holders, were improved. 
 
4.9 The PSD in power in the 1980s. Party governmentalisation under Cavaco Silva 
In 1979 the PSD formed the “Democratic Alliance” (Aliança Democrática – AD) coalition 
with the centre-right “Democratic and Social Centre” (Centro Democrático Social – CDS) 
and the “Monarchic Popular Party” (Partido Popular Monárquico – PPM) to run in the 
legislative elections of the same year. From 1979 to 1983, the AD coalition formed three 
governments. The first was headed by Sá Carneiro until his sudden death in December 1980. 
Then, the AD’s governments were led by Pinto Balsemão. In this phase, only Sá Carneiro’s 
leadership calmed internal conflicts (Frain, 1997). Indeed, internal struggles exacerbated by 
personalistic  factionalism reemerged after Sá Carneiro’s death,  notwithstanding party’s 
governmental position (Lopes, 1988).  
In 1982 another statutory reform was carried out. At the national level, three vice-
presidents of the political committee were introduced, enabling the representation in the 
party directorate of the different “factions”. At the local level, the local structures’ leaders 
got ex-officio representation in the district structures’ political committee (Comissão Política 
Distrital) and the public office-holders in the deliberative body (Assembleia Distrital). The 
district permanent committee was included in the statutes as the restricted executive body 
and its competencies specified. The local sections were formally involved in the MPs 
candidate selection, obtaining the right to be consulted by the district structures regarding 
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the candidacies. These features show the greater power held from the outset by the PSD 
territorial structures compared to the PS.  
After the governmental experience under the AD, the PSD governed with the PS 
from 1983 to 1985, under the “Central Bloc”. In that year, the PSD’s majority governments 
begin, to be concluded only in 1995. In 1985, Cavaco Silva was (unexpectedly) elected 
leader by the congress, and two years later the PSD won its first absolute majority, which it 
replicated in 1991, thus governing alone for nearly a decade (1987-1995).79 During this 
phase, the organisation was controlled by the leader and prime minister, through the 
governmentalisation of the party executive, which comprised several ministers and junior 
ministers (Lobo, 2003; 2005b: 173-174). Lack of internal debate, marginalisation of the 
national bodies and reduction of factionalism characterised this phase (Frain, 1997: 89, 1998: 
188). Whenever in disagreement with the party leader, “exit” rather than “voice” strategies 
were chosen by prominent party members. The occupation of power fostered the 
autonomisation of the party leader from the party organisation, and extra-organisational 
resources provided by the access to power (i.e. patronage) were used to ensure the leader 
internal support and calm the factions aggregated around local barons and their clienteles 
(Frain, 1996; Lopes, 2004; Lobo, 2005b; Jalali and Lisi, 2009). Cavaco Silva’s personalised 
leadership was based on the establishment of direct linkage with the individual members and 
the electors, and on the neglection of the mediating role of the apparatus and intermediate 
strata (Lopes, 1988; Corkill, 1995; Frain, 1998: 199). On the other hand, Cavaco Silva’s 
weak relation with the party apparatus hampered his attempts to strengthen the control over 
the party by means of party rules, as best exemplified by the failed attempt to revise the 
statutes introducing disciplinary rules against internal dissent. Thus, in government there 
have been attempts to strengthen hierarchic control over the organisation, which were 
resisted in the congress by the party’s middle-level elites. 
When the second PSD administration was nearing its end (1995), Cavaco Silva 
decided not to run for a further mandate as leader. Following this decision, two candidates 
disputed the leadership at the 1995 Congress: Fernando Nogueira and Durão Barroso. The 
former was elected thanks to the support of the apparatus, which by contrast was broadly 
hostile to Barroso (Frain, 1997).80 Nogueira’s tenure was nonetheless short as he resigned 
from the leadership following the party’s defeat at the 1995 elections.  
                                                          
79 Cavaco Silva was elected for only few votes from the other candidate, Salgueiro.  
80 A third candidate, Santana Lopes, withdrew the candidacy.  
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4.10 Adapting to a ‘culture of opposition’. The organisational reforms in the second 
half of the 1990s  
The electoral defeat in the 1995 elections marked the beginning of a long opposition period 
and the change of several leaders in a few years. In 1996 the congress elected Marcelo 
Rebelo de Sousa as party leader, who remained in power until 1999. However, from the 
outset the new leader’s position was weakened by two facts. First, he was not in Parliament, 
thus it was more difficult for him to control the parliamentary group. Second,  the party 
executive was made up of members in charge of European and regional public offices (i.e. 
Jardim, Dâmaso, Capucho), thus the “dispersion” of the party executive hindered the 
containment of the pressures coming from local leaders, especially those linked to the Lisbon 
district-structure (Frain, 1997: 228).  
Within this context, under Marcelo’s leadership a wide plan of reorganisation was 
carried out. The statutory reforms were aimed at improving the internal functioning and at 
revitalising the membership.81 The party’s main goal was to adapt to the opposition status. 
As declared by the Secretary-General, Rui Rio: «the PSD had a culture of power, it did not 
have a culture of opposition and it needed to readapt to this new condition» (1997: 6-7).82 
The internal reforms regarded different issues: modernisation, clarification of the internal 
rules to avoid their manipulation and the overrepresentation in internal processes, financial 
transparency.83 Therefore, a wide process of “reaffiliation”, which entailed the update of the 
membership registers, was undertaken. As Pereira put it:  
«the process represented the most profound internal change, whose 
practical implementation was due to the exceptional combination of 
unrepeatable circumstances, namely the initiative of the party leader and the 
secretary-general, who acknowledged the political relevance of intervening in 
the recruitment processes» (Pereira, 2002: 8).84 
The measure represented a direct intervention of the national party over a local domain aimed 
at enhancing the top-down control in internal mechanisms (i.e. hierarchy). The membership 
recruitment was managed with large autonomy by the local structures, whereas the party at 
                                                          
81 “Povo Livre”: «Alteração dos estatutos PPD/PSD - Documento de reflexão», n° 1069, 15/5/1996, pp. 2-3, 
82 “Povo Livre” n°1112, 21/5/1997. 
83 “Semanário”, interview with Rui Rio, 24/7/1998.  
84 See also the interview to Rio in “Povo Livre”, n° 1072, 5/6/1996, p. 12. 
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the national level held only marginal capacity of control over the process. This fostered the 
diffusion of phenomena such as the manipulation of the number of members,  formation of 
“paper” branches, mass payment of members’ fees in occasion of intra-party elections.85 The 
result was the distortion of internal representation and the tight control of party structures by 
local notables, who were able to dispose of several party posts (e.g. delegates at the national 
congress and district assemblies). The reaffiliation process was then followed by the 
centralisation of the membership through the assignment of a national number to identify the 
members, which until then were identified at the district level. Concomitantly, new financial 
rules regarding the dues’ payment were approved: the national headquarters collected the 
member’s fee, retaining 10% and then transferring the rest to the local section where the 
member was officially enrolled.86 The section could still collect fees locally but since then 
it was obliged to forward these to the headquarters. These measures reinforced the 
accountability capacity of the national party and the top-down control, limiting the local 
autonomy. The reforms, which represented an attempt of the national party to constrain local 
autonomy and strengthen the control over the organisation, raised intra-party conflicts and 
were resisted by the local structures, which were able to attenuate the effects of their 
implementation (Pereira, 2002). Thus,  territorial structures continued to exercise important 
powers regarding recruitment and capacity to influence the enrollment (and act as entry 
barriers).  
A second type of measures entailed in the statutory revision regarded ordinary 
members’ inclusion in internal decisions. Thereafter, the district structures’ bodies were 
directly elected by members. Concomitantly, the power of the local assemblies in these 
processes was reduced. The democratisation was applied only at the local level given that 
the proposals supporting the direct election by members of all the party bodies, including 
the leader, were withdrawn from voting due to Marcelo de Sousa’s opposition. Thus, the 
national congress kept its prerogatives in the process, remaining the selecting body of the 
party leadership.  
In the meanwhile, party instability intensified with increasing pressures coming from 
the local elites and difficulties for the national leadership to secure internal cohesion (de 
Sousa, 2000). The growing “infiltration” of the national bodies by local office-holders and 
                                                          
85 Reform proposals entailing measures aimed at counteracting those practices (called sindicatos de votos) by 
changing the criteria for the allocation of delegates were rejected. See for instance the position of former 
secretary-general, A. Capucho, in “Povo Livre”, n° 1069, 15/5/1996. 
86 “Povo Livre”, n°1100, 19/2/1997. 
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local cadres since the second half of the 1990s worsened the condition of vulnerability 
characterising party leaders outside governmental office (Jalali, 2006; Pereira, 2007: 58).87 
This process was apparent in the permanent deliberative body, the National Council, whose 
fractionalisation was worsened by the proportional representation system. This factor, 
coupled with the local leaders’ control over the district and local bodies, gave the peripheral 
structures leverage in intra-party dynamics to the detriment of the national leadership, which 
was discouraged from alienating the support of territorial leaders (Jalali, 2006, 2007).  
In this regard, it may be argued that this pattern diverges from the stratarchical 
paradigm originally predicted by Katz and Mair (1995). In fact, the penetration of the 
national bodies by the local sectors would contradict the separation of spheres of influences 
and mutual autonomy between strata. On the other hand, it is worth highlighting that local 
level’s pressure over the national level was not aimed at influencing party’s national 
strategies, but rather it served the local strata to keep their autonomy in local interests against 
national party’s intervention. The local level seems thus to take advantage of the national 
leadership’s weakness in opposition to secure its local autonomy by resorting to the 
occupation of the national deliberative bodies. The main source of national-local conflicts 
within the PSD emerged during the reform of the statutes governing the parliamentarians 
position, defended by Guterres’ government. The reform put an end to the frequent practices 
of MPs temporarily suspending office in order to exercise functions as mayors and then 
returned to the Parliament. The abstention of the PSD is illustrative of the influence capacity 
exercised by the local sectors and mainly aimed at preserving their local interests (Jalali, 
2007).  
In 1999, another leadership change took place with the election of Durão Barroso, 
whose mandate lasted until 2004. The new leader tried to consolidate his power by 
distributing internal incentives through the inclusion of party apparatus’ representatives (i.e. 
district leaders and mayors) in his lists for the national bodies.88 At the same time, this 
strategy served to ensure the  mobilisation of the organisation for the upcoming local 
elections (December 2001). Concomitantly, organisational measures indicate the efforts of 
the national leadership to contain the structures and enhance elites’ renewal, such as through 
the adoption of term limits to the district president’s office and the establishment of 
compulsory turnover after three mandates (six consecutive years in office). Like the PS, in 
                                                          
87 Pereira defined this trend as an “autarquização” (municipalisation) of the party structures.  
88 “Público” online: «Durão cerca-se de indefectíveis» 28/2/2000.  
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the PSD, low elites’ circulation fostered the emergence of oligarchic tendencies within the 
apparatus. The adoption of term limits in both parties showed the national level’s concern 
(at least in terms of party image) over the issue (see chapters 6 and 7).  
Concurrently, the ex-officio members ceased to be included as full members (i.e. 
voting rights) in the congress, which henceforth was formed exclusively by elected 
delegates. The measure aimed at appealing to the grassroots by providing more influence in 
the congress. However, it is worth stressing the strategic rationale behind the proposal of 
removing the ex-officio component, given that it emerged as counter-proposal to Santana 
Lopes’ motion entailing the direct election of the party leader that, for the first time, was to 
be voted by the congress (Congress of Viseu, 2000).  
The victory in the 2001 local elections (with notable wins in major cities such as Lisbon and 
Porto), increased the PSD’s perspective to return to power, contributing to calm internal 
pressures and to enhance Barroso’s room for manoeuvre (Jalali, 2007). The socialist defeat 
at the local elections was followed by Guterres’ resignation as Prime Minister and party 
leader and paved the way for early elections to be held in February 2002.  
 
4.11 From opposition to government and back. The rise of leadership instability 
(2000-2010) 
The victory of the PSD in the early elections of 2002 was followed by the formation of a 
coalition government with the CDS-PP as junior partner (Lobo and Magalhães, 2002).  
At the party level, the incumbency opened an internal debate regarding the need to find 
mechanisms discouraging the identification of the party with the government, occurred 
under Cavaco Silva, and the consequent demobilisation of the party.89 Yet, no consensus 
was found regarding the separation of the governmental and party function.  
Moreover, two years later, Barroso resigned from the government and the party leadership, 
due to his election as President of the European Commission. The PR, Sampaio, appointed 
as Prime Minister Santana Lopes, the first vice-president of the PSD, who was then elected 
party leader by the Congress.90 However, it turned out soon that Santana Lopes lacked 
support within the party, both from prominent members (e.g. Cavaco Silva) and from large 
                                                          
89 Público” online, «Um Congresso para evitar os erros do cavaquismo», 12/7/2002.   
90 Barroso had appointed Santana Lopes, the candidate defeated at the 2000 congress, as vice-president of the 
national political committee in order to foster party unity. 
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sectors of the territorial apparatus, which was still dominated by barrosistas - the 
personalised faction close to the former leader. The ensuing governmental instability led the 
PR to dissolve the Parliament and to call for fresh elections, held in February 2005.  
The leader’s negotiation with the territorial structures for the MPs candidates was highly 
conflictual, with the district presidents publicly criticising the leader’s unwritten prerogative 
to decide the top candidates. Thus, the conflictual candidate selection and electoral campaign 
denounced the enduring factionalism within the PSD and the difficulties for the new leader 
to build internal consensus.91An excerpt of a press interview delivered after the elections by 
the district president of the PSD-Leiria, Isabel Damasceno, well illustrates the relations of 
the structures with this leader:  
«the unanimity of the district structures towards Santana Lopes in the last 
congress existed because there was not an alternative, Santana was the Prime 
Minister. It was convenient to support him».92 
The 2005 election represented a true debacle for the PSD which obtained 28,7% of the votes, 
showing the leader’s reduced capacity to mobilise the party electorate (Lobo and Silva, 
2018). Shortly after the elections, and given increasing turmoil, with criticism towards the 
district presidents for not having supported the government, Santana Lopes summoned an 
extraordinary congress announcing his resignation.  
The leadership was then contested at the Congress by two candidates: Luís Marques Mendes, 
one of the main critics of Santana Lopes, and minister in Barroso’s government, and Luís 
Filipe Menezes, mayor of an important northern council (Gaia) and former leader of PSD-
Porto, the biggest district-structure. The former was the “favourite candidate”, being publicly 
supported by prominent national members as well as by large sectors of the party apparatus.  
The campaign for the leadership was centred on the organisational reforms, namely the 
reform of the leader’s selection method. The two candidates supported the introduction of 
the democratisation of the leadership selection  as a measure to revitalise the membership 
and provide participatory incentives. Contrary to Menezes, Mendes had been a strong critic 
of the direct election, indicating the strategic consideration behind the debate over the reform 
                                                          
91 For instance, Cavaco Silva, did not authorise the use of his image in the electoral posters, suggesting the 
perception of the PSD’s unpopularity. In January 2006 he would have ran as candidate in the presidential 
elections.  
92 “Público” online, 22/2/2005. https://www.publico.pt/2005/02/22/jornal/destaque-8214.  
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(Lisi, 2015a).93 Menezes also tried to appeal to the apparatus by supporting measures such 
as the inclusion of the district presidents as ex-officio members of the party executive, and a 
closer relation of the national leadership with the local structures.  
Mendes’ election was followed by the statutory revision, introducing the direct election of 
the leader by members, to be concluded with the final approval by congress held after the 
presidential elections. The reform altered the power distribution by decreasing the power of 
the delegates elected by the local structures and by improving the leader’s legitimacy. The 
reform is discussed more in detail in chapter 8.   
In the meanwhile, Mendes had to navigate the party in opposition, with local 
elections on the horizon and the PS government in its “honey-moon” phase. Mayors of 
important municipalities were included in the party executive in order to prepare the party 
for the local elections.94 Concomitantly, efforts to impose the national strategy over the local 
elections’ campaign were undertaken by the new leadership. This was best exemplified by 
Mendes’ attempt to filter candidates involved in corruption-related scandals and thus to 
forbid them to run under the party label. The decision, aimed at improving party image 
through transparency measures, triggered internal strife since it directly involved powerful 
local barons in party strongholds and who opposed the central intervention in issues 
considered of “local domain”. These episodes of conflicts, which in some case resulted in 
the disaffiliation and formation of (successful) independent lists running against the party, 
showed the difficulty for the national leadership to exercise control over the party in some 
areas due to local leaders and notables’ grip on local structures and local power. This feature 
makes national intervention in local domain more difficult. More in general, these episodes 
are indicative of the party’s fragile loyalties and organisational weakness due to the 
personalised control of the party structures. Notwithstanding the loss of some strongholds, 
the PSD won (alone or in coalition) more than half of the 308 municipalities, giving Mendes 
a little more breathing space (Jalali and Lobo, 2006).  
At the internal level, the reforms carried out in this phase regarded two aspects, which 
were both aimed at revitalising the organisation. Firstly by the direct election of the leader 
there were provided incentives of participation to the rank-and-file. Still, the Congress 
remained the elective body of the other national bodies, including the party executive. The 
                                                          
93 Menezes had actively endorsed the introduction of the members’ ballot for the district leaders and the party 
leader since the 1990s.  
94 Coimbra and Leiria mayors.  
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second regarded a key aspect for the party functioning, i.e. the separation between the party 
in government and the party organisation. This issue, which had been already discussed in 
2002 during Barroso’s government, concerned the attempt to avoid the hollowing out of the 
organisation when the party was incumbent, experienced under Cavaco Silva.  
In practice, the new rules set the prohibition for the secretary-general to accumulate 
governmental functions. Concomitantly, the measure gave this actor, directly appointed by 
the leader, strong powers to manage the organisation during the incumbency and to keep the 
party mobilised and supportive of the government on behalf of the leader and prime minister. 
Finally, other measures aimed at improving the vertical coordination with the peripheral 
structures by establishing regular (i.e. every two months) meetings to be held between the 
party leader and the secretary-general with the district presidents.  
In the first direct leadership selection experienced by the PSD (2006), Mendes ran 
unopposed. Nevertheless, the election in Congress of the national bodies showed that 
personalised factionalism was strong and organised. This was best exemplified by the fact 
that the leader’s list to the National Council failed to obtain the majority of the elective posts 
(23 in 55 elected members). In the following months, dissatisfaction towards the opposition 
strategy threatened leadership stability and finally led Mendes to resign following the defeat 
of the party in the early elections for the Lisbon’s town-hall (July 2007) governed in coalition 
with the CDS.95 The direct election was this time disputed by two candidates: Mendes, who 
was running for re-election, and his former challenger Menezes. While Mendes was 
supported by large part of the party elites, including most of the district presidents, Menezes 
tried to appeal to the local office-holders by endorsing measures such as the decentralisation 
of the financing, the exclusive competence of the district structures on the parliamentary  
selection, the establishment of regular contacts between the party leader and the local office-
holders.96 Menezes managed to win the direct election for a tight margin and failed to get 
the control over the National Council. The new leader’s longevity in office was short. Nearly 
seven months after being elected, Menezes stepped down due to the permanent state of 
internal criticism. 
                                                          
95 The Lisbon Mayor, Carmona Rodrigues, had been elected with the PSD-CDS coalition as independent in 
2005. Due to his involvement in a juridical investigation, Mendes decided to withdraw the confidence on the 
mayor, paving the way to early elections.  
96 “Povo Livre”, n° 1525, 17/10/2007, p. 3 Menezes also defended the return of the payment of the party dues 
on cash, a practise that had been forbidden due to transparency reasons, such as to hamper mass payment 
practices. The national council voted in favour of the revision of the party regulation on financing (68%). 
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The leadership was then contested by four candidates, displaying a high level of 
competitiveness. In the event, Manuela Ferreira Leite, former Minister of Finances and 
backed by prominent national members, defeated Pedro Passos Coelho and Santana Lopes 
who were supported by several territorial leaders (e.g. district presidents).97 Hence, Ferreira 
Leite’s election as party leader was interpreted by some observers as evidence of the reduced 
influence exercised by the local barons on members, due to the direct election system (Lisi, 
2011: 237). The leadership change coincided with an intensive electoral cycle: European, 
legislative and local elections were scheduled in 2009.  
This context required the new leader to focus on the electoral campaign rather than 
organisational issues. In fact, in this phase the candidate selection process was the major 
arena of conflict between the party leadership and large sectors of the territorial 
organisation.98 The national leadership tried to tighten the control over the process of 
selection for both the legislative and local elections and to marginalise the district presidents 
from the process. Firstly, in the pre-selection phase the leader decided to retain for herself 
the prerogative of appointing the top-list candidates for the legislative election. Secondly, by 
vetoing candidates approved by the structures while parachuting others. 
Thirdly, by forbidding the practice of “double candidacy”. Accordingly, a candidate could 
not run both for the legislative and the local elections. These hierarchically-oriented 
measures were best exemplified by the withdrawal of Passos Coelho, former challenger of 
the incumbent leader, from the list approved by the district structure (PSD-Vila Real).99 
While in the European election the PSD came out ahead of the PS (31,7% vis-à-vis 
26,5%), it was not able to capitalise the result at the legislatives, won by the socialists this 
time with a relative majority (Freire, 2010). The electoral defeat exacerbated the internal 
criticism towards the party leader, with public pressures to anticipate the leadership election 
before the expiration of the mandate (2010) emerging, and leadership changes at district 
level.100 However, the clarification was postponed after the local elections. Although the 
                                                          
97 The forth candidate was the MP, Patinha Antão, but he had no real chance to compete.  
98 For instance, the political committee of the PSD-Faro (leader supporter of Santana Lopes) approved a 
declaration questioning the “discretionary” use of the statutory powers by the leader.  
99 These episodes received an extensive media coverage. See for instance: “Público” online: «Pedro Passos 
Coelho fora da lista do PSD para as legislativas», 5/8/2009; “Expresso” online: «PSD: Polémica em Aveiro, 
Setúbal e Lisboa», 4/8/2009;  “Jornal de Notícias”: «Líder inflexível põe PSD em pé de guerra», 6/8/2009.  
100 “Público” online: «Aparelho laranja posiciona-se para a sucesão no PSD»; 17/11/2009; “Diário de Notícias” 
online: «Abaixo-assinado no PSD para provocar diretas já», 24/11/2009.  
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PSD won most of the town-halls, it failed to keep the number of councils won in the former 
elections and lost in terms of votes and seats (Freire, 2010).  
 
4.12 Passos Coelho’s leadership and the return to government (2010-2015) 
Finally, in March 2010, an extraordinary congress was assembled to debate the political 
situation and different proposals of organisational reforms, including the return to the 
election of the leader by the congress and the revision of the candidate selection. Some 
district structures (Viana do Castelo, Faro, Setúbal, Lisbon, Coimbra, Vila Real, Portalegre, 
Bragança, Castelo Branco and Évora) tried to aggregate support towards the reform of the 
candidate selection proposing to clearly specify in the statutes the division of power between 
the national and local level, i.e. while the national political committee retained the right to 
select the top-list candidates, the rest of the list was to be of competence of the district 
political committees.  
The direct elections that followed the congress were won by Passos Coelho. To 
secure the party organisation and try to consolidate his internal power, two main strategies 
were adopted by the new leader. First, the negotiation with the second most voted candidate 
(Paulo Rangel) of a unitary list to the national council. The move ensured the control of the 
majority of the seats. The second strategy was the building of tighter (and personalistic) 
linkages with the territorial structures, by appointing as Secretary-General a member with 
strong connections and popularity within the structures, Miguel Relvas, who had a key role 
in mobilising the support towards Passos Coelho.101 
The leadership change, and the return of the PSD to government after the early 
elections of September 2011, inaugurated a phase of party stability. Still, the incumbency 
occurred under harsh external constraints. In May 2011 the socialist government, the PSD 
and the CDS-PP signed the “Memorandum of Understanding” with the European 
Commission, European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The bailout and 
the adjustment program, negotiated with the “troika”, imposed austerity policies which the 
new PSD-CDS/PP government had pledged to comply with.102 
                                                          
101 Relvas was substituted in 2011 when he entered the government as minister since the party statutes prohibit 
the accumulation of the office of secretary-general with governmental functions. In April 2013 Relvas resigned 
due to a scandal involving his master’s degree.  
102 In May 2011 the PS government and the PSD and the CDS-PP signed the “Memorandum of Understanding” 
with the European Commission, European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund. 
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Thus, compared with the governmental experiences of 1985-1995 decade, the party 
faced a radically different economic and political environment. In particular, the reform of 
the local administration and the spending cuts on the local finances imposed by the 
Memorandum could trigger intra-party conflicts between the national and the local levels. 
The general context could make it more difficult for the national leadership to rely on the 
resources ensured by the access to power while neglecting the organisation as source of 
internal support. Moreover, Passos Coelho had a closer relation with the party apparatus 
compared to that established by Cavaco Silva. Measures for managing the party organisation 
during the incumbency were adopted. After being reselected for a second term (2012-2014), 
Passos Coelho reshuffled the party executive replacing some of the members which held 
governmental functions, which indicated the effort to avoid party governmentalisation. A 
new party office, the “political coordinator” for heading the party on behalf of the leader and 
PM was created. Initially, this office was entrusted to a member rather distant from the party 
apparatus (Moreira da Silva), which was interpreted as a way to contain the influence of this 
sector in the party executive.103 Concomitantly, internal incentives aimed at rewarding 
careerists were introduced through the expansion of the national bodies (the national council 
shifted from 55 to 77 members), suggesting the attempt to consolidate internal support.  
On the other hand, intra-party democracy reforms improving members participation and 
party openness, which had been promised by Passos Coelho when elected leader in 2010, 
were rejected by the congress (see chapter 8).  
The first congress held with the party in government (2012) served to show the party 
cohesion towards the government. Even though this time the unitary list to the National 
Council failed to reach an absolute majority, apparently the competing lists were not 
antagonistic to the leader’s line. The discontent towards the governmental policies expressed 
from the party in local power and represented by the ASD (local office holders’ affiliated 
association) and ANAFRE (parishes’ national association) was circumscribed to avoid the 
negative effects on the image of the government.104 
Yet, in the following months the relations with the structures and the district leaders seemed 
to deteriorate due to the difficult of the territorial structures to be heard by the government 
regarding local issues.105 Few weeks before the 2013 local elections, a crisis within the 
coalition government led to a governmental reshuffle with implications on the party 
                                                          
103 Público: «Passos quer romper com o aparelhismo no interior do partido», 25/3/2012, p. 8.  
104 Público: «Cúpula do PSD receia que autarcas descontentes ensombrem o congresso», 23/3/2012, p. 8.   
105 Jornal de Negócios online: «Líderes das distritais do PSD criticaram Passos Coelho», 10/5/2013.  
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organisation. The political coordinator, who was appointed minister, was substituted by the 
vice-president and junior minister, Marco António Costa.  The choice for Costa, who held a 
strong influence within the structures, could contribute to calm the territorial structures that 
lamented difficulties in acceding to the government after Relvas’ resignation as minister.  
At the electoral level, the PSD’s official position regarding the interpretation of the 
Law of 2005 on the term limits in local power indicates national party’s low interference in 
local affairs or, from a reversed perspective, local barons’ high influence. Contrary to the 
PS, the PSD decided to allow the mayors who had completed three consecutive terms in 
office to run as candidates in a different council. In some councils, powerful mayors were 
able to impose their candidacy notwithstanding the opposition of the local sections and the 
activists (e.g. Porto, Guarda). On the one hand, these occurrences confirm party’s 
organisational weakness on the ground vis-à-vis personalistic tendencies and, on the other 
hand, national party’s difficulty or unwillingness to intervene at the local level, even in 
episodes potentially damaging for party’s public image.106  
 
The debacle at the 2013 local elections represented a yellow card to Passos Coelho’s 
government. Public dissent towards the party’s neo-liberal drift were expressed by 
prominent members in the national media and the party in local power tried to make its voice 
heard demanding a new “pact of confidence”.107 At the following congress (of 2014) the 
party directorate placed the emphasis on the governmental success in complying with the 
Adjustment Program and on the approaching European elections. At the internal level, the 
leader’s strategy towards the organisation suggested the attempt to reinforce his position and 
avoiding power concentration in the political coordinator. The political committee included 
influential new vice-presidents, such as Cascais’ Mayor and former PSD-Lisbon president, 
Carlos Carreiras. Likewise, the unpopular and controversial return of his former right-hand, 
Relvas, as top-list candidate in the National Council indicated the leader’s room for 
manoeuvre.108 Still, the decision had a negative impact on the results for the national bodies’ 
                                                          
106 Porto was the most emblematic case. Menezes’ candidacy to the town-hall was criticised by prominent 
members, including the outgoing PSD mayor, Rui Rio. Público: «PSD Concelhio dividido quanto à candidatura 
de Menezes ao Porto», 11/10/2012. In Guarda the process led to the resignation of the local section: «Concelhia 
da Guarda do PSD demitiu-se em bloco por discordar do candidato». In Sintra the conflicts between the local 
and the district structure led to the expulsion of the former Secretary-General (António Capucho). Several 
members were expelled for having supported or joined opposition lists.  
107 Motion presented by the Autarcas Social-Democratas (ASD).  
108 Expresso: «Passos escondeu Relvas da direção do PSD», 1/3/2014, p. 8. The list headed by Relvas only 
elected 18/70 members at the national council. 
 102 
 
lists thus undermining party cohesion in a difficult context, which was further complicated 
by the defeat of the PSD-CDS coalition in the European elections.  
The 2015 candidate selection process showed the national leadership’s goal to filter 
candidates. Firstly,  stricter pre-selective criteria excluded local office-holders from running. 
Secondly, in some cases top-list members were imposed in opposition to the district-
structures’ preferences.109 These decisions affected candidates backed by the territorial 
structures which tried to challenge the national party on this issue, to no avail.110  
While the PSD-CDS/PP coalition won the elections, it failed to have the necessary 
majority support in Parliament to govern. This phase of instability was followed by the new 
political scenario that led the PS to the government. The unpredictable political context 
created a stalemate within the PSD. On the one hand, the perception was that the government 
would not have lasted too long. On the other, concrete alternatives to the leadership had not 
emerged or they still needed to aggregate consensus. In such context, Passos Coelho was 
reselected for a fourth term, which was characterised by internal strains from the outset. 
Passos Coelho stepped down shortly afterwards the party’s electoral debacle in local 
elections. In January 2018, Rui Rio, former secretary-general and former Porto Mayor, was 
elected leader.  
Summary  
In the case of the PSD, local structures’ autonomy was more pronounced from the outset and 
was stated in the formal rules adopted in the early years, making this level stronger in 
comparison with the PS. Concomitantly, on the part of the leadership there was the need to 
conciliate internal pluralism and local autonomy with central control, which implied the 
adoption of hierarchic-oriented measures (e.g. party discipline). This strategy was more 
easily accomplished when Sá Carneiro managed to affirm his undisputed leadership and until 
his sudden death (1980). During Cavaco Silva’s majoritarian governments, the national 
leadership extensively resorted on extra-organisational resources, i.e. patronage and 
occupation of the state, to build the consensus and contain internal pressures. The party was 
identified with the government (the so-called poder laranja).111 The long incumbency was 
                                                          
109 PSD, Comissao Politica Nacional, «Regulamento eleitoral» (2015). Note that the lists were negotiated with 
the CDS/PP, junior partner of the pre-electoral coalition, “Portugal à Frente”, thus the number of seats at 
disposal of each party was reduced.  
110 Diário de Notícias: «Autarcas fora das listas causa desconforto nas estruturas do PSD», 12/7/2015. See also 
Público: «Escolha de Nilza obriga a organização de Beja do PSD a ‘engolir sapos vivos’»  
111 Orange power. Laranja (orange) is the colour of the PSD 
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followed by a long period in opposition, briefly interrupted between 2002 and 2004 with 
Barroso’s government. The adaptation to the novelty of being opposition required the 
adoption of organisational reforms aimed at revitalised the organisation, enacted by Marcelo 
Rebelo de Sousa and Rui Rio (1996-1999). The direct elections of the district party bodies 
were the main incentives to mobilise the rank-and-file. Concomitantly, the measure reduced 
local assemblies’ influence at the territorial level. The reforms also comprised politically 
sensitive measures for enforcing transparency in internal processes and issues of local 
domains, which in fact triggered conflicts with the peripheral structures. Similar reforms 
were done by Mendes’ directorate, which also tried to impose decisions in local candidacies. 
Concomitantly, the introduction of the direct leadership selection reduced the influence 
exercised by the local structures through the delegates in the national congress. However, 
this innovation was forced by external and internal pressures, i.e. contagion form the PS, 
electoral defeat, party image and struggle for the leadership. Moreover, in this phase the 
reform also concerned the party-government separation and namely the need to counteract 
the demobilisation of the organisation, experienced under Cavaco Silva. Overall, the phase 
in opposition was characterised by high leadership instability fostered by internal strains 
which also involved national-local relations, showing the difficulties experienced by the 
PSD leadership in trying to tighten hierarchic control in local domains. The high instability 
experienced during the 2000s indicates the importance for the leader to hold a broad support 
within the apparatus for surviving in office. The two long phases in government, first under 
Cavaco Silva and then under Passos Coelho are different. Beyond the characteristics of the 
government, (majoritarian vis-à-vis coalitional) and of the socio-economic context (2011 
bailout), the leader’s relation with the party apparatus diverged. Under Passos Coelho’s 
mandate, the relations of the national leadership with the territorial structures are managed 
relying on actors very popular within the territorial structures, such as the secretary-general 
and the political coordinator, which may have enabled the leader to have the territorial 
organisation under control and mobilised in support of the government.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the centre-periphery relations within the PS and the PS from 1974 
onwards to test whether an increasing degree of reciprocal autonomy over time emerged. It 
has looked at the different institutional position (opposition-government) experienced by the 
two parties. The expectation was to find stratarchical features (reciprocal autonomy) when 
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the party was incumbent, and to find attempts to reinforce hierarchical control under 
opposition status. The analysis has shown that in both parties, distinct patterns emerge in the 
different phases. The PS started from a hierarchic configuration entailing unilateral control 
from above, which was loosened since the mid of 1980s. The loosening of hierarchical 
control was directed from the centre and responded to the necessity of improving party’s 
local electoral performance and consolidating the leader’s internal position. In other words, 
it was not the result of conflicts triggered by the periphery demanding for autonomy.  
The case of the PS confirms previous observations suggesting a trend towards stratarchical 
configuration, especially during governmental phases (Lisi, 2009). Incumbency fostered 
reliance on extra-organisational resources to the detriment of the resources and the inputs 
generated by the organisation, except for the ritual mobilisation in specific phases. However, 
in opposition, the attempts to tighten hierarchical control have been too short for showing to 
what extent the configuration of the relations between levels radically changes. The 
governmental experience under Costa’s leadership is still ongoing. On the one hand, 
differently from the previous phases in government, the leadership is trying to avoid the 
hollowing out of the organisation by separating the party from the government. One the other 
hand, the last statutory change seems to envision the diluting of the organisational 
boundaries through the inclusion of sympathisers in party decisions and through the creation 
of new forms of coordination non-territorially based. 
Compared to the PS, the PSD has followed a different path. While in the PS the starting point 
is a hierarchical configuration, in the PSD the territorial structures’ autonomy, and therefore 
the tendency towards stratarchical configuration, has been more pronounced since the outset, 
confirming previous studies (Jalali, 2006; Jalali and Lisi, 2009). This initial feature has been 
incorporated in the party’s functioning through formal rules and informal practices adopted 
during the formative phase. The long governmental phase experienced under Cavaco Silva, 
and the stability ensured by the occupation of power, contributed to consolidate the division 
of competences between levels. This model has then conditioned the following 
developments in intra-party relations. In the long phase at the opposition, there have been 
attempts of tightening the control from above, but their practical effects have been defused, 
as well as the interference in local electoral issues has been contested. The autonomy of the 
local level made more difficult for the leadership to try to impose hierarchic measures, 
especially in opposition and under high leadership instability. In this phase, the internal 
conflicts concerned the defence of the local structures’ autonomy regarding the management 
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of local power. The local level has been able to keep its degree of autonomy by means of 
internal struggles which have taken place by means of local elites’ penetration in the national 
bodies (Jalali, 2006). Contrary to what predicted by Katz and Mair (1995) – as separation of 
the local and national levels also in party bodies’ composition – the territorial structures used 
precisely their access to the national party bodies for defending their own local autonomy. 
However, the periphery seems not to have taken advantage of this higher autonomy, and 
influence capacity, to improve its formal powers in terms of allocation of resources and 
competences over time. Rather, like the PS, the territorial structures have lost influence 
capacity in the selection of the party leader, which has been transferred to the members and 
withdrawn from the congress contributing to the autonomisation of the leader.  
Finally, in line with our expectation, the different nature of party origin seems to play a role 
in the different paths emerged in the two parties. In the PSD, the local structures’ autonomy 
originated in the party formative phase seems contribute to explain the model of relations 
between levels. Likewise, the higher centralised nature of PS contributes to explain the 
convergence towards stratarchy over time, and namely the autonomy as a process ‘delegated’ 
from the centre. 
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Chapter V 
Organisation, resources and powers of the PS and the PSD territorial 
structures 
  
This chapter focuses on the territorial structures by presenting key features concerning their 
organisation, resources, powers and leadership. From this perspective, this chapter dialogues 
with chapter 3 which has observed the two parties at the national level. The goal of this 
chapter is to provide a more comprehensive examination of the role and functions of the 
territorial structures bringing together formal rules and actual practices, and thus to 
understand the relative strength of this component in intra-party dynamics. To this aim, we 
resort to the information collected through interviews to party elites – namely the federation 
(PS) and  district presidents (PSD) – and through the analysis of party documents and 
secondary sources.   
5.1 Organisation and resources of the territorial structures 
In this section we describe the organisation of the PS and the PSD at the territorial level and 
provide data on membership density and organisational extensiveness. At the time of their 
formation, the two parties adopted an organisational model formally based on the mass party 
and the party structure is territorially-based. The two parties are organised following 
Portugal’s administrative division in district/regional, municipal and parish levels. Beyond 
that, both the PS and PSD organise members living abroad under two “emigration” 
structures, European and extra-European. The PS also holds shop-floor structures (secções 
de acção sectorial), whereas the PSD extinguished them in the mid-1980s (Biezen, 2003). 
In the continental area, the two parties are organised in nineteen intermediate structures at 
the district level, the PS federations (Federações) and the PSD district structures (Distritais), 
which correspond to the eighteen districts plus one structure encompassing few councils in 
Lisbon’s western area.112 The party intermediate  echelon at the district level in Portugal 
continental was initially conceived as a temporary solution pending the implementation of 
the constitutional provision concerning the establishment of administrative regions. To date, 
the meso-level of government has not been introduced and parties only compete in legislative 
                                                          
112 The Federação Regional Oeste (PS-FRO) of the PS encompasses five councils, i.e. Alenquer, Cadaval, 
Lourinhã, Sobral de Monte Agraço, Torres Vedras. The PSD-Área Oeste (PSD/AO) also encompasses Arruda 
dos Vinhos, therefore six councils.  
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and local elections.113 Conversely, the Azores and Madeira’s archipelagos hold the special 
status of autonomous regions, with own regional governments and parliamentary assemblies. 
In those areas, the PS and the PSD are organised in regional structures, the PS-Açores and 
the PS-Madeira and the PSD-Açores and the PSD-Madeira. Differently from the nineteen 
structures of the mainland, the regional structures hold their own statutes and ex-officio 
representatives in the national executive body. 
In both parties, the structure has remained ‘crystallised’ in the model set in 1974, with only 
minor changes over time. On this regard, the interviewees highlighted the absence of changes 
in this dimension, and the limits of this articulation for the party functioning at the present 
time.  
«Nowadays, the organisational structure based only on geography is very 
anachronistic, it has emerged that it is not truly close to the citizens. The party 
structure should be increasingly organised according to other aspects besides 
geography, such as thematic areas or professions, and the party should shift 
towards a non-geographic organisation that would better attract the citizens to 
the party, by providing other types of motivations. In contemporary society, with 
high degrees of  citizens’ mobilisation, the territorial organisation is obsolete. 
This issue has to do with another problem, related to the system of 
representation. The reform of the party may only exist together with the reform 
of the political system and the establishment of single-member constituencies. 
Party territorial structures are dispersed and disconnected from social reality in 
terms of positions and themes. This is coupled with the distancing between 
electors and elected and the lack of a real accountability of the representatives 
towards the electors» (P. Pinto Luz, PSD-Lisboa, 2013).   
 
5.1.1 The internal articulation  
As for the internal articulation, both parties are rather prescriptive regarding the composition 
and competences of the party bodies. Although the intermediate structures have the right to 
approve internal regulations, the self-ruling capacity is limited to complementary powers of 
                                                          
113 In 1998 the PS promoted a referendum on regionalisation which failed to achieve the quorum and was 
rejected (Gallagher, 1999; Baum and Freire, 2003). In the districts the national government was represented 
by appointed civil governors (governador civil) extinguished in 2013.  
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self-organisation (e.g. regulating the electoral processes of the local sections). This low 
degree of autonomy in self-regulation, which has remained unchanged since the outset, 
indicates high vertical integration and may be related with the specificities of party formation 
and the need to control the organisational building through detailed guide-lines and 
templates to be followed by the emerging territorial structures.  
 
The PS 
At local level, the PS holds two types of structures: (1) the section of residence (secção de 
residencia) which encompasses the parish (freguesia) and requires at least fifteen members 
to be constituted, and  (2) the council-level structure, i.e. the concelhia. When in a council 
there exists only one section – which is rather frequent – the section is identified with the 
concelhia and exercises its functions. The section holds a deliberative body, the members’ 
assembly (Assembleia Geral) and an executive body, the secretariat (Secretariado), headed 
by the secretary-coordinator and elected by the assembly. The secretariat is formed by a 
number of elective members that varies (5-9) depending on the membership size, and by a 
member of the youth socialist organisation (Juventude Socialista – JS) as ex-officio. The 
sections depend on the concelhia, which is in charge of carrying out the party strategy in the 
council area. The concelhia is made up of a deliberative body, the political committee 
(Comissão Política Concelhia), headed by a president, and the secretariat (Secretariado) 
with executive functions. The political committee is made up of a varying number of elective 
members (15-61) directly elected by members. Local office-holders and JS representatives 
are included as ex-officio.114 The top-list member of the winning list for the political 
committee is elected as president, and on his or her proposal the political committee elects 
the secretariat (6-10 members) which also includes the JS’ coordinator as ex-officio member.  
At the intermediate level,  the federation ensures the vertical coordination between 
the local and the national levels. The federation is organised almost resembling the party at 
the national level, holding the congress (Congresso da Federação) which represents the 
membership organisation, the political committee (Comissão Política da Federação) as 
permanent deliberative body, the federation president and the secretariat (Secretariado da 
Federação), the executive body led by the president. Finally, the federation entails two 
                                                          
114 The mayor and the municipal assembly’s president, when the party is incumbent. The top-list members 
elected for the two council’s organs (executive and municipal assembly), when the party is in opposition. The 
members of the JS on a 1/10 rate of the elective component.  
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committees in charge of the jurisdictional and the financial accountability issues (Comissão 
Federativa de Jurisdição, and Comissão Federativa de Fiscalização Económica e 
Financeira). The congress is the elective body of the political committee and the 
jurisdictional and financial and economic accountability committees. Following the national 
format, the congress comprises elective delegates and ex-officio members, with the latter not 
exceeding one-quarter of the elective component. The ex-officio component includes party 
officials, i.e. the federation president and the secretariat, the presidents of the concelhias, the 
representatives of the affiliated organisations, and the public-office holders, namely the 
mayors and the MPs elected in the electoral college. The national party bodies’ members, 
governors, and European parliamentarians may attend the congress, yet without voting 
rights. The political committee is made up of elective members (15-71) plus as ex-officio, 
the president and other representatives of the JS, and the president of the women federative 
department, the PS women organisation (Departamento Federativo das Mulheres 
Socialistas). The members of the federation secretariat, the presidents of the concelhias, the 
local public office-holders (mayors and presidents of the municipal assemblies), the 
members of the national bodies, governors, MPs and MEPs may attend the meetings, albeit 
without voting rights. This body is in charge of important functions, including the approval 
of the MPs list that the federation presents to the party at the national level. On the federation 
president’s proposal, the political committee elects the secretariat. The secretariat has a small 
size (7-15 members) plus the presidents of the JS and women organisation. It is in charge of 
executing the national and federative bodies’ deliberations and defining the political action 
in the federation under the guidance of the federation president.  
 
The PSD  
Like the PS, the PSD is locally organised in two types of structures: the nucleus (núcleo) and 
the section (secção) which encompass the parish and the council areas respectively. The 
statutes require at least twenty members to constitute a nucleus. The nucleus holds an 
assembly of members (Assembleia de Núcleo) which elects the political committee 
(Comissão Politica de Núcleo) in which are present also representatives of the youth 
organisation as ex-officio (Juventude Social Democrata – JSD). Contrary to the PS, the PSD 
lowest basic units do not elect delegates. The section, also called concelhia, is constituted 
by a minimum number of forty members. It holds a members’ assembly (Assembleia de 
Secção), and a political committee (Comissão Política de Secção), with deliberative and 
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executive functions respectively. The political committee is elected by the assembly and is 
made up of a president, 1-2 vice-presidents, a secretary, a treasurer and 4-8 members. 
Representatives of the JSD and of the social democrat workers’ organisation (Trabalhadores 
Sociais Democratas – TSD) take part as ex-officio. The local public office-holders may 
attend the committee’s meetings, yet without voting rights.  
At the intermediate level, the PSD organises in district-level structures (Estruturas 
Distritais), commonly called distritais. The Distrital entails an assembly (Assembleia 
Distrital) and a political committee (Comissão Política Distrital) with deliberative and 
executive functions respectively. The permanent committee (Comissão Política Permanente 
– CPPD), which is made up of the elective component of the political committee, is the  
restricted executive body. The district structure also includes the jurisdictional council 
(Conselho de Jurisdição Distrital) and the recently created (2012) committee for the 
financial accountability (Comissão Distrital de Auditoria Financeira – CDAF). Differently 
from the PS, the members are called to elect all these bodies , plus the delegates to the district 
assembly. Beyond elective members, all the bodies entail ex-officio representatives, i.e. party 
and public local office-holders and representatives of the affiliated organisations (JSD and 
TSD). The local leaders, the local office-holders (2), and the JSD’ and TSD’ representatives 
take seat in the district assembly as ex-officio. The political committee includes the 
permanent committee plus the local leaders. The permanent committee comprises the district 
president, 1-2 vice-presidents, the secretary, the treasurer, 4-8 members. Representatives of 
the JSD, the TSD, and the local office-holders’ organisation (Autarcas Social Democratas – 
ASD) take part as ex officio.  
In both the PS and PSD, the statutes allow members of the national bodies to attend the 
meetings of the lower echelons. This feature has been considered an indicator of top-down 
representation, in contrast with the formal bottom up mass-structure of the parties, and as an 
indicator of central control and degree of centralisation (Biezen, 2003). In line with what 
observed by Biezen, the top-down representation is higher in the PS, albeit in both parties 
the national bodies’ members have not voting rights. Interviewed about the participation of 
national bodies’ members to the lower levels, a former PSD district president observes:  
 
«Although the statutes admit the participation [national members], it does not 
happen frequently, at least when the meeting is held for taking decisions. It is 
not a common practice for them to attend the meetings, it may occur a 
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situation…they may be there more on a personal level. It may happen that the 
Secretary-General, or another member of the directorate, attends a district 
assembly, but in the case of meetings in which no decisions are taken. They go 
there more to explain the party vision, to explain the party position, […] never 
to influence or inspect». (C. Crespo, MP, PSD-Portalegre, 2016) 
 
5.1.2 Membership density and basic units 
In most parties the number of active members, i.e. those holding electoral capacity, is still 
the principal criterium for the allocation of party posts (e.g. delegates).  
In both the PS and the PSD, active and passive electoral capacity is based on the payment of 
membership fees and on the seniority criterium, i.e. minimum membership length.  
Inactive members, i.e. those with voting rights suspended, are still relevant for two reasons. 
Firstly, they constitute a reservoir of potential voters which may be strategically re-activated 
in occasion of internal disputes. Secondly, the number of total members tends to be used by 
the national party for party image and party legitimacy.115  
In Table 5.1 and 5.2 the distribution of active members and elected delegates by federation 
(PS) and distrital (PSD) is presented.116 In particular, the size of delegates each structure  
has the right to elect serves to illustrate their relative strength and within-party variation. 
Unfortunately, in the case of the PS, some data on the active members is missing. In terms 
of membership density, both the PS and the PSD hold few large structures (2-3), some 
medium-large, and several medium-small structures. This distribution is mainly due to the 
fact that the they encompass districts with large variation in terms of demography as well as 
in terms of socio-economic structure. At the same time, it may provide some insights on the 
different implantation in some areas. In this regard, previous analyses have shown that 
despite the substantial ‘nationalisation’ of the two parties, the PS tends to have a more 
homogenous coverage across the country, whereas the PSD appears still rather 
                                                          
115 By way of example, in 2010 the PSD declared 131,488 members, but only 60% of them (i.e. 78,094) could 
vote in the leadership selection of that year. Similarly, of 91,000 members declared by the PS in 2016, 54% of 
them were active (i.e. 49,127). Sources: official party data and Correia Almeida (2017: 59). The PS National 
Secretary for the Organisation, Hugo Pires, has recently declared to the press that in 2016 the party held 
150,000 members, with 87,000 of them having not paid membership dues for over 2 years. 
116 In comparison with the PSD, the PS elects a higher number of delegates. The number of congressional 
delegates (750 delegates), is specified in the PSD statutes. Conversely, the PS establishes the number of 
delegates to be elected before each congress, thus the number tends to fluctuate. The PS includes ex-officio 
component which could not exceed one-quarter of the elected component. While the PSD congress is smaller, 
it is composed only by elective members, ex-officio members are not entitled to vote. 
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heterogeneous, with a higher concentration in the norther districts (Lisi, 2011: 87; but see 
Coelho, 2012: 110-111).  
 
Table 5.1 Active members and delegates by PS federation, 2016 
PS Federation Active members Delegates (%) 
PS-Algarve n/a 61 (3.5) 
PS-Aveiro 2,500 76 (4.3) 
PS/Baixo Alentejo 600 35 (1.9) 
PS-Braga n/a 93 (5.2) 
PS-Bragança 600 32 (1.8) 
PS-Castelo Branco 1,100 34 (1.9) 
PS-Coimbra 4,500 182 (10.3) 
PS-Évora n/a 31 (1.7) 
PS-Guarda 1,300 55 (3.1) 
PS-Leiria 1,400 60 (3.4) 
PS-Lisboa 6,500 219 (12.4) 
PS-Portalegre 500 42 (2.4) 
PS-Porto 8,000 311 (17.6) 
PS-FROeste 300 16 (0.9) 
PS-Santarém 1,200 51 (2.9) 
PS-Setúbal 2,800 98 (5.5) 
PS-Viana do Castelo 700 39 (2.2) 
PS-Vila Real n/a 48 (2.7) 
PS-Viseu 2,700 68 (3.8) 
PS-Açores n/a 98 (5.5) 
PS-Madeira 1,900 82 (4.6) 
PS-Europa n/a 22 (1.2) 
PS-Fora Europa n/a 11 (0.6) 
Total - 1764 
Own elaboration. Members (estimates): own database of intra-party elections. Delegates: PS (2016) “Relação 
dos delegados a eleger, XXI Congresso Nacional”.  
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The PS-Porto and PS-Lisboa are the largest federations, with approximately 7000-8000 
active members, reflected in a national representation of nearly 30% delegates (17% and 
12% respectively). The medium-large federation of the PS-Coimbra follows, alongside the  
two medium federations of the PS-Braga and the PS-Setúbal. Therefore, these five 
federations cover nearly 50% of the total delegates. The other federations are medium-size 
structures, such as the PS-Setúbal and the PS-Aveiro in the southern and northern coastal 
areas. Finally, the PS has some very small structures, with 600-700 active members, which 
represent less than 2% of the delegates.  
 
Table 5.2 Active members and delegates by PSD district-structure, 2017 
PSD district-structure Active Members 
(%) 
Delegates  
(%) 
PSD-Algarve-Faro 1,931 (2.7) 23 (3) 
PSD-Aveiro 7,683 (10.9) 77 (10.2) 
PSD-Beja 358 (0.5) 5 (0.6) 
PSD-Braga 7,830 (11.1) 70 (9.3) 
PSD-Bragança 1,625 (2.3) 21 (2.7) 
PSD-Castelo Branco 815 (1.2) 14 (1.8) 
PSD-Coimbra 2,972 (4.2) 37 (4.9) 
PSD-Évora 641 (0.9) 9 (1.1) 
PSD-Guarda 2,017 (2.8) 29 (3.8) 
PSD-Leiria 3,376 (4.7) 36 (4.7) 
PSD-Lisboa AM 10,765 (15.3) 88 (11.7) 
PSD-Lisboa Aoeste 509 (0.7) 8 (1) 
PSD-Portalegre 600 (0.8) 8 (1) 
PSD-Porto 13,132 (18.6) 115 (15.3) 
PSD-Santarém 2,209 (3.1) 29 (3.8) 
PSD-Setúbal 1,209 (1.7) 18 (2.3) 
PSD-Viana do Castelo 2,425 (3.4) 24 (3.2) 
PSD-Vila Real 2,991 (4.2) 32 (4.2) 
PSD-Viseu 1,769 (2.5) 29 (3.8) 
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PSD-Açores 1,031 (1.4) 30 (4) 
PSD-Madeira 2,684 (3.8) 30 (4) 
PSD-Europa 459 (0.6) 9 (1.1) 
PSD-Fora Europa 1,354 (1.9) 9 (1.1) 
Total 70,385 750 
Own elaboration. PSD, Povo Livre n°1995, 20/12/2017, pp. 18-20, and n°1996, 3/1/2018 p. 3.  
 
Likewise, the PSD-Porto and PSD-Lisbon stand out as the two largest structures, 
representing the 19% and 15% of the total number of delegates, i.e. nearly 35% of the total. 
Braga’s and Aveiro’s northern structures follow, with more than 7,000 members and 9-10% 
of delegates each. These four structures represent, alone, nearly 47% of the delegates and 
more than half of the active members. Then, most of the structures present a medium (e.g. 
PSD-Leiria) or medium-low size (e.g. PSD-Setúbal). Finally, there are structures with less 
than 1000 members (e.g. PSD-Castelo Branco), or even with less than 500 (PSD-Beja).  
 
Basic units by structure 
Beyond membership, the number of basic units is a relevant indicator of the party’s local 
presence and organisational strength (Scarrow, 2000; Gabrow, 2001; Tavits, 2013). In 
Chapter 3 we have presented aggregate data showing that the PS holds a higher number of 
basic units, and thus its territorial extensiveness is higher compared to the PSD, which, on 
the other hand, displays a higher number of members. In this chapter we look at the 
distribution of the basic units by intermediate structure. This indicator also matters in terms 
of relative weight since the delegates ratio depends on the number of active members held 
by each local section (e.g. 1/60 members).117 The distribution of basic units has been 
assessed through the official information released by the parties during the pre-congressional 
phases.  
 
 
                                                          
117 Hence, the structures holding more local sections and less members are rewarded, to the detriment of those 
with more members but less local sections. The distortion mainly regards the PS, since in the PSD the delegates 
are elected by the council-level sections whose number by district structure tends to be more homogenous and 
the lowest basic units (sub-municipal level), differently from the PS, do not elect delegates. 
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The PS 
In 2016, the PS counted 522 local sections distributed in the nineteen federations, and 53 
shop-floor sections, the latter mainly concentrated in the PS-Lisboa (n=31) and PS-Porto 
(n=12).118 Still, only 65% of the 522 local sections were able to elect at least 1 delegate to 
the congress, whereas the number of delegates elected by shop-floor sections was irrelevant. 
The PS-Porto alongside the PS-Coimbra and the PS-Lisboa hold the highest number of local 
sections. Thus, in these federations the local presence is, at least formally, rather dense. The 
Porto federation has the highest number of sections electing delegates (78 out of 81); 
followed by Coimbra. The latter presents an extraordinary number of sections (n=86), 
although only 74% (n=64) of them elect delegates. The PS-Lisbon follows, with 47 local 
sections, 90% of which getting representation. On the other hand, the PS-Lisbon has the 
highest number of shop-floor sections (n=31). The remaining sixteen federations hold a 
lower number of sections, more or less corresponding with the councils present in the 
district. Few of them have sub-municipal sections with active members, mainly the PS-
Aveiro (n=29) and the PS-Setúbal.  
In terms of number of delegates elected, the PS-Braga, which has only few active 
sections (n=15), holds the largest section of the party with eighteen delegates elected to the 
national congress. In other words, this local unit is able to elect more delegates than the 
party’s smaller federations. However, the system of allocation tends to penalise the 
concentration of members in few local sections. Thus, it could happen that federations with 
more active members, but less local sections elect a lower number of delegates to the national 
congress. This is exactly as the case of the PS-Braga. In this regard, proliferation of “paper” 
sections – created with the purpose to get delegates and to influence intra-party processes – 
may be fostered by such system.119  
 
The PSD 
The data released by the PSD in 2017 indicates that the party holds 278 local sections, 
distributed in the nineteen district-structures. Nearly 80% of the basic units elects at least 
one delegate to the national congress. Formally the party holds structures in most of the 
                                                          
118 The other federations holding shop-floor sections are Algarve (1); Braga (1); Castelo Branco (1); Coimbra 
(2); Setúbal (3); Vila Real (1).  
 
119 Interview with MP, Pedro Delgado Alves, who was proponent of a motion to the XX National Congress 
endorsing the change in the system of allocation of the delegates. The motion was withdrawn by the proponent.  
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councils, still in some cases the local presence appears to be very weak. This is best 
exemplified by the cases of the PSD-Beja, PSD-Évora and PSD-Portalegre in the Alentejo 
region. Apparently, in these districts only few sections manage to elect a few delegates, while 
the other units are not able to get representation. This is not very surprising since in this 
region the party is traditionally weak. In the other sixteen district structures, there is more 
homogeneity, since most of the local sections elect delegates, albeit large variation exists. 
The sections electing the highest number of delegates are present in the PSD-Lisbon, with 
two sections alone getting 70 delegates. More in general, this data suggests organisational 
weakness and low members’ mobilisation, with several local sections lacking the minimum 
number of active members required for electing at least a delegate and getting representation 
at the national level.  
Beyond the general organisational weakness, what emerges is the within-party variation 
in both the PS and the PSD with basic units much stronger. This feature is acknowledged by 
the party officials interviewed who highlight the presence of internal imbalances, as follows:   
 
 «The structures are weekly organised, i.e. there are or very small, or very large 
concelhias. In my region we have three concelhias with nearly four hundred 
militants each, whereas the other twelve concelhias hold less than one hundred 
militants each. Consequently, three structures rule the region. Thus, there is a 
regional unbalance, and this has to do with local dynamics of regiment of 
militants» (M. Freitas, MP, PS-Algarve president, 2014). 
 
5.1.3 Financial resources  
In terms of financial resources, Chapter 3 has shown that both the PS and the PSD are highly 
based on public funding, and that that financial resource is directly allocated to the national 
party, which manages the subsidies. By contrast, in both parties the membership fees belong 
to the local sections in which the member is enrolled, and the party rules that govern this 
dimension are quite similar. 
In the PS, the fees’ payment is centralised and the rules prescribe it must be done by 
the member via ATM or bank transference to the national headquarters’ account. The 
national level then transfers the fees to the section’s account, which is controlled by the 
federation. Due to transparency reasons, different forms of payment (e.g. cheque) are 
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admitted only on an exceptional basis. The section only gets the value of the minimum fee, 
whereas any additional contribution to the minimum value is considered supplementary and 
is retained by the national headquarters, unless member’s expressed opposition. Moreover, 
the national party has the right to retain 2/3 of the fees paid by the members with voting 
rights suspended who regularise their financial situation with the party. 120 The local sections 
are held accountable to the federations. The federations are funded by the national party, 
which allocate the funding depending on specific demands, electoral dimension and 
membership dimension. Therefore, they have not autonomous source of funding. Beyond 
the resources allocated from the party headquarters, the PS statutes recommend the MPs to 
contribute to the federation, but there is not obligation in this respect. From the interviews it 
has emerged that some federation presidents have established this practice.121 However,  
given that no obligation is set, it depends on the initiative of the different leaders who led 
the federation. 
Likewise, the PSD territorial structures resort to members’ fees, which are firstly 
collected by the central level and then transferred to the district and the local structures 
respectively. The national headquarters retains a share of the fees for administrative costs 
while the rest is transferred to the political committees of the district structures (1/3) and to 
the local sections (2/3). Fundraising activities must be expressly authorised  by the secretary-
general.122  
«The public funding is allocated to the national level. Then, there is a rule: 20% 
of the members’ fees is assigned to the distrital. In addition, the national level 
may sustain some expenses, such as the staff and the rental contract, by giving a 
monthly subsidy for the payment of this type of expenses. However, the costs 
incurred by the distrital are low (the PSD-Braga has one fonctionnaire, most 
distritais do not have functionaries at all). The expenses incurred by the sections 
(council-level) are higher, since they organise events and support entirely the 
expenses» 
 (P. Cunha, mayor, and PSD-Braga president, 2014).  
The strict formal rules and the irrelevance of members’ fees to the party income – which is 
highly based on public funding in both parties – indicate the low financial autonomy of the 
                                                          
120 PS, “Regulamento de quotas”.   
121 Interview with M. Freitas, MP and PS-Algarve president.  
122 PSD (2014) “Regulamento Financeiro”.  
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territorial structures, and the clear imbalance in power distribution in favour of the national 
level. The PSD appears to retain a lower part of members’ fees compared to the PS, which 
by contrast seems slightly more centralised.  
Resources’ scarcity is stressed by the presidents interviewed and is perceived as a problem 
for the structures. Beyond the dependence from the higher level, this feature conditions the 
party functioning on-the-ground as well as activists’ mobilisation during non-electoral 
periods.  
«Beyond the fees, we have no funds. The financial situation in very difficult. 
When we need to carry out an activity we have to ask to the national. Fund-rising 
is infrequent, there is still a misconception about that. We have to work with 
what we have». (N. Serra, MP and PSD-Santarém president, 2014) 
 
5.2 Functions and powers of the territorial structures  
This section deals with the functions and powers carried out by the territorial structures. In 
particular, we focus on membership recruitment, and on a key institutional function, i.e. 
candidate selection, and compare the two parties. The final section narrows the analysis by 
focusing on the leadership.  
 
5.2.1 Membership recruitment  
As for membership recruitment, the local structures still have a key role as gatekeepers. 
While in the case of state-dependent and electoralist parties, like the PS and the PSD, 
membership’s relevance for the national leadership is reduced, for the local level the control 
of this resource still plays a key role, for at least two reasons. Firstly, due to the 
aforementioned system of allocation of party posts and, secondly, due to its mobilisation in 
internal disputes, especially at the local level.  
As shown in chapter 4, the relevance of this function for the local structures is best 
exemplified by the conflicts engendered by the national level’s attempts to tighten the control 
on this domain, or by measures such as the membership record’s update, which, in fact, the 
two parties have not implemented with the frequency formally required by their rules. The 
occasional emergence of malpractices at the local level, linked precisely to the local control 
on this function, may generate tensions with the national level due to the perception of the 
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negative effects on party image.123 As such, the intervention on this domain tends to be 
justified by the need to improve internal transparency.124 
Both parties rule the affiliation process in the statutes and ad hoc regulations. Accordingly, 
the applicant member may join the party contacting directly the headquarters (e.g. via web 
page), without applying to the local structure. Nevertheless, the decision over the candidacy 
still competes to the local section, which communicates its decision to the party 
headquarters, being “the silence” considered as acceptance. In case of rejection, the applicant 
has the right to appeal before the national jurisdictional body. There are slight differences in 
the way the PS and PSD rule this process. In the former, the local structures’ autonomy 
seems more constrained. Firstly, the PS headquarters requires the local sections to present 
motivated reasons for opposing the entry, whereas more vagueness or ‘discretion’ is left to 
the PSD sections. Secondly, the PS local sections have only fifteen days to accept or reject 
the application request, vis-à-vis thirty days of the PSD ones. Afterwards the request is 
accepted. However, as for the PSD it is worth highlighting the reforms on this issue that the 
new leader, Rui Rio (2018-), is undertaking with the purpose of enhancing the central 
control. The most recent regulations approved by the National Council revise the system 
constraining local sections’ autonomy in deciding regarding the applications. 125  
 
5.2.2 The selection of candidates for national and local public offices  
This section focuses on the role played by the structures in the process, complementing the 
formal rules with information on the actual practices emerged from the interviews. In doing 
so, it intends to contribute to previous literature on this topic looking more in detail on the 
territorial structures. 
 
                                                          
123 For instance, mass payments of the fees and control of pockets of votes by local notables (caciques) for 
influencing internal disputes. (see also chapter 8 for “caciquismo” practices). 
124 The requirements for applying may also indicate the party effort to make the process more transparent. The 
PS in 2012, under Seguro leadership, has undertaked such type of “minor” reforms (e.g. requirement of official 
data indicating the address of the applicant, official evidence of individual payment of the membership fee...).  
Interview with SNO, Miguel Larnjeiro (2014).  
125 The National Council has approved the new regulation in May 2018. Accordingly, the section which 
opposes the entry must expressly motivate the rejection and must decide within 3 days vis-à-vis the 30 days of 
the current rules. Beyond that, it extends from 3 months to 3 years the time for a member remaining enrolled 
in a section before migrating to another. This device is aimed at avoiding the transfer of members with the 
purpose of voting in internal elections. 
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The MPs candidate selection  
The candidate selection (CS) process is one of the main indicators of power distribution 
between levels and of the degree of (de)centralisation (Lundell, 2004; Hazan and Rahat, 
2010). In chapter 3 we have shown that the CS involves both the national and the sub-
national levels, with the former having the ultimate decision. Therefore, in both parties, the 
procedure is still assembly-based. 
The PS  
The PS statutes set the power-sharing between the national party and the federations. The 
national political committee, on proposal of the secretary-general, fulfills and ranks 30% of 
the list, being the ratio calculated on the number of seats won by the party in each electoral 
constituency in the former legislative election. The secretary-general plays a prominent role 
in the process. The rest of the list competes to the federation political committee, which votes 
the candidates to be then presented to the national political committee which holds the final 
say on the lists and it may decide to take upon itself the decision on the candidacies. In 
fulfilling their share of the list, the federations are conditioned by the criteria established by 
the national political committee in the pre-selection phase (e.g. renovation, gender quota, 
ethic profile and so on). The non-compliance with the criteria may cause the rejection of the 
list proposed by the federation and high tensions between levels.126 Although the national 
level’s dominant position is clear, there exists room for negotiation between levels.  
In practice, the share reserved to the party directorate may be adapted to the federation’s 
influence, as one of our interviewees explains:  
 
«Generally, the Secretary-General choices the 30% share through negotiation 
and conversation with the federation presidents and, therefore, I would say that 
the decision on the top-list candidate is the major competence of the Secretary-
General. The choice [of the 30% quota] is done considering the evaluations made 
by the federation presidents and secretariats regarding the people who are closer 
to the district-structure and/or the party cadres and that for their competence, 
parliamentary experience, loyalty with the party leader, influence capacity, 
technical and specific competencies. Those are often appointed for number two 
                                                          
126 See for instance: Público, “Direcção Nacional do PS recusa lista de Coimbra e inclui Rosario Gama” 
20/07/2015 and “Direcção Nacional atenta as listas que não respeitam a representatividade do partido”.  
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or three in different lists. But, for my experience in the PS I would say that this 
work is carried out in articulation between the federations and the national 
[party]» (A. Gameiro, MP, PS-Santarém president, 2013). 
 
The statutes do not mention the local structures (i.e. concelhias) in the process, which 
suggests a low degree of decentralisation at formal level. This feature may indicate 
autonomy on the part of the federation leadership in managing the process. Nevertheless, 
our interviews show that the local structures are de facto involved and that negotiations 
regarding the candidates take place. The list must in fact be previously voted in the federation 
bodies, where the concelhias are represented through their presidents. Factors, such as the 
weight in terms of membership or in terms of electorate in the different councils of the 
federations, are often taken into consideration and there is the attempt to balance the 
influence exercised by the local structures within the federation.127 
 
The PSD 
The PSD statutes assign to the district-structure’s political committee the power of drawing 
up the list after having audited the district assembly and the local sections. The list is then 
voted by the national political committee, and finally approved by the national council. In 
practice, however, the national level’s role is more pronounced than that codified by the 
formal rules. Firstly, like the PS, the party executive sets the main principles regarding the 
candidacies. As such, it shapes the pre-selection phase. Secondly, the final approval 
competes to the national bodies. In this phase, the national political committee may reject 
the candidates proposed by the district-structures, triggering conflicts between levels. 
Conflicts are normally resolved by the party leader with the district presidents, before the 
list being presented to the national council for final ratification (Freire and Teixeira, 2012). 
Thirdly, the interviews confirm previous studies (Lobo, 2003: 263) about the key role of the 
party leader, even though this actor is not mentioned in the party statues. The interviewees 
admit that the leader preserves the prerogative of choosing the top-list candidates. Yet, they 
also point out that this decision is generally done in coordination with the district structures. 
                                                          
127 Interview with MP, P. Nuno Santos, PS-Aveiro president (2013). 
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At the same time, they observe that the coordination have not functioned well under the 
different party leaders, with more conflicts emerged in the past.  
Overall, the process results from coordination between levels rather than separation. The 
national executive does not merely rubber-stamp the lists proposed by the structures, but it 
negotiates the candidates’ position, and the district leaders play a key role in the way the 
process is carried out at the local level. Depending on who leads the district structure the 
candidate selection may function in different ways:  
 
 «A list with all the candidates ranked is released by the district political 
committee. The list is sent to the national bodies, which will try to change and 
bargain. Otherwise, a list with the candidates placed in alphabetical order is sent 
and it is delegated the  decision about the ranking to the ‘national’. The first 
method: the choice is more done by the district structure, and it identified the 
candidates with the interests of the district; the second way: it may define and 
identify the candidates with the country’s interests. The former method gives 
more weight to the district structure, the latter gives more influence to the 
national. When the list is ranked by the district structure, we have a problem: 
within the political commitee all the local leaders are represented, and the larger 
concelhia has the same weight as the smaller (i.e. one vote)» (MP, N. Serra, 
PSD-Santarém president 2014).  
Therefore, in both the PS and PSD, the MPs candidate selection is shared. The PS 
ensures the national leadership the right to select and rank 30% of the lists, whereas the PSD 
does not set a similar provision. As such, the PS formally provides more power to the 
national level, whereas in the PSD the territorial structures seem to hold higher influence. In 
addition, only the PSD statutes establish the involvement of the local sections in the process. 
At the same time, in this party, the low codification of the process, especially the undefinition 
of the leader’s role and prerogatives may make it easier for conflicts to emerge. The decision 
on top-lists has been retained by different leadership, in some cases provoking clashes with 
the district structures due to the imposition of top-list candidates. This seems to be especially 
true when the leader does not hold strong support within the territorial apparatus.128 
                                                          
128 See for instance the selection process under Ferreira Leite’s leadership (2009).  
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Overall, in both the PS and the PSD the national level prevails. In the pre-selection phase, 
the party executive operates as a steering-agency setting the criteria for the list fulfillment 
and then approving the final lists. Informal practices complement the low codification of the 
process in the formal rules and may foster the accommodation of reciprocal influences 
between levels. In this respect, informality and the key role of the leaders in the process 
identified by previous analyses are confirmed (Freire, 2001; Lobo, 2003; Teixeira 2009; 
Freire and Teixeira, 2011).  
The interviews shed light on the functioning of the process at the territorial level. 
Firstly, in drawing up the lists the structures are not entirely disconnected from the national 
level, but coordination and negotiation are the norm. The structures need in fact to have their 
list approved by the national bodies and the party leader would try to accommodate the 
influences of the structures avoiding the public exposure of conflicts. Authoritative 
intervention from the top is negatively perceived by the structures, but at the same time the 
high informality of the candidate process leaves the national with some room for  maneuver. 
The national level has the final say and the leader retains clear prerogatives, especially in 
terms of eligible seats, but the structures’ role is not marginal as in hierarchic systems.  
At the same time, a dynamic of ‘checks and balances’ rather than mutual autonomy, as stated 
by the stratarchical argument, better characterises these processes. 
Secondly, variation in the way the different structures carry out the process on-the-
ground emerges. This may depend on different local practices as well as on the decisions of 
the actors coordinating the process (i.e. federation/district presidents),indicating their 
autonomy. Due to the implications on political representation, further examinations on the 
way the candidate selection process is carried out at the territorial level would be needed.  
 
The candidate selection for local office-holders 
Local politics is a key arena for the territorial structures. Electoral mobilisation for local 
power, in particular, is the main goal of the two parties at the territorial level.  
«Nowadays the work of local or regional organisations is completely different 
from the past. And if I can say that one of the objectives is still the mobilisation 
of the electors for our national struggles regarding the program of the party, the 
true is that large part of the local ‘energies’ are concentrated in the local electoral 
disputes. Thus, the concelhias of the PS consume large part of their energies in 
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local politics. This is the pattern, when they are in opposition as well as when 
they are in power» (P. N. Santos, MP, PS-Aveiro president 2013). 
 
In both the PS and the PSD, party action in local elections is coordinated and supervised by 
the intermediate structures, while the selection of candidates for the executive and the 
deliberative bodies for both local government (municipality and parishes) is carried out by 
the sections at the council-level. 
In the PS, the political committee of the concelhia is formally in charge of drawing 
up the list of candidates for the local elections. Yet, local autonomy is formally constrained 
by the statutory provisions that allow to the federation and the national political committee, 
under specific circumstances, to take upon themselves the decision on behalf of the local 
structures. Besides, the national directorate sets specific regulations for the local campaigns 
by defining general criteria to be followed by the local structures. In some case the guide-
lines may constrain the local structures’ decisional power on this domain.  
In practice, the selection of mayoral candidates in the district capitals or in the most 
important cities must have the approval of, or be negotiated with, the higher levels.129  
When there is not agreement, or the positions of the territorial structures diverge significantly 
from the preference of the national party, severe local-national conflicts may emerge, since 
the national party has the right to impose authoritative decisions.130 In this process, the PS 
has recently experienced closed primaries for selecting the mayoral candidate, by including 
ordinary members in the process. In Chapter 8, we discuss in detail that experience applied 
for the 2013 local elections and its internal and external consequences.  
In the case of the PSD, the statutes assign the power of proposing the list to the local 
section’s political committee, specifying that it must consult the assemblies and political 
committees of the lowest units (i.e. the “nuclei”). Then, the proposal is made to the district 
political committee – where the local leaders take part as ex-officio – and as stated by one of 
our interviewees, the large majority of the lists are approved. Then, the final ratification of 
the mayoral candidates competes to the national political committee.  
                                                          
129 Interview with Miguel Freitas, PS-Algarve, 2014.  
130 See for instance the conflict between the PS-Braga and the Deputy Secretary-General in “Expresso” online: 
«Revolta no PS contra Ana Catarina Mendes – Braga aprova moção de censura», 16/5/2017.  
 125 
 
«The Distrital takes a leading role in the process and together with the concelhia 
choices the candidates. It evaluates the proposals made by the concelhia and then 
approves or rejects. In general, 98% of the proposals are approved» (P. Cunha, 
PSD-Braga, 2014).  
 
Overall, although in both parties the national level may impose authoritative decisions, when 
questioned about the degree of autonomy of the territorial structures in managing these 
processes, the interviewees refer to hold large autonomy.  
Finally, an interesting aspect emerged during the interviews regards the large share of 
independents who run under the party label. This feature reflects the absence of a significant 
membership base in both parties and, more in general, confirms the organisational weakness 
and the weak loyalties built on the ground. 
«In my district there is a strong tradition of having independents in the lists for 
the local elections because in the south of the district the party is more fragile, is 
very weak, and we have difficulties in forming the lists in some councils of the 
south. In the south of the district we have councils where 90% of candidates are 
independents, there are lists for the freguesia (parish) where independents are 
100%» (P. Nuno Santos, PS-Aveiro, 2013). 
«There is no concelhia that has in its lists more than 15-20% party members for 
local elections. The rest of the list are made up of independents» (A. Gameiro, 
PS-Santarém, 2013).  
 
5.3 The leadership. The PS federation presidents and the PSD district presidents 
 
In this final section we focus on the actors that lead the territorial structures. This final 
section serves also as an introduction to the next two chapters (6 and 7), which are centered 
on the territorial leadership. As we contend, the federation and district presidents are crucial 
actors for exploring the party functioning at the territorial level and centre-periphery 
relations within the two parties. In both the PS and the PSD, the presidents represent the 
territorial structures through the ex-officio presence in the national deliberative bodies and 
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through regular meetings with the party leadership.131 The federation presidents are ex-
officio members of the national congress, the national committee and the national political 
committee, whereas the PSD district presidents are ex-officio members of the national 
council. Differently from the PS, they attend the national congress without exercising voting 
rights, due to the entirely elective composition of this body in the PSD. On the other hand, 
they are excluded from the highest executive body, i.e. the PS national secretariat, and the 
PSD national political committee. This is an important aspect, since being formally 
represented in the highest executive body is an indicator of the territorial structures’ 
involvement at the higher level (Fabre, 2010), and a counterweight of power 
“verticalization” (Ignazi and Pizzimenti, 2014). Therefore, the absence of representation in 
the executive bodies may indicate low influence capacity.132 However, on this aspect the two 
parties present different patterns. As referred in chapter 4, following Ferro Rodrigues’ 
reform (2002), the PS prohibits the accumulation of executive offices. As such, the 
federation presidents cannot be concomitantly member of the national secretariat.  
By contrast, in the case of the PSD, there is not a similar provision, and there have been 
several cases of district presidents being members of the national political committee (e.g. 
under Barroso, Passos Coelho, Rio).  
An important element ensuring these actors a central role within the territorial 
organisation is the direct election. In both parties, the territorial leaders have always been 
chosen autonomously. The selection method has changed in the second half of the 1990s, 
shifting from the election by the local assemblies to the direct election by the members. The 
change has enhanced the position of the president within the structure, in terms of powers 
(e.g. composition of the executives, management of the organisation and the party functions 
at the local level) and legitimacy, fostering processes of personalisation of the territorial 
structures, as well as the building of personalised linkages with the national leadership.  
At the formal level, the federation presidents’ position is stronger than that of the 
PSD district presidents. Firstly, they are unipersonal bodies, holding the right to attend and 
vote in all the federation bodies’ meetings (7). Moreover, the federation presidents are 
elected in an uninominal list, encouraging the perception of a “personal” mandate. Finally, 
                                                          
131 The statutes of the PS (2015) and the PSD (2012) prescribe that the party leader shall meet regularly with 
the presidents (joint meetings). The frequency varies, being more frequent in the PSD (every two months) than 
the PS (every three months). In practice the compliance with this rule has varied in both parties, being 
influenced by the specific context faced by the party. 
132 Conversely, the Azores and Madeira regional structures of both the PS and the PSD are represented in the 
party highest executive body by their presidents. 
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the formal rules allows them longer longevity in office since they may be reselected for four 
terms (eight years) vis-à-vis the three terms (six years) of the PSD district-structures 
presidents. In chapters 6 (PS) and 7 (PSD) we will return on these observations more in detail 
through the in-depth analysis of the leadership selections.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has described in broad outline the main characteristics of the territorial 
structures, presenting their internal configuration, resources, and main competences. It has 
shown different aspects. Firstly, the territorial structures are organizationally weak and 
under-financed. Their financial autonomy lies in a scarce resource, membership fees. The 
national control, occurred over time on this resource, has further constrained their autonomy. 
Still, active members have a crucial relevance as a resource of influence, to be mobilised in 
internal disputes and due to the allocation of party posts. This aspect explains the strong 
resistance of the structures towards centralising attempts on the affiliation process. 
“Perverse” effects entailed in this system are the closeness of the structures and the 
entrenchment of local personalistic factions. Secondly, the territorial structures should not 
be conceived as a homogenous entity within the party, since there are important within-party 
variations, which may influence internal dynamics and, as demonstrated by Tavits (2013) 
may explain the electoral performance of the same party across different districts. Thirdly, 
it has shown that the territorial leaders are important actors in governing the processes at the 
territorial level and in the way the institutional functions, namely candidate selection, is 
carried out across the different party structures. 
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Chapter VI 
The territorial leadership in the PS. The federation presidents’ selection 
 
The present chapter focuses on the PS territorial structures by analysing the federation 
presidents’ selection. The next chapter applies the same analysis to the case of the PSD 
district presidents. As chapter 5 has shown, these actors are crucial for linking the territorial 
organisation with the party at the national level, and for carrying out important functions, 
such as the MPs candidate selection and the coordination of party strategy in local elections. 
This chapter and the next follow a similar structure. Firstly, the reform introducing the direct 
election of the federation/district presidents is described together with the main rules 
governing the process. Then, the empirical analysis investigates the main characteristics of 
these internal elections focusing on the degree of competitiveness, turnover, and overlap 
with public offices. We contend that the analysis of the territorial leadership sheds light on 
under-explored aspects of the territorial organisation, which have impacts on the party as a 
whole. Firstly, because it provides insights on the processes of personalisation and 
leadership-centredness, based on the increased power of individual actors vis-à-vis  
collective bodies, as hypothesised at the beginning of this study. Secondly, given that the 
selections are analysed taking into consideration the national context (institutional status and 
national leadership) the analysis seeks to understand whether and to what extent dynamcis 
related with the national level emerge. Finally, the analysis provides insights on members’ 
inclusion and intra-party democracy in decisional processes at lower levels of party 
organisation.  
 
6.1 The federation presidents. Reform and rules of the selection method 
The selection method for the federations’ leadership was reformed in 1998 with the 
introduction of the direct election by members. The reform was aimed at strengthening 
federation presidents’ position in leading the territorial organisation. Initially, the 
federations’ leaders had their powers barely constrained: the rules did not set a maximum 
number of terms or limits to office accumulation (PS, 1998). These aspects were then 
addressed by the statutory reform carried out by Ferro Rodrigues in 2002. Thus, specific 
provisions aimed at stimulating renewal and elites’ circulation and at hindering the 
expansion of the presidents’ powers, increased under the Guterres’ leadership, were 
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introduced.133 Firstly, by setting the term limit to four consecutive terms (no retroactive) and, 
secondly, by forbidding the overlap of federation presidency with other executive offices, 
i.e. the national secretariat. Then, organisational reforms addressing the federation 
presidents’ selection re-emerged only in 2012, with the  reform carried out by António José 
Seguro, who extended to four years the elective bodies’ term in order to synchronise their 
duration with the legislature and reduce party instability caused by internal disputes held in 
the middle of a legislative cycle.134 Yet, these changes were short-lived, being withdrawn 
only three years after by the new Secretary-General, António Costa.  
In terms of formal rules, the selection process is governed by the regulations defined 
at the national level which set the requirements needed to elect (i.e. the selectorate) and to 
be elected (i.e. the candidacy). As for the former, a minimum membership seniority and the 
payment of the party dues are to be fulfilled by the members for them to be able to vote. As 
for the candidacy, it is necessary the formal endorsement (i.e. signatures) by a defined 
number of members. The financing of the campaign is entirely supported by the candidate, 
who is accountable to the party for the expenses.135 Other (apparently minor) rules set the 
period of time within which the members have to pay the dues for exercising the voting 
rights and for the party headquarters to close  members’ register and define the final number 
of members entitled to vote. These rules have been often changed, and in both parties are a 
rather contentious issue. In fact, stretching the limit closer to the date of the election or, by 
contrast, closing the registers much earlier, affects the mobilisation for gathering votes on 
behalf of rival candidates.  
Table 6.1 sums up the main rules and the changes occurred over time under different 
leadership.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
133 Interview with M. Coelho, former president of PS-Lisboa council-structure and supporter of the reform. 
134 Público: «Seguro quer sincronizar mandatos internos do PS com os ciclos eleitorais», 23/3/2012. 
135 Note that in the Portuguese case the intra-party elections are not financed by public funding.  
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Table 6.1 Rules for the federation presidents’ selection 
Party Leader Organisational Reform Selectorate  Candidacy  
António Guterres Direct election of the 
federation presidents by 
the members with 
electoral capacity (1998) 
Membership 
seniority: 6 
months. Payment 
of membership 
fees.  
Membership 
seniority: 18 
months. Payment 
of membership 
fees. Endorsement 
of 2.5% members.  
Eduardo Ferro 
Rodrigues 
Introduction of term 
limit: 4 consecutive 
mandates. Executive 
offices accumulation 
forbidden (2002) 
Unchanged Membership 
seniority: 6 
months. Payment 
of membership 
fees. Endorsement 
of 2% members or 
80 members. 
José Sócrates  
 
 
Unchanged  Unchanged  
António José 
Seguro 
Elections to be held 
every 4 years (2012) 
Membership 
seniority: 12 
months. Payment 
of membership 
fees. 
Membership 
seniority: 12 
months. Payment 
of membership 
fees. Endorsement 
of 100 members  
António Costa Reintroduction of the 
elections every 2 years 
(2015) 
Membership 
seniority: 6 
months.    
Payment of 
membership fees  
Membership 
seniority: 6 
months. Payment 
of membership 
fees. Endorsement 
of 100 members 
Source: own elaboration. PS Statutes and Internal Regulations; «Regulamento para a eleição do Presidente da 
Federação» in “Acção Socialista” n°1185, 30/1/2003, p.19; «Regulamento eleitoral do Presidente da 
Federação» in “Acção Socialista” n° 1388, Junho/Julho 2014, p. 12.  
 
 
As table 6.1 shows, under Ferro Rodrigues the seniority membership for running as 
candidate was reduced from 18 to 6 months. The change was consistent with the process of 
renewal aimed at improving the participation of the newer and younger members to the party 
leading bodies. This requirement was then doubled by Seguro with the purpose of 
strengthening internal transparency by counteracting malpractices such as the control of 
pockets of votes and “strategic” enrollments. However, the six months’ membership 
seniority was reestablished by Costa. The candidacy’s endorsement has followed two main 
criteria, the collection of members’ signatures, corresponding to 2.5% or 2% of the 
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federation’s membership size or, since 2012, the collection of a given number of signatures, 
regardless the federation dimension. The latter system may disincentive the competitiveness 
of the contests in smaller federations with only some hundreds of dues-paying members (e.g. 
PS-Vila Real, PS-Portalegre). Hence, compared to the larger federations, the emergence of 
more than one candidate would require a greater organisational effort.  
 
6.2 Empirical analysis, 2003-2016 
In this section we present the main findings of the empirical analysis carried out on 133 
selections held between 2003 and 2016 in the 19 party federations. Due to missing data the 
races held in 1998 and in 2000 have been excluded from the empirical analysis. Hence, the 
analysis covers 77% of the selections. The source is the original database of intra-party 
elections we built specifically for this study. The empirical analysis explores three 
dimensions: the degree of competitiveness, the turnover and the federation president’s 
overlap with public office. Even though it has not been possible to analyse the participation 
rates due to data availability and reliability, the characteristics and dynamics of the selections 
may provide insights on the real opportunities for members to participate or to merely 
rubber-stamp a candidacy.  
Table 6.2 provides the main information on the context in which the direct selections have 
taken place, the party leader in office and the party’s  institutional status.  
Table 6.2. National context of the federation presidents’ selections  
Round of selections Party leader  Institutional status 
1998 António Guterres Government  
2000 António Guterres Government  
2003 Eduardo Ferro Rodrigues Opposition  
2006 José Sócrates Government  
2008 José Sócrates Government  
2010 José Sócrates Government  
2012 António José Seguro Opposition  
2014 António José Seguro Opposition  
2016 António Costa Government  
Source: own elaboration. The round scheduled for 2005 was postponed by Sócrates due to the early 
legislative elections. 
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An important characteristic of these races is the fact that they take place synchronically in 
all the federations. Beyond the president, the members also elect, in a separate ballot paper, 
the delegates to the federation congress.   
 
6.2.1 The degree of competitiveness  
This section analyses the degree of competitiveness of the selections. To this aim two 
indicators are considered: (1) the number of candidates, (2) the margin of victory between 
the top two finishers. These two indicators are broadly applied by literature on party 
leadership selection (e.g. Kenig, Rahat and Tuttnauer, 2016: 64-65). Building on these 
studies, we have classified as “coronation” or “uncontested selection” the race where there 
is only one candidate stepping forward. Conversely, when more than one candidate runs for 
the office we define the race a “contested selection”. In this case the second indicator of 
competitiveness, the margin of victory, is analysed. This measure enables us to assess the 
closeness of each race. 
The number of candidates: coronations or contested selections? 
In this section we first present the average data and the results disaggregated by round of 
selection and then by federation. Table 6.3 shows that on average “coronations” tend to be 
more frequent than “contested” selections, with single-candidate selections representing 
62.4% of the observations, whereas only 37.5% involve more than one candidate.  
This finding indicates that, on average, the federation presidents’ selection is characterised 
by a low degree of competition, as more than 60% of the selections are uncontested. 
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Table 6.3 Frequency of coronations and contested selections, 2003-2016 
Selection Year Coronations  
single-candidate 
Contested selections 
+1 candidate 
2003 10 (52.6%) 9 (47.3%) 
2006 11 (57.8%) 8 (42.1%) 
2008 15 (78.9%) 4 (21.0%) 
2010 14 (73.6%) 5 (26.3%) 
2012 11 (57.8%) 8 (42.1%) 
2014 7 (36.8%) 12 (63.1%) 
2016 15 (78.9%) 4 (21.0%) 
Average  83 (62.4%) 50 (37.5%) 
Source: own dataset of intra-party elections, see Annex IV.  
Looking at this indicator by round of selection we see that coronations prevail over the 
contested selections in six rounds. Competitiveness is particularly low in two cases, in 2008 
and 2016, when 15 out of 19 party federations hold single-candidate selections. The outlier 
is the round that took place in 2014.  
Narrowing the analysis at the federation level the picture is far from uniform and 
considerable differences across the nineteen federations on this dimension are found.  
As figure 6.1 shows, some PS federations display a well-established pattern of single-
candidate selections. This occurs, for instance, in the PS-Algarve, PS-Castelo Branco and 
PS-Évora federations. The most extreme case is the norther federation of PS-Vila Real, with 
all rounds being uncontested. Conversely, other federations present a pattern of high 
competitiveness as most of the races are disputed by more than one candidate, such as in the 
cases of the PS-Coimbra and PS-Setúbal. Yet, only in 5 out of 19 federations more than half 
of the races have been disputed by at least two candidates, i.e. the PS-Aveiro, PS-Coimbra, 
PS-Leiria, PS-Setúbal and the largest party federation, the PS-Porto.  
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Figure 6.1. Degree of competitiveness by PS federation, 2003-2016 
Source: own data set of intra-party elections, see Annex IV. 
 
The rate of closeness  
We now analyse the second indicator of competitiveness, the rate of closeness measured by 
the margin of victory achieved by the winner. Hence, the analysis is restricted to the 
selections that have been contested by more than one candidate. One case (PS-Baixo 
Alentejo 2003) has been withdrawn due to uncomplete data, thus we remain with 49 cases.  
The closeness of the races has been classified following the index applied by Kenig, Rahat 
and Tuttnauer (2016). Based on that, we have coded as ‘tight’ the races where the margin is 
lower than 10 percentage points, ‘close’ when lies between 10 and 25, ‘moderate’ between 
25 and 50, and ‘uncompetitive’ when is higher than 50 percentage points. We show the 
results in Table 6.4.  
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Table 6.4 Frequency of tight, close, moderate and uncompetitive selections, 2003-2016 
Rate of closeness  Frequency  
Tight races 
(<10) 
15 
30.6% 
Close races 
(10 – 25) 
15 
30.6% 
Moderate races 
(25 – 50) 
11 
22.4% 
Uncompetitive races 
(> 50) 
8 
16.3% 
N  49 
Source: own dataset of intra-party elections, see Annex IV. 
 
In nearly one-third of the races (30.6%) the rate of closeness is very high, with a tight margin 
of victory for the winner.  When ‘tight’ and ‘close’ races are added up, it turns out that in 
nearly two-third of the selections (61.2%) the margin between the first and the second place 
has been lower than 25 percentage points of the votes. Furthermore, the average margin of 
the ‘close races’ is rather low: 15.8 percentage points. Uncompetitive selections are quite 
rare (16.3%). Hence, aggregate findings indicate that when the selections are contested these 
tend to be rather competitive, and that the challengers develop an organised work on the 
ground to mobilise members in their favour. 
The distribution of this indicator by round of selection shows that in both 2008 and 
2016 the degree of competitiveness is rather low since, on average, the (few) contested races 
held in those two years are uncompetitive or moderately competitive. Conversely, high 
competitiveness is found in the 2003 and 2014 rounds of selections. This finding suggests 
that  the emergence of competitive candidacies, with candidates able to organise support and 
mobilisation and with realistic possibilities to contend, tends to occur more frequently in 
correspondence of specific phases, such as the leadership change and the opposition status. 
The more vulnerability of the party leader in these phases, or the need to reshape the 
territorial configuration of power, may be possible explanations for these dynamics. We 
return on this point later on.  
We now narrow the analysis at the federation level. As explained previously, the 
nineteen federations display different patterns in terms of coronation vis-à-vis contested 
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selections. Consequently, this difference is reflected in the analysis of the second indicator, 
i.e. the margin of victory, by federation. Table 6.5 maps the degree of competitiveness of the 
contested selections by federation.  
 
Table 6.5 Frequency of tight, close, moderate and uncompetitive selections by 
federation, 2003-2016 
Federation Tight 
(<10%) 
Close 
(10%-
25%) 
Moderate 
(25%-50%) 
Uncompetitive 
(>50%) 
N 
PS-Algarve 1    1 
PS-Aveiro 1 1 1 2 5 
PS/Baixo A.  1    1 
PS-Braga 1 1   2 
PS-Bragança 1 2   3 
PS/Castelo B  1   1 
PS-Coimbra 2 3 1  6 
PS-Évora   1  1 
PS-Guarda 1   1 2 
PS-Leiria 1 1 2  4 
PS-Lisboa 1   1 2 
PS/West(Oeste)   2  2 
PS/Portalegre 1   1 2 
PS-Porto 2 1  1 4 
PS-Santarém   3  3 
PS-Setúbal 3  2 1 6 
PS-Viana do C.  1 1  2 
PS-Vila Real     - 
PS-Viseu   1 1 2 
Source: own dataset of intra-party elections, see Annex IV. 
The findings at the party federation level does not show a clear pattern. In fact, there are 
cases where the selections are rarely disputed, being the single-candidate elections the rule 
or, when disputed, the races display a low degree of competitiveness (e.g. PS-Évora, PS-
Oeste, and PS-Viseu). In other cases, the (few) disputed selections have been competitive 
(e.g. PS-Castelo Branco, PS-Braga, PS-Santarém). Conversely, there are federations 
displaying high competitiveness, both in terms of number of disputed selections and in terms 
of rate of closeness. However, these cases seem to be outliers, such as the PS-Coimbra, or, 
to a lesser extent the PS-Setúbal, suggesting the role played by factional dynamics at the 
local level for the control of the federation. So, at the federation level different patterns 
emerge: from federations that rank low in both indicators to federations that rank high in 
both indicators. The territorial variation is important since it indicates that, within the same 
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party, the members may make different experiences of the internal processes depending on 
the territorial structure they are enrolled in.  
 
6.3 Institutional status, leadership change, and competitiveness 
The descriptive analysis presented in the previous sections has shown that on average the 
selections are characterised by a pattern of low competitiveness, with nearly 63% of single-
candidate selections held during the overall period considered. Table 6.3 shows that this 
pattern is more apparent when the PS is incumbent (2005-2011, 2016). This is best 
exemplified by the round of selection that took place in 2008, when nearly 80% of the races 
were run by single-candidates. In only four federations were the members presented with a 
choice between alternative candidates (i.e. PS-Aveiro, PS-Coimbra, PS-Guarda, PS-Porto). 
Moreover, the rate of closeness shows that the margin of victory is higher than 50% 
indicating the non-competitiveness of the races and the predictable victory of the 
“institutional” candidate.136  Hence, behind those challenges there was not an organised work 
to overturn the federations with a candidacy with realistic chances to seize the power. 
Moreover, as we will show afterwards, the 2008 round of selection also generated the lowest 
degree of turnover. In several cases, in fact, to be reselected are the incumbent presidents 
without facing competition. The unity and continuity of the party’s territorial apparatus  is 
in this phase very pronounced. In the specific case of the round of 2008, party organisation’s 
cohesion could have been further enhanced  by the upcoming electoral struggles, with the 
legislative and local elections both scheduled for 2009.  
Likewise, low competitiveness characterises the selections held in 2016, under António 
Costa as party leader and Prime-Minister. The federation presidents are predominantly 
selected in coronations (nearly 80%). Beyond that, two features of this  round must be 
stressed. Firstly, most of the 15 single-candidate selections present ‘institutional’ candidates, 
i.e. identified with, or endorsed, by the leader. Secondly, in the four cases where a 
competition between candidates takes place (PS-Évora, PS- Leiria, PS-Setúbal and PS-Viana 
do Castelo), the margin of victory indicates that on average, the races were rather 
uncompetitive, expect for the case of the PS-Leiria. 
                                                          
136 In the case of the PS-Coimbra and PS-Porto there is a challenge to the incumbent leaders who managed to 
keep the office. The challenges seem to be ensued in local dynamics.  
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In terms of context, there are similarities between 2008 and 2016: the PS is in 
government and electoral struggles are approaching, i.e. local elections in 2017. Likewise, 
they suggest that the party leadership has his internal power consolidated. The 2016 round 
follows the resolution of the struggle between Costa and Seguro in 2014 which pushed the 
reshaping of power configuration at the territorial level, with federation presidents closer to 
the new party directorate. This contributed to the leader’s internal power consolidation 
through the control of the territorial apparatus.  
Compared to the PS in government under Sócrates, in this case there is an important 
novelty. The PS forms a minority government with the parliamentary support of the BE, 
PCP and PEV, with which the party negotiates agreements on specific policy issues. 
Therefore, in such a context the cohesiveness of the party organisation may be even more 
crucial for the leadership. Although the latest round of selection (2018) has not been analysed 
for this study, preliminary observations confirm the pattern of low competitiveness under 
governmental status and leadership stability, with approximately 74% of single-candidate 
selections.  
What may explain this finding is that the governmental status fosters intra-party 
cohesion neutralising or reducing the emergence of challenges, or competitive candidates, 
for top positions in the party apparatus. The relevance of the institutional position is 
consistent with previous studies which have highlighted the members’ demobilisation when 
the PS is in government (Lisi, 2011: 233). The absence of competition is in itself a factor 
reducing members’ participation. More in general, the finding is in line with cross-country 
studies that have found a correlation between incumbency and decreasing competitiveness 
in party leadership selection (Cross and Pilet 2014; Kenig, Rahat and Tuttnauer, 2016). 
Differently from those analyses, focused on the national level, we found that incumbency 
and leadership stability - which is on turn fostered by  the occupation of power- seem to 
discourage the emergence of conflicts also at the lower organisational levels and to pressure 
the territorial apparatus towards a unitary and cohesive action. There is a reciprocal 
advantage on that.  On the one  hand, it ensures the party leader and prime minister to have 
the power within the organisation consolidated, and the structures led by loyal actors which 
ensure the aggregation of support and consensus towards the governmental power.137 On the 
other hand, the territorial leaders manage in autonomy the organisation and the resources 
                                                          
137 A. Costa (2016)  «As concelhias e as federações sejam o esteio do poder governativo» (The local structures 
and the federations have to be the support of the governmental power). Declaration to the press when presenting 
the motion to the 21st congress. Source: PS website. 
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provided by their position within the party. This may suggest, contrary to the 
presidentialisation thesis, that the leader is still interested to have the party apparatus under 
control, also when incumbent and his or her power is based on the electoral appeal.  
The opposite scenario occurs in 2014, when the selections display the highest rate of 
competitiveness. This is the only round in which the contested selections exceed the 
coronations. Challenges take places in 63% of the cases (12) with an average margin of 
victory of nearly 24 percentage points. Most of the disputes have been ‘close’ or ‘tight’, 
while only one-third have been ‘moderate’ or ‘uncompetitive’. Overall, the rate of 
competitiveness is rather high making the intra-party elections held in this phase an 
interesting outlier. The 2014 selections took place in the middle of the Seguro-Costa conflict, 
only few weeks before the open primaries for the Prime Ministerial candidate for the 2015 
elections. Even though the selectorate of the two types of elections was substantially 
different, the results in the federations were indicative of the degree of support held by the 
two candidates within the party apparatus.138 In fact, in almost all the federations the races 
were polarised around the ‘national’ challenge, with a clear cleavage between candidates to 
the federation supporting the incumbent secretary-general vis-à-vis candidates supporting 
the challenger.  
Apparently, national-level internal struggle had a crucial role in encouraging the 
emergence of challenges even in federations traditionally low competitive. In terms of 
number of federations, the results were in favour of Costa, since candidates endorsing him 
were elected in 10 out of 19 federations and in most of the contested selections.139  
The round set the basis for the power reconfiguration at the territorial level, which was then 
confirmed in 2016, and was a first indicator of Costa’s future election as secretary-general. 
This seems to be the main determinant behind the outcomes of the federation selections. This 
round, specifically, is illustrative of the mobilisation of the organisation, and the territorial 
structures in particular, in the context of struggles between personalistic factions. The 
struggle is on turn triggered by the opposition status and by the different perceptions about 
                                                          
138 While for the federations were admitted voting only the dues-paying members with at least 12 months of 
membership, the primaries for the PM candidate were opened to all the party members regardless the 
membership length and financial situation, plus the party sympathisers and supporters registered for voting in 
this specific competition. An in-depth analysis of the open primaries is carried out in chapter 8. 
139 PS-Aveiro (Costa), PS-Bragança (Seguro), PS-Braga (Costa), PS-Castelo Branco (Costa), PS-Coimbra 
(Seguro), PS-Leiria (Costa), PS-Lisboa (Costa), PS-Oeste (Costa), PS-Santarém (Seguro), PS-Setúbal (Costa), 
PS-Viseu (Seguro). In the PS-Viana de Castelo Federation the 2 candidates were both supporters of Seguro.   
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the leader with better chances (due to his popularity within electors) to bring the PS back in 
power.  
The fact that the opposition status tends to coincide with the leadership change may imply 
that the higher competitiveness and more competitive candidates found in this phase are the 
effect of the new leader’s attempt to consolidate his power by means of a renewal of the 
structures with loyal actors. In this regard, the analysis of the turnover carried out in the 
following section may provide further insights.  
 
6.4  Continuity and renewal 
The present section explores the degree of renewal of the federation leadership by analysing 
the degree of turnover. This indicator measures the seniority in office of these actors, which 
in the PS is limited to 8 consecutive years due to party rules. In our view, presidents that 
remain in office all the terms show a strong capacity of control over the organisation and 
autonomy. The empirical analysis considers the turnover by round of selection and by 
federation, to see whether differences on this indicator emerge during specific phases or in 
certain areas more than others. The analysis is complemented with the degree of 
competitiveness for exploring to what extent the turnover is the result of a contested or 
uncontested race.  
Table 6.6 shows the turnover rate during the overall period and by round of selection. 
Column three lists those cases in which the new president has already been in charge of the 
office, which in our view indicates a “false” renewal and strategic behaviours on the part of 
the elites.  New federation presidents are selected in 54 cases, i.e. 40.6%.  In 8 of them the 
winner had already held the office, being this occurrence more pronounced in 2014. In 13 
cases (24%) the turnover is due to the term limit. In the remaining 79 cases (59.3%) the 
incumbents are reselected.140  
The highest rate of turnover takes place in 2012, when new presidents are elected in more 
than half of the cases, i.e. 52.6%. At the national level, this round follows the leadership 
change and the election of Seguro as Secretary-General. Conversely, the lowest rate, 21%, 
                                                          
140 As for the selections held in 2003 and 2006 our data are slightly different from those referred in a previous 
study (Lisi, 2009). This difference is probably due to the different way in which turnover is considered in 2006 
since in this case two presidents resign to integrate the national secretariat in 2004. This led to an interim which 
has been then competed. We calculate this case as turnover.  
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is found in the selections held in 2008 with the aforementioned four federations changing 
their presidents.  
 
Table 6.6. Turnover rate by round, 2003-2016 
Round of Selection Turnover Rate  Former Presidents 
Reselected  
2003 7 (36.8%) - 
2006 9 (47.3%) - 
2008 4 (21%) 1 
2010 7 (36.8%) 1 
2012 10 (52.6%) 1 
2014 9 (47.3%) 4 
2016 8 (42%) 1 
Average  54 (40.6%) 8  
Source: own dataset of intra-party elections, see Annex IV. 
Narrowing the analysis by federation a large variation in the number of leadership changes 
emerges. Table 6.7 shows the number of turnover experienced in the different federations 
during the overall period.  
 
Table 6.7. Turnover rate by federation, 2003-2016 
Party federations Number of 
Turnover 
PS-Baixo Alentejo 1 
PS-Algarve, PS-Braga, PS-Castelo Branco, PS-Guarda, PS-
Lisboa, PS-Viana do Castelo, PS-Vila Real, PS-Viseu 
2 
PS-Aveiro, PS-Bragança, PS-Coimbra, PS-Leiria, PS-Portalegre 3 
PS-Oeste/West, PS-Porto, PS-Santarém 4 
PS-Évora, PS-Setúbal  5 
Source: own dataset of intra-party elections, see Annex IV. 
For instance, in the PS-Évora and the PS-Setúbal the turnover is very high with 5 presidents 
changed in 7 selections, whereas the lowest turnover rate is found in the small federation of 
PS-Baixo Alentejo, with only 1 turnover. The turnover experienced by the other federations 
varies, but 2-3 leader changes tend to be the norm in most of the federations.  
However, the turnover may be a tricky indicator. For instance, although apparently the PS-
Évora and PS-Setúbal federations show the same degree of turnover, the two cases are 
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substantially different. While in the former the new presidents are mainly selected in 
coronation, in the latter leadership change tends to be the result of a contest among new 
candidates or against the incumbent president. Conversely, in the PS-Baixo Alentejo, 
together with the low rate of turnover, we find a pattern of uncontested reselection of the 
incumbent president. Hence, they suggest  the presence of territorial diversities within the 
party.  
These observations make it particularly interesting to explore more in depth the different 
characteristics of the leadership change in each structure, and to what extent it is the outcome 
of a disputed selection or a coronation. This analysis may provide insights on intra-party 
dynamics at the territorial level, such as to what extent incumbent presidents are challenged, 
to what extent they succeed in keeping the office, whether a real competition takes places or 
whether leadership change is an ‘elite controlled’ process. Table. 6.8 shows the findings.  
 
Table 6.8 Continuity, turnover and competitiveness, 2003-2016 
 Continuity  Turnover  
Coronations 60  
(76%) 
23  
(42.6%) 
Contested selections 19  
(24%) 
31  
(57.4%) 
N=133 
(%) 
79  
(59,3%) 
54  
(40,6%) 
Source: own dataset of intra-party elections, see Annex IV.   
 
Some observations can be made. Firstly, in a considerable number of cases the incumbents 
are reselected in uncontested races (76%). This means that, once they get into office, the 
presidents tend to keep it safely. Moreover, when challenged by other candidates, their rate 
of success is high. During the period analysed there have been n=27 challenges to the 
incumbent presidents and they won in 70% of the cases. In this regard, the control of the  
organisation, ensured by the incumbency, might represent an important resource.  Secondly, 
the turnover is in most of the cases the result of a disputed selection (57.4%), included the 
incumbent president’s defeat by a challenger (n=8 observations).141  More in general, this is 
consistent with the expectation that, when the office is at stake (e.g. whether the incumbent 
                                                          
141 Among the cases classified as “disputed turnover” (31), in 8 cases the incumbent is defeated, in the 
remaining (23) the new president is selected in a race confronting new candidates.   
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steps down, or is forbidden to run due to term limit), the number of competitors increases. 
Yet, the number of cases in which new presidents are selected in coronation is rather high 
(42.6%), which indicates that the turnover is the result of an elite-controlled process to be 
ratified by members’ vote.  
In table 6.9. we disaggregate the cases by round.142 
 
Table 6.9. Turnover and competitiveness by round, 2003-2016 
Round of 
selections 
Turnover rate Coronations Contested selections 
2003 7 (36.8%) 1 6 
2006 9 (47.3%) 5 4 
2008 4 (21%) 3 1 
2010 7 (36.8%) 4 3 
2012 10 (52.6%) 4 6 
2014 9 (47.3%) 2 7 
2016 8 (42%) 4 4 
Source: own dataset of intra-party elections, see Annex IV. 
 
In 2003 the term limit does not show its effects due to the non-retroactivity of the new rule. 
This explains why federation presidents in power since the early 1990s could still run for the 
office (e.g. Braga, Bragança, Viana do Castelo, Viseu). The new presidents are mainly 
selected in competitive selection and tight races. Overall, this round reshaped the internal 
power at the territorial level in favour of the recently elected leader, Ferro Rodrigues, for 
whom the outcome of these elections was an evidence of members’ support towards the plan 
                                                          
142 Data by federation as follows: in 2003 contested in: PS-Algarve; PS-Aveiro PS-Coimbra; PS-Porto 
(incumbent defeat), PS-Santarém, PS-Setúbal, (incumbent defeat),  coronation (PS-Lisboa); 2006: contested: 
PS-Leiria (term limit), PS-West (Oeste), PS-Santarém; PS-Setúbal (incumbent defeat); coronations: PS-
Aveiro, PS-Castelo Branco (term limit), PS-Évora, PS-Porto, PS-Vila Real; 2008: contested: PS-Guarda; 
coronations: PS-West (Oeste); PS-Portalegre (term limit); PS-Santarém; 2010: contested: PS-Aveiro; PS-
Coimbra (incumbent defeat); PS-Lisboa (incumbent defeat); coronations: PS- Évora, PS-Portalegre, PS-Viana 
do Castelo (term limit), PS-Viseu (term limit); 2012: contested: PS-Baixo Alentejo (term limit), PS-Bragança 
(term limit), PS-Coimbra (incumbent defeat), PS-Portalegre (incumbent defeat), PS-Porto, PS-Setúbal; 
coronations: Algarve (term limit), Ps-Braga (term limit), PS-Évora, PS-Santarém; 2014: contested: PS-
Bragança, PS-Braga, PS-Castelo Branco (term limit), PS-Leiria (term limit), PS-West (Oeste), PS-Setúbal 
(incumbent defeat), PS-Viseu; coronations: PS-Évora, PS-Vila Real (term limit); 2016: contested: PS-Évora, 
PS-Leiria, PS-Setúbal, PS-Viana de Castelo coronations: PS-Bragança, PS-Guarda (term limit), PS-West 
(Oeste), PS-Porto. 
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of party’s renewal and the program of political reforms (i.e. limitation of the terms in public 
offices at the local level).143 The reconfiguration is best exemplified by the case of the largest 
federation, PS-Porto, where the incumbent president and mayor of an important town-hall is 
defeated.144   
In the next round, in 2006, the turnover is higher. Yet, there are more coronations, 
and above all the contested selections display a low degree of competitiveness. Hence, the 
renewal seems to occur in a consensual internal context. The only case of tight race (PS-
Setúbal) signals a change in favour of the new party leadership, with the incumbent defeated 
by a candidate close to the new secretary-general. The context is in fact radically different 
from that of 2003, the PS is led since 2004 by a new leader (Sócrates) and is government 
since 2005.  
As mentioned previously, continuity and stability characterise the 2008 round of 
selections. Only four federations change their leader and in one case, the PS-Portalegre, the 
turnover was compulsory. Furthermore, we have found that in three cases the new presidents 
are selected without facing competition and in the remaining case the race is uncompetitive. 
The following round (2010) was held under the same party leadership and the same 
institutional status. The PS was in fact reconfirmed in government after the 2009 general 
elections albeit this time without the absolute majority. The turnover rate increases, however, 
the outcomes do not necessarily indicate a reconfiguration of the territorial leaderships in a 
direction which is hostile to the party leader and Prime-Minister. Rather, in the important 
federation of  Lisbon the incumbent is defeated by a member of the national secretariat and 
junior minister, suggesting the dominant coalition’s attempt to secure a key piece of the 
territorial apparatus. On the other hand, there are interesting moves on-the ground, especially 
as far as the Porto federation is concerned, where the incumbent, very close to the party 
leader, is challenged in a very tight race.  
The highest degree of renewal (53%) is found in 2012, with 10 territorial structures 
changing their leader. As aforementioned, it coincided with the leadership change (Seguro) 
following the defeat of the PS in 2011. A close observation of the new presidents shows that 
in many cases these are close to the new party leader, for instance the PS-Braga’s and the 
PS-Porto’s presidents, which before being elected belonged to the national secretariat. In the 
PS-Porto, in particular, the race represented a U-turn with respect to the former leadership, 
                                                          
143 Público online: «Novo alento para Ferro avançar com limitação de mandatos», 3/2003.  
144 Público: «Francisco Assis destrona Narciso Miranda na maior federação socialista», 3/2003.  
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which was identified with the socratista faction. As mentioned in the former section, the 
following round clearly resembled the struggle for the national leadership between Seguro, 
and Costa. The turnover rate in 2014 is still rather high, since 9 federations changed their 
leadership.145 The outcomes show that in most of the cases the new presidents are those 
candidates that endorsed Costa and signals a reconfiguration of the territorial leadership in 
his favour, which is then confirmed and reinforced in 2016. Once again, although excluded 
by the analysis, the 2018 round seems to confirm the tendency towards stability, with a low 
rate of turnover, 31%, and low competitiveness.   
In our view these findings support our previous observations regarding the effects of the 
national context, in terms of party’s institutional position and leadership change/instability, 
over the selection processes. We return on this point in this chapter’s conclusion.  
 
6.5 Office overlap: federation presidents holding public offices  
This section focuses on the federation leaders exploring the overlap between this party office 
with public offices at the European and national level (parliamentarian, governmental), and 
at the local level (mayors and municipal councillors). This is an important aspect since the 
overlap ensures these actors political capital, material and symbolic resources (e.g. prestige, 
expertise, influence, media access…), as well as an easier access to the national leadership, 
namely when the accumulation regards national public offices.  
Hence, we have researched whether at the time of the election the president was also in 
charge of a public office. Figure 6.2 maps the degree of office overlap and its evolution over 
time. Due to the few cases of overlap with European parliamentarians (n=2), we have 
aggregated them into the national offices. 
                                                          
145 Turnover and winners’ position towards Costa or Seguro for the PM open primaries: PS-Bragança (Seguro), 
PS-Braga (Costa), PS-Castelo Branco (Costa), PS-Évora (Costa), PS-Leiria (Costa), PS-Oeste/West (Costa) 
PS-Setubal (Costa), PS-Vila Real (Seguro), PS-Viseu (Seguro).  
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Figure 6.2 Federation presidents holding public offices by year, 2003-2016
 
Source: own dataset of intra-party elections, see Annex IV. 
 
Firstly, the findings show that there is a clear overlap between federation presidents and 
public office-holders. Globally, only 10% of them are not in charge of a public office (i.e. 
14). In addition, although not specified, the variable ‘other’ includes some cases of political 
appointments. We have then explored the distribution of the office overlaps and the 
variations  by round of selections. The findings indicate that the highest degree of overlap 
regards federation leaders holding local offices (45%), followed by the MPs (nearly 40%). 
When we add the members of government, the share of federation presidents in charge of 
national public offices shifts to 43%.  
Considering the data by round of selection interesting findings emerge. Compared to the 
previous rounds, in 2016 the number of federation presidents in charge of national public 
offices is striking, with 11 MPs and 2 junior ministers in the Costa’s 2015 minority 
cabinet.146 
Conversely, in the former round the office overlap follows the opposite pattern. In this case 
only 32% (n=6) of the presidents hold a national office (MPs) while 58% are in local power. 
Similar pattern is found in 2012. Some observations regarding the general context of these 
                                                          
146 Junior ministers: Pedro Nuno Santos (PS-Aveiro), Marcos Perestrello (PS-Lisboa). Note that in 2017 Costa 
appointed as junior minister the president of the PS-Setúbal.  
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two rounds are needed. Firstly, the 2012 and 2014 selections take place when the PS was in 
opposition; second, the list of MP candidates for the 2011 early elections has been fulfilled 
under Sócrates’ leadership and the federation presidents involved in that candidate selections 
were those selected in 2010, for the 2010-2012 term. These elements contribute to explain 
the low ratio of MPs found in this phase. As shown in the previous section, the 2012 round 
displays the highest turnover rate. In this case, the new configuration of power at the party 
leadership level – being in this specific case a shift from two ‘dominant coalitions’ – pushes 
the change at the federation level, and this ‘new blood’ comes predominantly from the local 
power.147 
 
Conclusion  
This chapter has analysed the main characteristics of intra-party elections within the PS 
focusing on the federation presidents’ selection. The analysis sought to test the argument of 
personalisation processes at the territorial level. We have found a pattern of low 
competitiveness of these elections over the period analysed. Likewise, the unchallenged 
reselection of the incumbent president is a solid pattern of the races. These characteristics 
suggest high autonomy of the territorial leaders in the control of the structure, and that these 
selections tend to be elite-dominated. In this regard, the direct election has strengthened the 
federation presidents’ legitimacy and autonomy within the structures and the establishment 
of leader-centric model at this level. As such, we argue that it has fostered the building of 
personalised relations with the national leadership, as we have described in chapter 4.  
At the same time, we found these characteristics to be more pronounced during 
specific phases. Party’s institutional status seems an important factor in influencing these 
dynamics. When the party is incumbent the emergence of challenges from competitive 
candidates tends to be rare. Likewise, the characteristics of the turnover are not indicative of 
organised attempts to overturn the status quo. This ensures to the national leadership a 
cohesive organisation with a unified message and provides the federation presidents with 
autonomy in managing the organisation and the local dynamics. This pattern seems to 
change at the opposition. In this case there is an important element to be stressed. The shift 
to the opposition tends to be followed by a leadership change. In  this case, the number of 
contested selections and competitive races tend to be more frequent and the turnovers are 
                                                          
147 New federation presidents in 2012 and local offices: PS-Algarve, PS-Baixo Alentejo, PS-Bragança; PS-
Braga, PS-Coimbra, PS-Porto.  
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indicative of a reconfiguration in line with the new directorate. Still, the opposition status 
remains a condition of vulnerability for the leader. What seems to enhance the ‘linkage’ with 
the national context is the synchronicity of these elections in the PS. The races are in fact 
held in all the federations concomitantly, under the same phase and context. This feature 
may make easier for a (new) leader the attempt to consolidate his or her internal power. At 
the same time, the synchronicity is indicative of party centralisation.  
An important aspect that has emerged observing the main characteristics of the 
internal elections deals with intra-party democracy. As indictated by scholars, low 
competitiveness may condition members’ participation (Lisi, 2009; Wauters, 2010). In most 
of the cases party members are called to rubber-stamp a single candidate, without having a 
real choice between alternative candidacies and, above all, between different party 
proposals. This may impact members’ mobilisation and (further) alienate them from party 
life. Moreover, we have found the presence of different dynamics in the nineteen federations 
which suggests that, within the same party, the members may experience intra-party life 
differently. We argue that this would deserve an in-depth investigation, based on survey 
data, which however is beyond the scope of this study. 
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Chapter VII 
The territorial leadership in the PSD. The district presidents’ selection 
 
Building on the analysis developed in chapter 6, this chapter focuses on the PSD district 
structures’ leaders. Thus, we first describe the reform that introduced the direct election of 
the district presidents and the rules governing the selection process. Then, we explore the 
elections focusing on the degree of competitiveness, turnover rate, and presidents’ overlap 
with public offices. Investigating the selections, the analysis takes into consideration the 
developments regarding party’s institutional position and the national leadership. We 
examine whether and to what extent the PSD diverges from the PS in this dimension and, if 
so, what factors may explain the differences.   
 
7.1 The district presidents. Reform and rules of the selection method  
The direct election of the district-level bodies was introduced in 1996, in the context of the 
organisational reform carried out by Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa and Rui Rio, with the party’s 
shift to the opposition after a long period in government. The empowerment of members’ 
rights was aimed at revitalising the rank-and-file by attaching participative incentives.148 
However,  the reform was circumscribed to the selection of the district-level bodies, whereas 
the power of selecting the party leader was kept under the control of the Congress, until 
2006. The direct election widened district presidents’ autonomy from the collegial bodies, 
by reducing the need to negotiate with the local structures and leaders. This observation is 
best exemplified by an excerpt of a document published by a PSD district-structure in 
occasion of the fortieth anniversary of party’s foundation (2014). While revisiting the PSD’s 
history at the local level, the excerpt reveals the internal mechanisms which ruled the system 
prior the direct election:  
«On 28 June 1985 the district bodies’ elections were held. For the first time, two 
lists competed. Moura Guedes tried to secure the leadership, succeeding on it 
only through negotiations with the concelhias, and using the influence of the 
                                                          
148 “Povo Livre”, n° 1055, 7/2/1996.  
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Lisbon Civil Governor’s office, namely the subsidies allocated by the office». 
(Damas Antunes, 2014: 131).149 
The direct election enhanced the district leaders’ position by shifting the power of selection 
from the local leaders, with which the candidate had to negotiate support, to the ordinary 
members. With the 1996 reform, the direct election was applied to all the party bodies (i.e. 
executive, deliberative, jurisdictional and financial). As for the district leadership, the 
members vote for the Political Committee’s board on a ballot paper which lists the 
candidates running respectively for the presidency, the vice-president(s), the secretary-
general, the treasurer, and a variable number of members. Although the system is not 
properly candidate-centered like that of the PS, in practice the campaign is centered on the 
candidate, and the ballot paper clearly indicates who runs as leader. Since 1996, the PSD 
revised the rules only once, introducing the term limit in 2000. Accordingly, after three 
consecutive terms in office (six consecutive years) the turnover is compulsory. Then, after 
one term of interruption the former president is allowed to run again for the office. Thus, 
compared to the PS (four terms), the PSD rule apparently encourages a more frequent 
turnover at the top of the intermediate structures. This is the main formal limit to the district 
president’s office. In fact, the PSD has not forbidden the accumulation with other executive 
offices. As such, a district president may be member of the National Political Committee 
and, in the event of being elected as vice-president, may belong to the Permanent Committee, 
the restricted executive body. In practice, this has occurred in several cases and under 
different party leaders.150 The inclusion of these actors in the party executive body depends 
on trust relationship with the leader, as well as on the latter’s willingness to accommodate 
the influence and weight of each structure.  
The party regulations set the main requisites for both the active and passive 
electorate, i.e. to be part of the selectorate or  to run as candidate (candidacy). Like the PS, 
membership seniority and payment of the party dues are the two prerequisites to be fulfilled. 
                                                          
149 «A 28 de Junho 1985 há eleições para os Órgãos Distritais, pela primeira vez há duas listas a concorrer, 
Moura Guedes tem de se empenhar para manter a liderança da Distrital, só o conseguindo com negociações 
com as concelhias, e jogando com a influência do cargo de Governador Civil de Lisboa, nomeadamente os 
subsídios que atribuía». Translated from Portuguese by the author.  
150  For instance, in 1999 the PSD-Braga president, Fernando Reis, (D. Barroso); in 2005, the president of the 
PSD-Leiria, Isabel Damasceno (M. Mendes); the president of PSD-Lisboa, Paula Teixeira da Cruz (M. 
Mendes), she left the office when elected president of PSD-Lisboa; Mendes Bota PDS-Algarve in the CPN 
elected in 2007 (L. F. Menezes), in 2010 the president of PSD-Porto, Marco António Costa, was also vice-
president of the CPN (P. P. Coelho). The most recent case is the president of the PSD-Aveiro, Salvador 
Malheiro, elected as vice-president of the CPN in 2018 (R. Rio).    
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As for the candidacy, the collection of members’ signatures endorsing the list is also 
required. The criteria are listed in table 7.1.  
Table 7.1 Rules for the district presidents selection 
Party Leader Organisational Reform Selectorate  Candidacy  
 
Marcelo 
Rebelo de 
Sousa 
District presidents to be 
directly elected by the 
members holding 
electoral capacity (1996) 
Membership 
seniority: at least 
six months; 
Payment of 
membership fees. 
  
Membership 
seniority: at least 
twelve months; 
Payment of 
membership fees. 
 
Durão Barroso 
 
 
Term limit: no more than 
three consecutive 
mandates (six 
consecutive years in 
office) (2000) 
Membership 
seniority: at least 
six months; 
Payment of 
membership fees. 
 
Membership 
seniority: minimum 
twelve months; 
Payment of 
membership fees. 
Threshold: 20 
signatures 
Source: own elaboration, PSD, Statutes and Regulations for internal elections.  
 
The rules shaping the selectorate and candidacy dimensions have not changed 
substantially over time. Since 1996, the membership seniority requirement for being part of 
the selectorate is six months, while at least twelve months of seniority are required to run as 
candidate. In order to exercise both selectorate and candidacy rights it is necessary that no 
membership dues are left unpaid. The dues’ payment need to be updated before a term limit, 
established by national regulations, which has been changed frequently though. As for 
becoming a candidate, the national regulations establish the collection of the endorsement 
(i.e. signatures) of at least twenty members, which seems more of a symbolic threshold. Like 
the PS, the financial costs of the campaign are to be paid by the candidate, which is held 
accountable for the expenses. Party fund contributes are not provided.  
In the case of the PSD, an important element of the internal elections is the non-
synchronicity, i.e. they are not held concomitantly in all the district structures, but they take 
place according to each district structure’s internal calendar. The party headquarters can only 
recommend not having internal elections in specific periods, such as immediately before 
electoral competitions. In our view, the non-synchronicity matters for different reasons. 
Firstly, it indicates a higher degree of local structures’ autonomy compared to the PS, where 
the process is unified. This room for maneuver is apparent in the frequent practice of 
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anticipating the elections before the official end of the mandate, when it is considered too 
close to legislative or local elections. The self-regulation of the internal calendar may foster 
strategic behaviours on the part of the incumbent leadership and it could mean pre-election 
deals with deter alternative candidacies or discourage the formation of concurrent lists. 
Secondly, differently from races taking place concomitantly, this ‘dispersion’ may imply a 
different relation with the dynamics of the party at the national level, since the races may 
take place under different external and internal environments and leadership. The effects of 
the non-synchronicity are discussed in detail in the empirical analysis developed in the next 
sections.  
 
7.2 Empirical analysis (2003-2017)  
The empirical analysis examines 133 races held in the nineteen PSD district-level structures 
between March 2003 and July 2017, based on the original data present in the database of 
intra-party election we have built. Seven elections by structure are analysed, except for two 
structures (PSD-Castelo Branco and PSD-Guarda) for which we have six races available 
each, and two (PSD-Lisboa and PSD-Porto) with eight races available each. Globally, the 
sample analysed corresponds to 70% of the overall number of internal races held by the PSD 
since 1997. The lack of complete data has in fact constrained the analysis of the races that 
took place between 1997 and 2002. Due to the non-simultaneity of these internal elections, 
their distribution by year is not homogenous, making it difficult to compare the races by 
round, as we have done in the case of the PS.  
As table 7.2 shows, the empirical analysis covers different phases, in terms of party 
leadership and institutional position.   
Table 7.2 National context of the district presidents’ selections 
Year Party leader Institutional status 
2003-7/2004 José M. Durão Barroso Government 
9/2004-4/2005 Pedro Santana Lopes Government 
5/2005-/2007 Luís Marques Mendes Opposition 
2007-2008 Luís Filipe Menezes Opposition 
2008-2010 Manuela Ferreira Leite Opposition 
3/2010-5/2011 Pedro Passos Coelho Opposition 
6/2011-9/2015 Pedro Passos Coelho Government 
10/2015-11/2017 Pedro Passos Coelho Opposition 
Source: own elaboration 
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Following Durão Barroso’s resignation in July 2004, the PSD faced a period of high 
leadership instability changing several leaders in a few years, until the election of Passos 
Coelho in 2010 who led the party from 2010 to 2017. Hence, little more than half of the 
races have been held under this second phase of high leadership stability, while the other 
half occurred under different leaders, whose longevity in office was substantially lower. 
During the period analysed, the PSD has been in government until the end of 2004, 
remaining in opposition until 2011 when returned in power and fulfilled the mandate until 
the 2015 elections.  
7.2.1 The degree of competitiveness  
Following the analysis carried out in the previous chapter we first investigate the degree of 
competitiveness, in terms of number of candidates and then in terms of margins of victory 
between the two top finishers. Even though we refer here to candidates, it is worth reminding 
that in the case of the PSD the ballot paper is not uninominal but includes the complete list(s) 
for the executive bodies, identifying who is the candidate that runs for president.   
The number of candidates: coronations or contested selections? 
Based on Kenig, Rahat and Tuttnauer’s analysis we have classified the races as ‘coronations’ 
or ‘single-candidate’ selections when only one list runs, and contested selections when there 
are more lists. Considering the aggregate data, we first observe that on average the races 
display a very  low degree of competitiveness: nearly 72% (n=95) of them are in fact single-
candidate selections, whereas in only 28% (n=38) the members are presented with alternative 
candidacies. Compared to the PS, the PSD presents a lower degree of competitiveness, with 
a difference of 10 percentage points (62.4%). We now look at the performance of each 
district structure on this indicator to see whether within-party variations emerge. The 
findings are shown in Figure 7.1. 
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Figure 7.1 Degree of competitiveness by district-structure, 2003-2017 
 
Source: own dataset of intra-party elections, see Annex IV. 
 
The lowest degree of competitiveness is found in two structures, the PSD-Braga and the 
PSD-Viseu: in these cases, all the races (n=14) have been uncontested. Similarly, the PSD-
Porto, the largest PSD district structure, shows a very low degree of competitiveness, since 
in only one case (2014) more than one candidate emerge. The PSD-Portalegre, PSD-Lisboa-
West, and the PSD-Vila Real, all of them small structures, follow the pattern found in the 
PSD-Porto, with only one race disputed by more than one candidate. By contrast, the second 
largest structure, the PSD-Lisboa, presents a trend of contested selections, with only two 
cases of coronations (2015 and 2017) during the overall period. Beyond the PSD-Lisboa, 
only another structure presents less than 50% of coronations, i.e. the medium-low size PSD-
Guarda. In the remaining cases, single-candidate races are the majority.  
The opposite patterns found in the case of the two largest party structures, the PSD-Porto 
and PSD-Lisboa, holds true when we consider the races held between 1997 and 2003, for 
which we have available data. Before 2003, in fact, there have only been single-candidate 
races for the leadership of the PSD-Porto, whereas the opposite is true for the PSD-Lisboa 
where the races have always been competitive. Thus, this seems to be an enduring pattern of 
the two main PSD structures, which suggests the presence of different dynamics behind the 
control of these two important structures.  
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The rate of closeness  
Then, the second indicator of competitiveness is the rate of closeness, measured by the 
margin of votes separating the two top finishers. To classify the rate of closeness we rely on 
the aforementioned index applied by Kenig, Rahat and Tuttnauer (2016) who code as ‘tight’, 
‘close’, ‘moderate’ or ‘uncompetitive’ depending on the margin of percentage points. We 
measured this indicator in 37 out of 38 cases of contested selections, since in one case the 
data on the share of votes is missing (PSD-Lisbon West 2007). Table  7.3. presents the 
results.  
Table 7.3 The rate of closeness  
Margin of victory  Percentage N 
Tight races <10% 32% 12 
Close races 10% - 25% 35% 13 
Moderate races 25% - 50% 24% 9 
Uncompetitive races > 50% 0,8% 3 
Source: own dataset of intra-party elections, see Annex IV. 
 
The findings show that when the race has been contested the margins have been ‘tight’ or 
‘close’ in the large majority of races (77%) (n=25), indicating a rather high degree of 
competitiveness, reinforced by the fact that the average margin of the ‘close’ races is 16% 
percentage points. By contrast, the number of uncompetitive races is irrelevant (less than 
1%). Like the PS, this finding suggests that while the number of candidates is generally low, 
with “inertia” dominating the apparatus, when competition does occur there is an effective 
work on the ground behind rival candidacies.  
We then map the rate of closeness by district structure, excluding the two structures which 
held only single-candidate races in the time-frame considered (PSD-Braga and PSD-Viseu), 
and the small structure of PSD-Lisbon West due to data missing.  
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Table 7.4 Closeness of the races by district-level structure, 2003-2017 
District-level structures Tight 
(<10%) 
Close 
(10-25) 
Moderate 
(25-50) 
Uncompetitive 
(>50%) 
PSD-Lisboa 2 - 4 - 
PSD-Guarda 2 2   
PSD-Setúbal 2  1  
PSD-Viana do Castelo 2 1   
PSD-Algarve  1 1  
PSD-Aveiro 1 1   
PSD-Beja  1 1  
PSD-Bragança  1 1  
PSD-Castelo Branco  1 1  
PSD-Coimbra 2    
PSD-Évora 1 1   
PSD-Leiria  1  1 
PSD-Santarém  2   
PSD-Portalegre  1   
PSD-Porto    1 
PSD-Vila Real    1 
Source: own dataset of intra-party elections, see Annex IV. 
 
Some observations can be made. The PSD-Guarda combines a high degree of 
competitiveness in terms of number of candidates and in terms of closeness. Similarly, PSD-
Setúbal, PSD-Viana and PSD-Coimbra present a dynamic of competitiveness of the races. 
However, we are referring to less than one-fourth of the PSD structures. Whereas Lisbon is 
normally a multi-lists race, the outcomes show that most selections have been moderately 
competitive. In the PSD-Porto, on the other hand, the one race involving more than one list 
has been uncompetitive (i.e. margin of victory higher than 50 percentage points), thus one 
of the candidates had unrealistic chances of victory. The same occurs in the northern 
structure of PSD-Vila Real. Coupled with the absence of disputed selections found in the 
cases of the PSD-Braga and PSD-Viseu, these four northern structures share similar features 
in term of dynamics of the contests suggesting a sort of ‘northern pattern’ in the territorial 
leadership.  
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7.3 Institutional status, leadership change, and competitiveness 
Due to the non-simultaneity of the races in the PSD, the longitudinal analysis is rather  
constrained. In the PSD we do not have an equal number of observations by year which 
enables us to analyse the characteristics of the intra-party elections, controlling for party 
leadership and institutional status. Therefore, we have decided to divide the races in two 
blocs: the first phase from 2003 to March 2010 (n= 65 races), and the second phase from 
April 2010 to July 2017 (n= 68 races). In the first phase, and especially between 2004 and 
2010, there is high instability at party leadership level: four different leaders are selected, 
and the party is in opposition. Conversely, in the second phase, from 2010 onwards there is 
high leadership stability and the party is in government. Of course,  incumbency has a crucial 
role in stabilising the party leader’s position and consolidating his power. Hence, we have 
looked whether in the two phases different patterns emerge, in particular we want to see 
whether competitiveness is more pronounced in the first phase. In doing so we explore the 
type of control exercised by the district presidents and whether the disputes for controlling 
this important sector of the territorial organisation are sensitive to the national context and 
what does it mean for intra-party relations. The results are illustrated in Figure 7.  
 
Figure 7.2 Degree of competitiveness by year, 2003-2017
 
Source: own dataset of intra-party elections, see Annex IV. Note that as for 2010 we have put  
together the races pre and post Passos Coelho’s election. The 10 coronations occur in the 2nd 
phase, from April 2010. 
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On average, in the first phase, the share of competitive races is nearly 34% (22 out of 65), 
whereas in the second it decreases to nearly 23,5% (16 out of 68).  
In 2004, most of the district structures held internal elections, the overwhelming majority of 
which are single-candidates (13 in 16). In this phase, the PSD is in government and since 
2000 is led by the same leader (Barroso). Most of the district presidents could be considered 
barrosistas. Furthermore, local elections were scheduled for the following year, thus the 
district structures needed to have their internal issues resolved in advance. Thus, these 
circumstances may have together enhanced the territorial apparatus’ stability and 
discouraged the emergence of internal conflicts.   
After the party’s shift to the opposition in February 2005, and at least until 2007, it seems 
not to emerge more competitiveness. In the meanwhile, the leadership had changed. After 
the brief experience of Santana Lopes, Mendes was elected in 2005 and reselected in 2006.151 
In 2006, several district structures held internal election, and once again coronations 
prevailed (9 out of 12). This finding suggests high stability in terms of district leadership. 
Moreover, the few cases of contested races could be identified as close to the party leader’s 
line, and thus reinforced the leader’s position within the territorial apparatus. This is best 
exemplified by the PSD-Lisbon which is conquered by a member of Mendes’ directorate.152 
The pattern of low competitiveness was only partially reversed in 2007. Out of thirteen races 
held that year, six of them were contested. Furthermore, the races displayed a high rate of 
closeness, with three tight and one close races. For the PSD it was a phase of high internal 
turmoil. The defeat in the early elections for the Lisbon’s town-hall led to Mendes’ 
resignation, and the following challenge for the leadership against Menezes was won by the 
latter, in a climate of high factionalism around the two personalities and divisions within the 
territorial structures. Mendes’ defeat was in fact followed by the resignation of the district 
presidents who had endorsed him, and the anticipation of the internal elections, which the 
resigning leaders nonetheless were able to keep. The overall outcome of the races did not 
entail a change of power configuration in the district leadership more favourable to the new 
leader, rather the party continued to be divided. This division is reflected in Menezes’ 
                                                          
151 The 2006 leadership election took place under the new system, i.e. direct election by members. Mendes was 
single-candidate. 
152 Paula Teixeira da Cruz. She was party vice-president and resigned to run for the PSD-Lisboa. The other is 
the PSD-Aveiro, where a local leader (A. Topa) won the contest against an MP (L. Montenegro).  
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difficulty in aggregating consensus around his leadership, which contributed to his 
resignation after only a few months.  
Beyond this specific increase in competitiveness, in the following two years single-candidate 
selections were the norm. The new leader, Manuela Ferreira Leite, defeated Santana Lopes 
and Passos Coelho, who were both endorsed by large sectors of the territorial leadership. 
Nevertheless, the low support held by the new leader within the territorial apparatus seemed 
not to be reflected in the dynamics of the district races held in 2008. In other words, the new 
leader seemed not to try to consolidate her internal power by trying to intervene in the 
disputes supporting a reconfiguration at this level. Thus, the territorial apparatus continued 
to be dominated by the former leadership. We might wonder about the reasons: was the 
control of the apparatus considered unimportant for the new leader (elected and legitimised 
by the members)? Or was not possible the attempt to challenge entrenched equilibria? Of 
course, the context could have plaid a chief role in this, since 2009 was a full electoral year. 
However, the non-reconfiguration of the apparatus may explain the difficult relations of the 
new leader with the district leadership, which de facto emerged during the candidate 
selection process for both the national and local elections (see chapter 4).  
Considering 2010 as a watershed year between the two phases, more competitiveness is 
found when Ferreira Leite’s term was ending, whereas from April 2010 until the end of 2013 
the overall competitiveness is remarkably low.153 As a matter of fact, in this time-frame there 
are only 3 contested selections vis-à-vis 32 coronations, which means nearly 1%. This is 
especially apparent in 2012, with only single-lists running for the 11 district structures at 
stake. The party was in government since 2011, and in 2013 local elections were scheduled.  
By contrast, in 2014 more than half of the races are competitive (7 out of 12), and above all 
the rate of closeness is rather high, with 3 ‘close’ and 2 ‘tight’ races. What may contribute 
to explain this dynamic, which runs counter the argument of internal cohesion pushed by the 
incumbency,  is the fact that this round of selections follows the 2013 local elections, which 
represented a strong defeat for the PSD in local power and the first setback for the 
government. However, the disputes seem not to be engendered in a challenge to the national 
leadership, which on the one hand may suggest that they are due to purely local dynamics, 
                                                          
153 The PSD-Lisboa was one of the competitive races in the early months of 2010. The incumbent president 
(C. Carreiras) and supporter of Passos Coelho in 2008 was challenged by a candidate (J. B. Gouveia) endorsed 
by M.F. Leite.   
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on the other that the leader tries to secure the apparatus with new presidents.154 The analysis 
of the turnover and the characteristics of the winners carried out in the next sections may 
provide some insights on it.  
In 2015, year of legislative elections, all the seven races are uncontested. Competitiveness 
seems to re-emerge the following year, with nearly half of the several races held being 
disputed (7 out of 16). In 2016 the PSD had shifted to the opposition, and the erosion of the 
support towards the party leader was growing. A closer look indicates changes in power 
configuration which seem to pay in anticipation the scenario of leadership change. Yet, this 
is more apparent in only one structure, the PSD-Aveiro, where the incumbent president is 
defeated, and the dispute involves the endorsement of  important members of the party at the 
national level (e.g. the president of the Parliamentary Party Group). This case is rather 
interesting in order to show the enduring capacity of local notables (caciques) to strategically 
mobilise members as a resource for internal struggles behind rival candidacies. Before the 
contest, in fact, there is an important increase of the affiliations which made the PSD-Aveiro 
the second largest PSD structure in 2016.155 Likewise, a similar challenge is attempted in the 
PSD-Lisbon in 2017.156 
However, given that the general pattern of uncontested (and uncompetitive) races is rather 
consolidated in the PSD, it seems difficult to disentangle the effects of national context in 
hindering the internal competition. On the one hand, it may indicate that the control of the 
structures is not affected by factors such as the struggles for the national party leadership, or 
the party’s government status. The non-simultaneity of the races, which favours strategic 
behaviours, concurs in making this analysis difficult. Moreover, this feature of the PSD 
internal elections reinforces the local autonomy vis-à-vis the national party. This may be in 
line with the idea of the stratarchical nature of the PSD observed by scholars and discussed 
in chapter 4 (Jalali, 2006, 2007; Jalali and Lisi, 2009). The district leadership in the PSD 
may be more linked to the control of the local power and the control ensured by this party 
office over local power. Yet, while in government this autonomy may be less relevant, it 
may be more problematic for the national leader in opposition, for instance in trying to create 
                                                          
154 For instance, in the PSD-Santarém the incumbent president is defeated by a MP close to the party leader.  
155 “Diário de Notícias” online: «PSD: Militantes inscritos em bloco fazem distrital de Aveiro maior que 
Lisboa», 29/2/2016. 
156 “Público” online: «Passos Coelho tenta segurar Lisboa com Pedro Pinto», 27/5/2017.  
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a front of close presidents and reshaping the power configuration on the ground. In this 
regard, this attempt may be easier for a PS leader.  
In some cases, the competitiveness, or the lack of thereof, seems to be linked to local 
dynamics. If internal ‘factions’ exist, in these cases they do not seem to emerge or be 
organised. At the same time, the low competitiveness may be indicative of low elites’ 
circulation, personalised control of the structures and entrenchment of an ‘oligarchy’ at the 
territorial level. An in-depth analysis of renewal dynamics and case-by-case observation 
would contribute to better understanding these processes.  Of course, it is clear that in terms 
of intra-party democracy the absence of competitiveness may discourage members’ 
participation and mobilisation, as well as the emergence of different party proposals.  
7.4 Continuity and renewal    
In this section we explore the continuity and renewal characterising the district leadership 
by focusing on the degree of turnover.  
Turnover rate 
The PSD encourages elites’ circulation at district level by making the turnover mandatory 
after three consecutive terms in office, corresponding to six years. The analysis shows that 
during the time-frame considered there have been on average three leadership changes by 
structure. The distribution is rather homogeneous since no less than three and no more than 
four changes have been experienced per district structures. Due to the aforementioned term 
limit and the fact that the empirical analysis have covered a period of 14 years, this finding 
is not surprising. It rather indicates that the rule is fully institutionalised. On the other hand, 
it also indicates that, on average, the district presidents tend to complete the number of terms 
allowed. Indeed, looking to what extent renewal has been influenced by party rules, we 
observe that in nearly 44% (n=28) of the cases the turnover has been compulsory.  
Overall, renewal is found in 48% of the observations (n=64). Still, in 11% (n=7) of the cases 
classified as “turnover”, to be elected was a former district president, suggesting that, like 
the PS, the incentives provided by the rules are not very effective in hampering strategic 
behaviours on the part of the territorial elites. Compared to the PS, however, the number of 
turnovers in the PSD is higher. This result may be explained due to the differences in the 
rules governing the term limit in the two parties, which ensure the PS federation presidents 
more longevity in office. Conversely, in 52% (n=69) of the observations to be reselected are 
the incumbent presidents.  
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We now examine reselection of the incumbent (continuity) and election of a new 
president (turnover) considering to what extent they are the result of a contested race or a 
coronation. We thus reintroduce the competitiveness dimension. We argue that this approach 
enables us to observe more in depth the main characteristics of these selections and see, for 
instance, whether challenges to the incumbent leaders are undertaken, as well as to what 
extent the prospects of turnover stimulate the emergence of a dispute. This perspective 
provides further insights on the characteristics of the territorial leadership, such as autonomy 
and control exercised over the organisation. The results are presented in table 7.5.   
Table. 7.5 Turnover, continuity and competitiveness, 2003-2017 
PSD district-structures Continuity  Turnover  
Coronations 54  
(78%) 
41 
(64%) 
Contested selections 15  
(22%) 
23  
(36%) 
N=133 69 64 
Source: own dataset of intra-party elections, see Annex IV. 
 
As the table shows, there is a clear pattern of uncontested reselection of the incumbent 
presidents. Indeed, in 78% of the cases the incumbent is reselected without facing 
opposition. Apparently, incumbency discourages the emergence and organisation of rival 
candidacies. Given the advantaged position of who controls the organisation, this is not 
entirely surprising. We have found a similar value in the PS (i.e. 76%).  
When challenged, the incumbent’s rate of success tends to be very high (83%). In the (few) 
cases of challenge to the incumbent president (n=18), the incumbent was reselected, and 
continuity was ensured, in 15 of the observations. Therefore, challenges to the incumbent 
leader tend to be rare, and defections rarer. Although the incumbent is rarely challenged, we 
have found this event to occur more (twice the times) in the phase of higher leadership  
instability. Yet, given that in that phase more competitiveness emerged this finding could be 
not significant. In the PS, we have  found the incumbent presidents to be challenged more, 
and their rate of success to be comparatively lower (70%). 
It is more surprising to find low competitiveness in the cases of turnover, when the party 
office is at stake. In fact, selection of new presidents occurs in 64% of the cases through 
coronations. Hence, apparently the prospect of a change does not enhance competitiveness 
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by stimulating the emergence of alternative candidates. The turnover is contested only in 
36% of cases (n=23), most of which involve new candidates (n=20), while the 
aforementioned rotation, triggered by incumbents’ defeat, is almost absent (n=3). In this 
regard, the PSD differs from the PS, where the turnover was disputed in most of the cases. 
These findings can be explained due to the dynamics of the pre-selection stage. On the one 
hand, there may be a ‘favourite son’ for the office, i.e. a candidate endorsed by the 
leadership, namely a member of the former district directorate (e.g. vice-president). On the 
other, there may be negotiation between different groups over a consensual candidate and 
unitary list. This, however, would require a case-by-case analysis which is beyond the scope 
of this chapter. However, the findings seem to indicate that turnover is in most cases the 
result of an elite-controlled process, pointing towards high autonomy and room for maneuver 
in the control of the organisation on the part of the territorial elites.  
 
Turnover rate by year, 2003-2017 
Although the systematic analysis of the turnover rate by year is constrained by the uneven 
distribution of the races, some observations can be made with reference to the different 
phases experienced by the PSD during the period analysed. Figure 7.3 illustrates the data. 
Figure 7.3 Turnover by year, 2003-2017 
 
Source: own dataset of intra-party elections, see Annex IV. 
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Several cases of turnover are found in 2006, when 67% of the structures, which held internal 
elections, changed their leadership. However, the aforementioned absence of 
competitiveness found in 2006 suggests that renewal in the district leaderships is not the 
result of internal divisions resulting in rival candidacies. From this perspective, the territorial 
structures did not show instability in their internal dynamics. Likewise, in 2010 the rate of 
turnover is high, with 57% of turnover, but it is not competitive. Differently from 2006, in 
2010 the renewal coincided with a change in the party  leadership change. This may indicate 
a ‘tranquil’ reconfiguration of the apparatus and cohesion around the new leader (Passos 
Coelho) on the part of the territorial leaders. In fact,  the results of Passos Coelho’s election 
demonstrated the large support towards him.157 
The following years, and at least until 2014, are very stable, with few changes at the top of 
the district structures and a substantial continuity. In 2014 the turnover rate is high (58%) 
and this time competitiveness has increased as well, most of the turnovers are in fact 
contested and the closeness of the races indicate that the challenges were competitive (close 
and tight). As we have shown, in that year the pattern of low competitiveness, experienced 
since Passos Coelho’s first mandate (and the party’s shift to government), was interrupted. 
However, at the same time, the new district presidents selected could not be identified with 
the emergence and mobilisation of an organised opposition towards the national leader. As 
mentioned, in some case the moves rather seemed to indicate the attempt to secure the 
apparatus with closer presidents. In part, the dynamics found in 2014 may be related with 
the defeat suffered by the PSD in the 2013 local elections and thus may be triggered by 
locally-based conflicts. Likewise, in 2016, 50% of the structures changed their president and 
the turnover is disputed in most cases with competitive races. We have mentioned that, 
especially in the case of the PSD-Aveiro, the race was significative for revealing the erosion 
of the national leader’s support within the structures.  
Overall, we have not found the turnover rate being significantly higher in the first phase with 
respect to the second. This may be explained due to the term limit. On the other hand, we 
have not found the turnover be more contested in one phase rather than another. In less than 
half of the cases, turnover is the result of a contested race. As shown in the previous sections 
a very low degree of competitiveness characterises these intra-party elections. Still, lowest 
turnover rate and lowest competitiveness were more apparent between 2010 and 2014, with 
                                                          
157 In the direct elections of 2010, Passos Coelho defeated Paulo Rangel in all the structures, with the exception 
of the regional structure of the PSD-Madeira.  
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Passos Coelho’s election, and during the first phase in government until 2014, suggesting 
the effect of incumbency in stabilising internal cohesion.  
 
7.5 Office overlap: district presidents holding public offices 
 
This section explores to what extent district presidents overlap with public office-holders, 
such as members of the European Parliament (MEP), governors and MPs, or local officials. 
In light of the purposes of the thesis, we are more interested in this feature rather than other 
type of information, such as gender, age and literacy. Holding a public office provides the 
district president with political capital and influence capacity and, depending on the type of 
office, a closer relation with the national leadership. At the same time, different patterns of 
office accumulation may indicate a closer relation of these elites with local or national 
power. The empirical analysis concerned the public office held by the district president when 
selected. In case of reselection we repeated the observation regarding the public office. Table 
7.6. presents aggregate data for the period analysed.  
 
 
Table 7.6 Percentage of district presidents holding public offices, 2003-2017 
MEP MP Local Office Other 
0,02% 
(2) 
33% 
(44) 
47% 
(63) 
18% 
(24) 
Source: own dataset of intra-party elections, see Annex IV. 
 
The first observation is that a large share of district presidents, 82% also holds a public office 
at the time of the election. However, like the case of the PS, the category labelled as ‘other’ 
includes cases of patronage posts. The emergence of the overlap is not in itself surprising. It 
is more interesting to look at the type of office occupied, whether and to what extent there 
is a prevalence of the national or local,  and eventual changes. This may contribute to shed 
light on the dynamics of the selections investigated in the previous sections. 
Firstly, among district presidents the overlap with local public offices tends to be more 
diffuse, with 47% of the observations. More than one/third held a national or European office 
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when elected. Differently from the PS, there are no cases of district presidents holding 
governmental offices, when the party was incumbent.158 The overlap with national and 
European offices is therefore lower than that found in the case of the PS (i.e. 43%).  
Looking at the distribution of party-public office’s overlap by year, illustrated in Figure 7.4, 
the presence of local officers at the head of the PSD district structures tends to be more 
pronounced in the phase that precedes the return to government in 2011. In this phase the 
overlaps with local officers is more evident, with 55% of district presidents holding a local 
office vis-à-vis the 37% in the second phase. This pattern is apparent in 2007 when the vast 
majority of district leaders is linked to local power. This data goes in the direction of previous 
studies which have highlighted the expansion of local-office holders’ influence in national 
bodies during the period at the opposition (Jalali, 2006, 2007). In that phase the territorial 
apparatus was mainly headed by members linked to local power.  
 
Figure. 7.4 District presidents holding public offices by year, 2003-2017 
 
Source: own dataset of intra-party elections see Annex IV. 
 
 
  
                                                          
158 But see the case of the government formed by the PSD/CDS coalition after the 2015 elections and presented 
to the Parliament for the vote of confidence, which was rejected. In this case, the presidents of the PSD-Porto 
and PSD-Lisbon are appointed as junior ministers. “Diario de Notícias” online: «Figuras do aparelho do PSD 
reforçam secretários de Estado», 30/10/2015.  
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The share of local offices tended to decrease in the second phase, with 2014 as the year in 
which more district presidents and in particular the new ones are MPs and MEP. On the one 
hand, this may not be particularly surprising, due the district presidents’ role in candidate 
selection. On the other, the fact that most of the MPs are new presidents in our view supports 
the observation that the high turnover and competitiveness experienced in 2014 reveals the 
leader’s attempt to secure the apparatus.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter we have replicated for the PSD the analysis carried out in chapter 6. The goals 
were the same: to investigate the argument of emergence of personalisation and leader-
centric model of organisation at the territorial level, and the relation of these dynamics with 
the party at national level. We have found both similarities and differences with the PS. 
Firstly, like the PS on average these intra-party elections tend to be uncontested. In the PSD 
this pattern is slightly higher. In both cases, we have found that when disputed the races are 
rather competitive. In other words, the emergence of more than one candidate means that 
behind rival candidacies there is an organised effort, whereas outsider candidates 
(uncompetitive contests) are very rare. As for the turnover, in the PSD, most cases of new 
presidents result from uncontested selections, therefore the tendency towards continuity in 
the control of the territorial organisation is rather pronounced.  
However, in both parties territorial differences are found, with structures in which absence 
of competitiveness and elite’s entrenchment appear to be more pronounced than in others. 
Yet, this would deserve a detailed analysis that looks at within-party variations. 
Overall, the characteristics of these internal disputes in both the PS and the PSD reveal 
important aspects. Rather than change, it is precisely the lack of change and competition that 
it is interesting. In our view, the low competitiveness and low renewal (in spite of the rule 
on terms limit) are indicators of dynamics of low elites’ circulation and ‘oligarchic’ 
tendencies in the control of the territorial level of the party organisation.  
In comparison with the PS, however, the PSD differs on an important aspect, i.e. the non-
synchronicity of the internal disputes. This feature suggests the higher degree of autonomy 
of the territorial leaders in managing the organisation, potentially fostering strategic 
behaviours. Overall, it is consistent with the more decentralised nature of the PSD. At the 
same time, this feature may hamper national leader’s eventual attempt to control the 
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apparatus, for instance by encouraging the emergence of alternative candidacies, and may 
contribute to explain the difficulties of the PSD leaders in opposition.  
Finally, the considerations done for the PS regarding the effects on members’ mobilisation 
and intra-party democracy, as well as party public image, apply to the PSD as well. Social-
democrats are called to rubber stamp decisions already taken internally that – coupled with 
the absence of a true renewal on the supply-side – may negatively affect their participation 
to intra-party life.  
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Chapter VIII 
The intra-party democracy reforms in the PS and PSD (2010-2017) 
 
 
Introduction 
This final chapter analyses the intra-party democracy (IPD) reforms – and the attempts of 
reforms – carried out by the PS and the PSD in the most recent years, placing the emphasis 
on the territorial structures.  
Chapter 1 has shown that members’ and supporters’ role in internal processes is a 
growing trend of contemporary parties, conceived as an organisational response to 
challenges such as membership decline, decrease of activism, and growing party distrust. As 
such, it represents an attempt to recover the public image by making the processes more 
inclusive (Dalton and Weldon, 2005; Ignazi, 2014). Parties, especially the electoralist ones, 
may be pressured towards these reforms by environmental factors relative to the electoral 
competition and their competitors’ strategies. Another perspective suggests that 
democratisation conceals a strategy to strengthen the leader from the constraints of the party 
middle-level strata (e.g. territorial structures, delegates, etc.), by appealing to the direct and 
un-mediated participation of the individual member (Panebianco, 1982; Katz and Mair, 
1995). 
 As a matter of fact, scholars have shown that a measure of IPD such as the direct 
election of the leader by members has enhanced leader’s internal autonomy and public 
legitimacy. This is the case of the PS and PSD, where the power of electing the leader has 
been transferred from the congress to the ordinary members, first in the PS in 1998, followed 
by the PSD in 2006. Conversely, it has weakened the territorial structures’ role – exercised 
by means of political influence and direct linkage with the congressional delegates – and 
more in general the internal system of accountability based on the collective bodies. 
Moreover, although it has been presented by party elites as a measure for revitalising the 
membership, there is no significant evidence that passive members have been mobilised or 
that new affiliations have risen due to this reform (Lisi and Espírito Santo, 2017). Scholars 
have highlighted the strategic rationales behind the introduction of the reform and the 
tailoring of the rules governing the process, as well as the low competitiveness and high rate 
of approval characterising the direct elections, especially when the party is incumbent, 
explained with the need for party elites to find consensual candidates to avoid the negative 
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impact of intra-party divisions in party public image (Lisi, 2010b, 2015a; Lisi and Freire, 
2014: 139). More in general, such features reflect the increasing leader’s centrality and the 
relevance of leader effects for parties’ electoral performance (Lobo, 2005a, 2006). As shown 
in chapter 3, the direct election is still applied by a minority of parties and tends to be more 
frequent in centre-left than centre-right parties.  
Since this specific reform has been widely explored by scholars in the Portuguese case, this 
chapter circumscribes the analysis to some considerations related to the role of the territorial 
structures, drawing upon the interviews carried out for this thesis. Therefore, it deals in detail 
with the more recent processes of reform concerning IPD in the two parties. Large part of 
the chapter deals with the PS case, since it has shown important developments during the 
recent years in opposition (2011-2015), vis-à-vis the inertia experienced by the PSD in this 
respect. Firstly, with the reform of candidate selection which expanded members’ role, 
carried out by Seguro. Secondly, with the open primaries for selecting the Prime-Ministerial 
candidate for the 2015 elections, the first experience of this type adopted by a Portuguese 
parliamentary party. As it will be shown, this innovation was ensued in intra-party conflicts 
and involved the territorial structures’ mobilisation capacity in supporting rival candidates. 
  
Before accounting the reforms of IPD, we consider how the two parties define their 
organisational boundaries, namely whether they enable the inclusion of other types of 
affiliates beyond the dues-paying members. This feature matters for different reasons. For 
scholars, this innovation belongs to the measures adopted for coping with the effects of 
membership decline on the internal participation and external legitimacy, as well as to 
attenuate the unrepresentative character of the members (e.g. prevalently male, elderly, etc.) 
(Scarrow, 2015; Pedersen et al., 2017; Achury et al., 2018). More in general, it reflects the 
changing nature of parties as organisations based on dues-paying membership (von dem 
Berge and Poguntke, 2017). At the internal level, the expansion of the party boundaries 
reduces the distinction between members and non-members. Moreover, if the party provides 
less-committed typology of affiliates with rights in internal processes, the direct linkage 
between leader and supporters is strengthened, and thus the ‘plebiscitary’ character of the 
party (Young and Cross, 2002; Young, 2013: 68). In our view, it further loosens the internal 
ties and affects the party territorial structures threatening  their role of intermediators and 
their mobilisation and influence capacity.  
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8.1 Expanding the organisational boundaries? The IPD reforms in the PS 
As chapter 3 has shown, the PS is among the few parties offering alternative types of 
affiliation, beyond the dues-paying membership. Party statutes include two types of formal 
membership: the member (the militante) and the sympathiser (the simpatizante). Everyone 
who identifies with the Program and the Principles may enroll as sympathiser, without 
supporting financial costs. This figure has been introduced by the PS with the 2003 statutory 
changes, alongside the adoption of non-territorial structures as the ‘thematic-branches’, the 
‘cyber-branches’ and the ‘political clubs’.  These innovations were undertaken by the new 
leadership after the shift of the party to the opposition and were presented as incentives to 
the involvement of the supporters and the openness of the party to the society.159  
An important element of this type of affiliation lies in the direct linkage set with the party at 
the national level and the disconnection from the territorial structures, being the register 
controlled by the party executive body, the National Secretariat.160 Joining the party as 
sympathiser ensures the participation in non-elective meetings and information about the 
party initiatives. Therefore, expanding the party boundaries the PS has not assigned rights 
that may alter the internal power distribution. However, as this chapter shows, recent 
developments have paved the way for a revision of this figure aimed at attaching rights in 
internal decisions, such as personnel selection.  
As referred in the previous chapters, the adoption of measures aimed at strengthening the 
ordinary members dates to the first Guterres’ administration (1995-1999) with the 
democratisation of the leadership selection. Over time, few voices have defended the return 
to the election of the secretary-general by the congress.161 Nowadays, this method is broadly 
consensual within the party, and party members appear to be largely supportive of the system 
(Sanches and Razzuoli, 2017).162 Furthermore, recent analyses have shown that there is a 
large consensus within PS members towards increasing IPD opportunities (Lisi, 2015b; 
Sanches et al., 2018).  
                                                          
159 “Acção Socialista”, n°1183, 16/1/2003, p. 10.  
160 Official data on the number of registered sympathisers is not available. Lisi (2009: 189) mentions that a few 
years after the reform, thousands of sympathisers had joined the PS and that they were concentrated in a few 
larger cities like Lisbon, Porto and Coimbra.  
161 The MEP, Ana Gomes, under Socrates’ leadership was in favour of the return to the election by the congress. 
162 According to the survey, 68% of the respondents are in  favour of the direct election.  
 172 
 
In more recent years, the expansion of the selectorate for the leadership election has 
gained support within some party sectors. The selection of the leader through primaries open 
to sympathisers was recently endorsed by a group of party officials and prominent 
members.163 The initiative named «Mais participação, melhor PS. Aproximar os cidadãos 
dos partidos, reforçar a ligação entre o PS e a sociedade» (More participation, better PS. 
Bringing citizens and parties together, reinforcing the linkage between the PS and society) 
aimed at discussing these reforms at the congress (2013) and entailed a wide set of reforms 
which included the possibility for members and sympathisers to present ideas to the congress 
and to discuss and vote through the internet proposals to be included in the electoral program. 
Yet, the initiative concealed an instrumental character and entailed a clear challenge to the 
new leader, Seguro, who still needed to consolidate his internal power. Most of the 
subscribers belonged to, or could be identified with, the party’s leftist sector, openly critical 
of the incumbent leader, and close to his potential challenger, Costa.164 In the end, it was not 
admitted to the congressional debates due to procedural reasons. The upcoming local 
elections (September 2013) discouraged the exposure of internal divisions and fostered the 
search for a compromise, achieved with Costa’s election to head the national political 
committee, and which suspended, at least temporarily, the conflict.165 However, following 
the leadership change that took place in 2014, with the election of Costa as Secretary-
General, the measure was finally adopted. The 2015 statutes admitted the possibility for 
registered sympathisers to vote in leader and candidate selection. Nevertheless, their 
applicability is conditioned. The statutes specify in fact that the inclusion of sympathisers 
depends on the favourable deliberation of the National Committee, which is also in charge 
of creating an ad hoc regulation for the process. Still, in the following leadership selections 
(2016 and 2018), this possibility has not been used and the selectorate has remained 
circumscribed to ordinary members.  
These episodes are illustrative of two features. Firstly, the instrumental rationales 
behind the organisational reforms, ensued in intra-party struggles, and secondly, the 
tendency towards bargain among ‘factions’ in order to avoid the public exposure of conflicts, 
confirming the importance of rather neglected factors, such as intra-party struggles, in 
explaining organisational change and/or inertia in the Portuguese parties (Lisi, 2015a).  
                                                          
163 Among the subscribers, prominent members like Carlos César, Ana Catarina Mendes, and Pedro Nuno 
Santos. 
164 The proposer, J. T. Silveira, was very close to Sócrates, and had been junior minister in the former 
government. 
165 Party website: «Partido Socialista unido elege Secretariado Nacional e Comissão Política», 18/5/2013.  
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As scholars contend, the direct selection has fostered leader-members linkage, undermining 
the intermediating role of the structures on the ground. As a consequence, it has enhanced 
leadership personalisation and autonomy vis-à-vis the party organisation. The reduction in 
structures’ influence capacity following the reform is acknowledged by the federation 
presidents interviewed for this study.  
«The federation president holds the bureaucratic structure of the party, being 
elected. This gives advantages in terms of influence capacity. Nevertheless, 
nowadays the direct communicational power between the national leadership 
and the militants is stronger than the regional leaders’ influence capacity»  
(M. Freitas, MP, 2014, PS-Algarve president).  
An interesting aspect emerged from our interviews has concerned the enduring relevance of 
structures’ work for aggregating consensus towards one or the other candidate. This 
phenomenon, defined as “organised caciquismo” would deal with local leaders’ and local 
notables’ (caciques) capacity in aggregating support or even controlling ‘pockets of votes’ 
(sindicatos de votos), by means of relations of loyalty, personal trust as well as patronage in 
local power.166 Therefore, the capacity of consensus aggregation seems to work also under 
a system of election based on ordinary members, who are allegedly less linked to the 
structures compared with the activists and the delegates. In this respect, the perdurance of 
caciquismo’s practices may attenuate the loss of influence, consequent to the introduction of 
the direct election, and may ‘constrain’ the candidate to leadership to pay attention to this 
sector. Although the ‘organised caciquismo’ seems more apparent in internal elections at 
lower levels, it may emerge also in case of national leadership selection when there are 
competitive rival candidacies.  
The intra-party conflicts on the rules governing the process of selection (e.g. the dues-
payment), as well as the attempt to strengthen the top-down control over the affiliation 
process via the reinforcement of internal transparency, demonstrate that these mechanisms 
are perceived by party elites as still relevant.167  
                                                          
166 Interview with Pedro Nuno Santos (2013). 
167 In both the PS and the PSD, media attention has been focused on malpractices, such as episodes of mass 
payment of members’ fees which the national party has tried to counteract due to the negative effects on party 
image. (see for instance: “Observador” online: Vítor Matos: «Caciques. Uma dentadura por votos e outros 
esquemas nas lutas internas do PS e do PSD» 20/7/2017. 
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The expansion of party organisational boundaries, and the extension of the selectorate to the 
party supporters is precisely perceived as a way to counteract this influence.  
This has been stressed by other interviewees, publicly supporters of the open primaries.  
«Nowadays, the profile of the militant is different from that of 40 years ago, 
when there was more willingness to participate and the perception of influence 
was greater. Over time, local structures more interested in building and 
preserving a structure of power have emerged. The closeness occurring within 
parties is part of the problems of democracy». [...]  «Open primaries are a way 
to break the sindicatos de votos and the structures’ closeness. There is an 
effective reduction [of these phenomena] with the openness to supporters who 
are not dependent on a machine created by a local leader. This does not mean 
that someone that has the weight locally will not try to regiment or try to create 
a mechanism for influencing the results, but it is more difficult when the 
electorate is more open. Primaries make it more difficult for closed structures 
which manage to regiment or to control a pocket of votes» (P. D. Alves, MP, 
2015).   
«Local leaders are mobilised on the ground also to grab the votes of party 
supporters, but through the open primaries this role is attenuated» (P. N. Santos, 
MP, PS-Aveiro president 2013). 
 
8.2 The democratisation of candidate selection  
In the PS, the internal debate about the expansion of intra-party democracy reemerged after 
the party’s shift to the opposition and the following campaign for the leadership. In line with 
literature’s expectations the institutional status and the need for the new leader to build 
internal support set the basis for IPD reforms to be discussed. The 2011 leadership campaign 
confronting Francisco Assis and António José Seguro addressed the reform of the candidate 
selection (CS) for national and local public offices, albeit with important differences 
regarding the selectorate. While Assis defended the openness of the process to party 
supporters, provided they had previously registered to vote (open primaries), Seguro 
safeguarded that only members had voting rights (closed primaries).168 Assis’ proposal was 
                                                          
168 For the sake of simplicity here we do not distinguish the open primary from the semi-open primary, which 
requires a previous registration (Kenig et al., 2015).  
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highly critical of the territorial elites, considered a sector moved from opportunistic interests, 
entrenched in local or national power and loosely linked to society, and maintained that open 
primaries would have counteracted «non-transparent practices, obscure decision-making 
processes or strategies of closeness» (2011: 33-34).169 At the same time, this approach is 
illustrative of strategic considerations. The appeal to the grassroots against the closeness 
fostered by some sectors and local cadres is a strategy often adopted by candidates with low 
internal support to try to mobilise passive members (Freire and Lisi, 2014; Lisi, 2015a).  By 
contrast, Seguro benefited from stronger support within the party structures.170 Including 
only the members, Seguro’s proposal affected the powers of the federations and the local 
structures in the candidate selection, but to a lower extent than open primaries. Furthermore, 
the reform would have been preceded by a period of debate and would have resulted from a 
collegial decisional process.171 Seguro’s election opened a six-months process for the 
revision of the party statutes concluded with the adoption of closed primaries for selecting 
both MPs and mayoral candidates.172 As the then National Secretariat in charge of the 
Organisation (SNO) declared to the party press:  
«Currently, the federations monopolise the elaboration of the MP candidates’ 
lists. With the new statutes, the federations would share this area of competence. 
The party members and the local units (concelhias) that disagree with the list 
may present an alternative list».173 (A. Galamba, SNO, 2012) 
Thus, the reform enabled a group of members and local structures to present an alternative 
list to the list voted by the federation’s political committee. As such, members’ ballot 
depended on the emergence of a challenge to the federation’s executive and its monopoly 
over the list fulfillment (Sanches and Razzuoli, 2017). However, since the beginning it was 
                                                          
169 Assis’ motion “A força das ideias” (The strength of ideas): «First, the concept of ‘internal life of parties’ 
must disappear from our discourse. The Portuguese citizens gave to parties, through the Constitution of the 
Republic, the privilege of the representation which is incompatible with non-transparent practices, obscure 
decision-making processes or strategies of closeness. The life of parties regards all the people, militants, 
sympathisers, citizens. It is a matter of citizenship» (2011: 33-34).  
170 “Público” online: «Seguro com vantagem no aparelho, Assis com mais apoios na direcção de Sócrates», 
21/7/2011; and «Os parasitas politicos». According to Assis: «Seguro is very popular within the PS. During 
the last years, he did not hold demanding public offices. Thus, he could rally the country. This must be 
acknowledged as a merit. I do not have the same deep linkage in terms of relations of proximity because in the 
last two years I was the leader of the parliamentary party group», 18/06/2011. 
171 Seguro’s motion, “O novo ciclo para cumprir Portugal” (The new cycle to accomplish Portugal): «We want 
to change the methods of members’ involvement. Our aims will be the participation of each member and the 
improvement of the democratic internal life. […] This national debate will discuss a new way to do party 
politics, will debate all proposals…including the selection method for our candidates to political office, 
including the possibility of primaries between the militants» (2011: 7). 
172 A. Galamba. In: “Acção Socialista”: «Estatutos reforçam a participação dos militantes», nº 1367, 3/2012. 
173 In party website, «Abertura e transparência marcam propostas de novos estatutos», 28/3/2012.  
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unclear which formula should be applied and the reform of the CS was complicated by the 
formula to be applied and, above all, it would affect the informal mechanisms of negotiation 
that characterise the lists fulfilment, as follows:  
«Seguro’s proposal was complicated. It was unclear how the D’Hondt method 
should be operationalised. When (the system) it is too complicated to be 
operationalised, there is a problem when elections are approaching. When the 
party is consumed in an internal discussion this is not positive before an electoral 
act. […] Choosing the PM candidate is easier, it is a choice about one person to 
fill the post; the mayor is the same, it is easy to approve the regulation of the 
process. Choosing MPs candidates is more difficult, a share is fulfilled by the 
party directorate, there are local dynamics, it has often to do with regional 
balances, demographic factors, or political factors within the party. The 
primaries system for MPs candidate is not very linear with the electoral system 
for the parliament, it is not a personalised contest in uninominal circles» (P. D. 
Alves, MP, 2015).  
However, due to the successive internal developments that paved the way to the leadership 
change in the second half of 2014, the reform ended up not being applied and withdrawn 
from the new statutes (2015).   
Nevertheless, the reform was tried for selecting the mayoral candidates at the 2013 
local elections. Although the closed primaries were applied in few councils, the process had 
significant implications at both internal and electoral level, namely in those cases where 
intra-party conflicts emerged. The next section reviews the empirical cases of closed 
primaries, the processes and the outcomes.  
 
8.2.1 The closed primaries for mayoral candidates’ selection (2013) 
In the Portuguese context, ‘mayoral candidate’ refers to the top-member of the list running 
for the council executive. The reform of the electoral legislation in 1996 gave to non-
partisan/independent lists, the grupos de cidadãos (citizens’ groups), the possibility to run 
in local elections, this system being applied four years later at 2001 local elections (Martins, 
2004). Over time, the number of independent lists has been growing, representing an 
increasing challenge to parties’ dominant position in local power. In this regard, this trend 
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responds to the growing citizens’ distrust towards parties and, above all, indicates the latter’s 
organisational weakening (Jalali, 2014: 248-249).  
As we have shown in the previous chapters, local politics is a key arena for the 
territorial structures, which exercise their powers in large autonomy from the national party. 
In the PS, the local political committee at council level, the Comissão Política Concelhia, is 
formally in charge of the candidate selection, thus the process is rather exclusive. The reform 
carried out by Seguro, enabled ordinary members to participate in the process directly voting 
for the top-list candidate. Accordingly, members were called to vote depending on the 
emergence of a candidate who challenged the official candidate selected by the political 
committee.174 Nevertheless, the rules shaping the candidacy were rather demanding since 
the candidate needed the support of 1/3 of the members of the local political committee, 10% 
of active members and 10% of the local public office-holders. In practice, the closed 
primaries were experimented in twelve cases, i.e. 4% of the councils (n=308). Still, we argue 
that their effects have been deeper.  
In Table 8.1 we have summed up the details of the empirical cases in terms of dynamics and 
outcomes.  
 
Table 8.1 Candidates and outcomes of the first PS closed primaries in local elections, 
2013 
Council  Dynamics of the closed 
primaries 
Consequences/Outcomes 
Alenquer 
(Lisbon) 
Candidates: local office-holder 
won the competition against the 
former leader of the local section 
(concelhia). 
Conflicts: the defeated candidate 
left the party and ran as top-
member of the Left Bloc (BE) list. 
Alpiarça  
(Santarém)  
Candidate endorsed by the local 
leader is defeated. 
Conflicts: resignation of the local 
leader who joined an independent 
list. 
Arganil  
(Coimbra) 
One of the candidates was the local 
party leader, who eventually won.  
No internal conflicts. 
Alijó  
(Vila Real) 
Candidate member of the local 
party executive was defeated.  
Conflicts: The loser ran under an 
independent list endorsed by 
“dissident” socialist members. 
                                                          
174 PS (2012), “Regulamento Eleitoral Interno”, art. 16-17 (2012).  
 178 
 
The PS loses the incumbency. 
The result is attributed to the 
primaries.  Strong ensuing 
conflicts. 
Caldas da 
Rainha  
(Leiria) 
Independent candidate had the 
endorsement of the local party 
leader and won the contest.  
No ensuing conflicts. 
Cartaxo  
(Santarém) 
Biggest section of the federation. 
Candidates: local leader vs 
member of the council executive. 
Preexisting conflicts among 
members of the council’s 
executive and the local party 
executive. Conflicts regarding the 
timing of the contest (e.g. fees 
payment). The PS local leader 
wins the primaries.  
The loser heads an independent 
list. The PS keeps the 
incumbency. But the independent 
list gets the second-best result 
(division within the socialist 
electorate).   
Guarda  
(Guarda)  
Main candidates were a member of 
the municipal executive and a 
member of the party executive. 
The race is not disputed since the 
former stepped down claiming 
procedural unfairness. He heads an 
independent list. Jurisdictional 
intervention of the PS against the 
list.  
High division and conflict.  
The PS loses the Guarda’s 
socialist stronghold in favour of 
the PSD. Local party executive 
resigns. 
Lagoa  
(Faro) 
One of the candidates was the local 
party leader, who eventually won.  
No internal conflicts. 
Matosinhos 
(Porto) 
Pre-existing conflicts between the 
Matosinhos’ mayor and the 
federation leader for the federation 
election. No closed primaries in 
this case. The incumbent mayor 
defended his re-selection as 
mayoral candidate without 
primaries. 
The party executive chose the local 
leader as candidate for the party.  
The adversary decision of the 
local executive led the mayor to 
disaffiliate and to head an 
independent list, which won the 
local elections. 
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Mealhada  
(Aveiro) 
Preexisting conflicts between the 
federation and the local executive 
for the federation election. The 
local leader is not a supporter of 
the federation leader. Candidates: 
local leader and his former 
challenger for the leadership of the 
local section, endorsed by the 
federation leader.  
The local leader wins the 
selection 
Póvoa de 
Lanhoso 
(Braga)  
Candidate endorsed by the local 
leader. The challenger had already 
challenged the local leader in the 
internal elections for the local 
party executive.  
Candidate endorsed by the local 
leader wins the closed primaries.   
Santo Tirso 
(Porto) 
Candidate endorsed by the local 
leader is defeated.  
Rejection of the result by the loser 
(alleged unfair process). Conflicts 
had to be resolved at the national 
level. 
Vila Nova de 
Cerveira  
(Viana de  
Castelo) 
Candidates: local leader and 
member of the municipal 
executive.  
Rejection of the result by the 
loser (alleged unfair process), 
disaffiliation followed by the 
presentation of an independent 
list which won the local election. 
The PS lost the council governed 
by the party since 1989. 
Sources: own elaboration, see Appendix IV.  
 
From the experience of the closed primaries at local level several observations may be 
drawn. The first observation regards the internal effects: closed primaries seem to have made 
it easier for pre-existing conflicts to emerge. The alternative list opened a window of 
opportunity for the opposite ‘factions’ to aggregate consensus and try to challenge those 
controlling the local structure. Secondly, the public exposure of internal divisions, made 
easier by the primaries, had negative effects on the party public image and thus on the party’s 
electoral performance, as can be seen in the third column where the consequences of the 
competition are reported. Thirdly, non-acceptance of the results of the primaries seems 
another feature of these elections. In some cases, it resulted in an adverse candidacy under 
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independent list that fragmented the electoral market and threatened the party performance 
even in its strongholds.  
The empirical cases also suggest the comparative advantage of the candidate who is linked 
to the local party executive, and more in general, they indicate the tendency, ascribed to the 
local structures, of regimenting the members. When the local leader is one of the candidates, 
or the candidate is endorsed by the local structure, the outcome tends to be in his favour. 
This may be explained due to the fact that the selectorates that have chosen the local leader 
shortly before, and are then called to select the mayoral candidate, are basically the same.175 
The restricted selectorate seems to make the outcome rather predictable in favour of whoever 
controls the local party structures. When the candidate is supported by the local structure, 
but he or she holds less support within the broader electorate, implications on the electoral 
performance of the party may ensue.  
The process was highly criticised internally, including by Seguro’s supporters. The 
member of the secretariat in charge of the organisation, who has been interviewed for this 
study, acknowledged the malfunctioning of the system in some cases, but considered the 
experience important from the «perspective of party openness», being the reform «a learning 
process as well» (M. Laranjeiro, 2014). Other interviewees have highlighted interesting 
mechanisms behind the process of selection. Accordingly, the closed primaries not only 
failed to counteract the closeness of the local structures, but also made it easier for public 
conflicts to occur. As a result, PS electoral defeats ensued.  
«The case of Matosinhos is a good example of the fact that the system of diretas 
(closed primaries) is not immune from block voting. Notwithstanding the 
diretas, what occurred was a divorce between the voters and the party, because 
the party provided a candidate that the voters did not want. With open primaries 
it would be different». (P. D. Alves, 2015). 
Two federation presidents highlighted the problematic aspects of the process as follows:  
«In my district I think that I will lose the councils (where closed primaries are 
held). (The rules) do not envisage the possibility for the federation to decide 
differently, after the results of the directas, only before. And before it hampers 
the power of the federation president, because if I need their votes to be elected, 
how can I say that I won’t implement the primaries?» [..] «We should ponder the 
                                                          
175 Interview with MP, PS-Aveiro president, Pedro Nuno Santos.  
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principle of the directas with a safeguard mechanism, thereby the federation 
could take back the process demonstrating that the candidate that has lost the 
primaries has better chances of winning the local elections, that the winner has 
more support within the party, but not within the electorate. The federation 
should have the power to prove (e.g. via opinion polls) that the outcome is 
‘wrong’ and the decision be then ratified by the party executive». (MP and PS-
Santarém president, A. Gameiro, 2013). 
The other interviewee observed how the closed primaries could act as a sort of springboard 
for losers and pave the way for them to run at the elections as independents. Accordingly, 
the fact that, at the local level, non-partisan lists are allowed works as a structure of 
opportunity for the primaries’ losers. The losers take advantage of having aggregated support 
during the campaign for the primaries:  
«There are candidates that have lost but that did not accept the outcome and thus 
they disaffiliated from the party and ran as independents against the party […]. 
Probably, without the directas this problem wouldn’t exist since the process of 
candidacy would have not even begun. A party member presents the candidacy 
to the directas, starts to talk with the citizens, talks with the militants, organises 
the internal contest, thereby a dynamic is created, then he loses the internal 
dispute. Yet, he has a dynamic, a willingness, and a team, and therefore he will 
disaffiliate himself from the party and run against it» (MP and PS-Aveiro 
president, P. N. Santos, 2013). 
 
In our view, the experience of the closed primaries, although circumscribed to a few cases, 
has contributed to uncover the process of erosion of  party organisation at local level. In line 
with scholars’ observation about “false” independent candidacies engendered by party 
dissents (Jalali, 2014: 248-249), it can be argued that the local primaries have further 
contributed in bringing internal divisions to the electoral arena. Following Jalali, this 
suggests two facts which may be ascribed to both the PS and the PSD. Firstly, the parties’ 
weakness in their role of gatekeepers to local power; secondly, it reflects an ‘unintended 
consequence’ of party cartelisation. The access to power, rather than sustain the organisation, 
may trigger internal struggles for power, resulting in internal divisions and the consequent 
weakening of the party organisation. In other words, the high dependence on the resources 
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ensued in the access to local power «also fosters greater factionalism in parties that have 
little else holding their organisations (and members) together» (Jalali, 2014: 249). In this 
respect the possibility of challenging the local party executive from within by means of 
primaries has created an opportunity for the emergence of pre-existent conflicts. The 
combination with the independent candidacies allowed – for the losers of the primaries – has 
exacerbated  the conflicts, showing the fragile loyalties characterising these parties and the 
organisational erosion of the local party structures.  
 
8.3 The Prime Ministerial primaries (2014) 
In this section the unprecedented experience of open primaries for selecting the PS’s prime 
ministerial candidate is analysed. As accounted in Chapter 4, Seguro’s internal consolidation 
as leader was difficulted by the criticism coming from the leftist sector and personalised 
faction around the Lisbon Mayor, Costa. The conflict between Seguro and Costa, 
temporarily resolved before the 2013 local elections, re-emerged after the 2014 European 
elections. This time, the intra-party division was settled through a public dispute, the open 
primaries called for a selection of the Prime Ministerial candidate for the 2015 elections. So, 
as a response to the internal challenge the incumbent leader proposed an election, following 
a primaries format, for choosing the Prime Ministerial candidate and bounded the leadership 
to the outcome.176 Open primaries had never been experienced by a Portuguese 
parliamentary party. The move represented a U-turn in Seguro’s position, which appeared 
difficult to explain. During the 2011 leadership campaign he had been against primaries open 
to party supporters. Moreover, the widespread perception was that Costa, could be favoured 
by the open primaries’ mechanism, due to his popularity.  
On the one hand, Seguro’s unexpected initiative postponed the question of the party 
leadership and reduced the room for maneuver of the adversary. On the other hand, the 
primaries were presented as an «innovative political solution» that showed party’s efforts 
towards openness, and as a form of counteracting the «dominance of the party apparatus» 
and, more in general, as part of a wider plan of reform of the political and electoral system.177 
This decision is illustrative of aspects highlighted by scholars with reference to the main 
Portuguese parties: the room for maneuver of the leader in managing the rules, and the 
                                                          
176 Seguro, “Proposta de Resolução” voted by theNational Political Committee on 5/6/2014, party website.  
177 “Público”: «Eleições primárias foram a surpresa na ‘batalha de Vimeiro», 1/6/2014, pp. 4-6.  
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strategic rationales behind the adoption of organisational changes, motivated by external and 
internal pressures (Lisi, 2010a; 2015a). In this case, internal divisions seemed to have played 
a chief role. Of course, the internal pressures and ‘factionalism’ against the incumbent leader 
had its raison d'être in the perception that only Costa would have ensured the return of the 
PS to power.   
Regarding the rules governing the process, the selectorate entailed party supporters under 
the condition of signing a declaration of commitment to the party principles and not being 
affiliated to other parties.178 The deadline for the registration was a contentious issue. The 
different positions of the candidates suggests different mobilisation strategies and, above all, 
the role of the territorial structures in the mobilisation. By restricting the deadline for 
registering, Costa’s proposal constrained the mobilisation efforts of the structures.179 The 
perception was that on-line registrations depended more on the initiative of the individual 
supporter and voter, disconnected from the party organisation. Therefore, were perceived as 
more favourable to Costa for his greater appeal before supporters and voters.180 Conversely, 
the on-paper registrations could be considered a proxy for territorial structures’ role in 
mobilising supporters, beyond the affiliates. Restricting the deadline would have favoured 
the on-online applications. The final data indicates that the share of paper/online registrations 
was approximately 70,000 vis-à-vis 76,000.181 Unfortunately, complete data of the 
online/paper registrations subdivided per district, which could provide some indications of 
the type of mobilisation by federation, are not available. 
The extensive media coverage – with three TV debates between candidates – was 
accompanied by an intense on-the-ground mobilisation and direct canvassing. The final 
number of the potential electorate, 250,862, apart from the 93,000 members included more 
than 150,000 non-affiliates that registered with the purpose of  voting. The participation rate 
was 71%, corresponding to 178,390 voters, showing high citizens’ participation. Costa won 
with 67.7% of the vote (120,790) while Seguro got 31.6% (56,353).182 The margin of victory 
separating the two challengers (36 percentage points) indicates that the competitiveness was 
moderate and that Costa was by and large the favourite candidate.  
                                                          
178 “Regulamento eleições primárias” in: “Acção Socialista”, nº 1388, 6-7/2014, pp. 5-6. 
179 Costa: 30 days before the election, Seguro: one week. The deadline was set to 15 days. 
180 Jorge Coelho, coordinator of the electoral committee, in:  “Sol”: «Mais de 36,500 pessoas já se inscreveram 
como simpatizantes do PS” 19/9/2014, p.6 and “22 mil fichas no ultimo dia e porto no topo». 
181 “Público”: «António José Seguro: Primárias do PS próximas dos 250,000 potenciais participantes»,.  
182 “Acção Socialista”, n°1390, 10/2014, p.5. 
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Table 8.2 presents data about the process per districts/party federation.  
Table 8.2 The open primaries for the PM candidate per party federation, 2014 
Federation Registered 
voters 
Participation  Costa Seguro Margin  
Algarve 6,702 75% 80.7% 18.6% 62.1 
Aveiro 11,190 74.5% 70.6% 28.6% 42 
Baixo A. 2,957 81.4% 62.5% 37% 25.5 
Braga 22,403 71% 56.2% 42.9% 13.3 
Bragança 3,797 73.7% 71.3% 28.2% 43.1 
Castelo B 6,000 76.1% 55.5% 43.6% 11.9 
Coimbra 15,456 69.1% 65.7% 33.6% 32.1 
Évora 2,392 83.4% 76% 23.6% 52,4 
Guarda 5,336 77.4% 38% 61.2% 23.2 
Leiria 5,647 78.8% 68.6% 30.6% 38 
Lisbon – 
Faul 
48,208 76.2% 86.7% 12.7% 74 
Lisbon – 
Oeste (West) 
1,875 79.3% 80.5% 18.8% 61.7 
Portalegre 3,180 80.9% 79% 20.4% 58.6 
Porto 58,817 65.5% 52.6% 46.4% 6.2 
Santarém 6,457 77.7% 71.6% 27.5% 44.1 
Setúbal 14,357 77% 79.1% 20.4% 58.7 
Viana do C. 3,703 81.3% 59.6% 39.6% 20 
Vila Real 6,130 69.5% 66.5% 33% 33.5 
Viseu 10,694 70.3% 58.9% 40.4% 18.5 
Açores 8,270 54.4% 86.5% 12.5% 74 
Madeira 6,004 48% 60.2% 38.9% 21.3 
Europe 748 44.8% 57% 42% 15 
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Extra-
Europe 
539 28.5% 55.1% 43.5% 11.6 
Total 250,862 71% 
(178,390) 
67.7% 
(120,790) 
31.6% 
(56,353) 
36 
Source: “Acção Socialista”, n° 1390, 10/2014, p.5. Margin of victory: own elaboration. 
 
The strongest concentration of the  registered voters occurred in the two largest districts 
(Porto and Lisbon), followed by Braga, Coimbra, Setúbal and, to a lesser extent, Aveiro and 
Viseu. Comparing the selectorate of this primary in some federations the number of non-
members registered is significantly higher than the number of active members, indicating an 
exceptional mobilisation of supporters in some areas. The table also shows the participation 
rates, the outcomes, and the  margin of competitiveness.  
Two aspects emerge from the data. Firstly, only in one federation, the PS-Guarda, 
did Seguro defeat Costa. The federation was a Seguro’s stronghold, yet it was comparatively 
small in terms of potential electors. In the other federations headed by presidents endorsing 
Seguro, the incumbent leader was defeated. Secondly, the margin of victory in favour of 
Costa in those federations was considerably lower than the margin registered in the 
federations led by federation presidents close to Costa, (i.e. 27.8 vis-à-vis 47 points).  
In the former, it appears that the structures were able to ensure more support, albeit 
insufficient, to Seguro. The PS-Porto presents the tightest competitiveness: 6.2 points of 
victory margin. The largest PS federation, led by a president supporter of Seguro, 
represented 58,000 potential electors. The variation in the competitiveness across the 
structures indicates that the structures’ work behind rival candidacies may still be an 
important resource even when the contests are open to non-members, but it is clearly not 
sufficient. This is even more apparent when one of the candidates benefits from a 
comparatively higher popularity in the wider electorate, and, thus, appears to have the best 
chances to bring the party back in power.  
However, more information at level of party federation would be needed. In this 
specific contest, it emerges that some territorial structures were more efficient in mobilising 
the non-affiliates and increase the number of electors. Moreover, it must also be taken into 
consideration the role of local leaders and public office-holders, not just the federation 
leaders and their endorsement in favour of one or the other candidate. For instance, Costa 
was publicly supported by a large sector of PS mayors, who may have contributed to 
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aggregate within their local communities the consensus in favour of this candidate. Finally, 
the experience of prime ministerial primaries highlighted the power of the media coverage 
and national tv in making or breaking candidates, vis-à-vis party organisational resources. 
The success in mediatic terms may push the parties in using instrumentally these initiatives.  
The results paved the way for leadership change, sanctioned with the election of Costa 
as Secretary-General in December 2014. The great participation and citizens’ involvement 
around the first primaries influenced the statutory revision carried out by the new leader and 
the absence of internal resistances to the measure. As observed by one of our interviewees 
when the process of reform was still ongoing: 
 «the success of the primaries has shown the electoral advantages, as well as in 
terms of increased legitimacy, that the party achieves in allowing the 
sympathisers to participate» (P. D. Alves, 2015).  
The new statutes (2015) have included the primaries as one of the methods for selecting 
external offices, namely parliamentary and mayoral candidates, as well as the party leader 
(see section I of this chapter). Nevertheless, the implementation is highly conditioned. In 
fact, the rules delegate to the national committee the adoption of primaries and their ad hoc 
regulation, that is whether these are closed or open. The territorial structures should also 
require the permission to set primaries for MP candidates to the party at the national level.183 
Compared to the system introduced by Seguro, the new rules are formally more inclusive, 
since the non-members are now included. Yet, the system seems less immediate and more 
centralised than the former, given that it depends on the previous authorisation of the national 
bodies and the initiative of the territorial structures in that sense. From this perspective, the 
reform increases the power of the local and federation executives in controlling the process 
in their area. Their effective implementation may thus be highly dependent on strategic 
considerations, contextual opportunities and leader’s agency. To date the open/closed 
primaries for CS exist only on paper and have not been applied in legislative and local 
elections, held in 2015 and 2017.184  
                                                          
183 “Party Statutes” (2015, art. 59.6 and 79.8); “Regulamento eleitoral interno e de designação de candidatos a 
cargos de representaçao política” (2015, art.14.8).  
184 At the time of writing this study the position of the party directorate seems that of maintaining the primaries 
open to sympathisers as a non-mandatory possibility regulated by the national level for the selection of the 
party leader excluding the selection of candidates for public offices.  
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8.4 Securing the organisational boundaries. The IPD reforms in the PSD 
 
Unlike the PS, the PSD only allows to dues-paying members to join the organisation. 
Apparently, the party differs from the PS, where the distinction  between ordinary members 
and supporters is increasingly blurred. In the PSD, the attempts to introduce forms of 
affiliation with reduced obligations have been blocked by the internal vetoes. During the 
2010 leadership campaign, the ‘sympathiser’ as a formal status of membership, without 
obligations and voting benefits, had been proposed by one of the candidates, Pedro Passos 
Coelho, as a way to approximate the citizens to the party.185 During Passos Coelho’s first 
mandate (2010-2012), the proposal became part of the statutory revision drawn up by the 
new leadership. Reaffirming the intention to create the sympathiser status, it left to the 
national council the decision whether this new affiliate could hold voting rights for selecting 
candidates. However, the congress vetoed the measure and rejected the expansion of party 
organisational boundaries beyond the card-carrying member.186  
When the territorial elites have been asked about the introduction of the sympathiser 
the evaluation has been generally negative. The sympathiser is perceived as a «comfort 
position that will completely distort the philosophy of the party» (…) and it would be better 
to «make the militancy easier, for instance by reducing the costs, rather than create a new 
category» (P. Cunha, PSD-Braga president, 2014). Therefore, «whoever wants to vote must 
join as militant, be involved with the party, being available every day» (N. Serra, MP, PSD-
Santarém president, 2014). Furthermore, it has been stressed that the sympathiser is 
incongruent with the PSD as a «party of militants» (Duarte Pacheco, MP, PSD-Lisboa Oeste 
president, 2014), and «a party created when it was difficult to be a member of the PSD» (N. 
Serra). Interestingly, the party officials also underline the instrumental use that could be done 
of the sympathisers to the detriment of the structures: «There may be a candidate who uses 
the sympathisers, who may say: ‘I worked with you, not with the structures.’ In that case, 
the structures would make no more sense and have no weight» (N. Serra). 
More in general, the introduction of IPD reforms within the PSD has been less 
consensual. As we have shown in the previous chapters, the inclusion of members emerged 
in the party debate in the mid-1990s, following the shift of the party to the opposition. In 
                                                          
185 Passos Coelho’s Motion (2010): “Portugal Primeiro” (Portugal First), in “Povo Livre”, n°1638, 9/4/2010, 
p. 2. “Público” online: «PSD vai criar figura do simpatizante e dia de abertura à sociedade», 6/5/2010.  
186 “Povo Livre”, n°1730, 28/3/2012, p.13  
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that phase, the reform was applied only to the district bodies (see chapter 7), which started 
to be elected by the ordinary members. The direct election of the leader remained a 
contentious and politically sensitive issue, being for the first time put to a vote at the 2000 
National Congress and rejected. During the 2005 leadership campaign, the reform was 
supported by the two candidates, Mendes and Menezes, as a way to increase the IPD and to 
open the party to the rank-and-file.187 Still, Mendes, who eventually won the competition, 
had been formerly one of the main critics of the direct election. The radical change of 
position suggested strategic considerations on the part of this candidate, fostered by 
pressures towards party’s organisational renovation after the electoral debacle (Lisi, 2015a). 
The public position of the then territorial elites confirmed the internal divisions on the issue, 
indicating the perception of losing influence due to the reform.188 The direct election was 
finally approved by the Congress, however, while the delegates voted in favour of 
transferring the selection of the leader the individual members, they secured the power of 
electing the other national bodies, including the national political committee, against the 
party directorate’s original proposal. As such, the congress is the elective body of the 
national political committee on proposal of the leader. Since alternative lists cannot be 
presented, formally this solution guarantees the leader a cohesive executive body. However, 
the share of votes of the congressional delegates on the national political committee are an 
important indicator of the extent of support the leader could count on within the congress, 
i.e. within the local cadres and activists.  
When the election is competitive, the rules governing the direct election are a major 
source of conflict.189 While selectorate and candidacy requirements have remained rather 
stable, the modalities and deadline of the dues’ payment for the members having the right to 
vote are highly discussed. These conflicts, characterising also the PS, indicate the influence 
that the local structures still have on membership in occasion of intra-party disputes, and 
may regard the aforementioned caciquismo’s practices and control of pocket of votes by 
local leaders (Pereira, 2007: 160-161). On the one hand, the existence of these conflicts 
                                                          
187 “Público” online: «PSD à beira de concretizar sonho das directas de Pedro Santana Lopes», 17/3/2006.  
188 “RTP” online: «Directas dividem distritais e estruturas do PSD», 21/2/2006. The PS-Porto and the PSD-
Lisboa presidents endorsed the reform while the other territorial leaders were more cautious, leaving the 
decision to  the delegates or declaring their opposition, albeit as a personal position. Disagreement also seemed 
to be rather diffuse among the mayors, reunited in the party’s local office-holders association (the ASD). The 
youth organisation (JSD) voted in bloc against the reform. 
189 See for instance the more recent leadership campaign between Rui Rio and Santana Lopes, January 2018.   
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suggests that the direct election has not completely neutralised the influence of these middle-
level actors and strata– and thus the relevance for the leader to have the party controlled or 
a solid power base within it, especially when he or she needs to consolidate internal power 
or in difficult times (long-term opposition).  
The persistency of internal dissatisfaction seems to hamper within the PSD the 
institutionalisation of the leader’s direct election. The return to the ex-ante situation has been 
repeatedly proposed during the meetings of the national bodies. A proposal aimed at 
reintroducing the former system was rejected at the 2010 congress only by a few votes (241 
in favour, 244 contrary, 92 abstained). Likewise, at the 2012 congress a motion proposing 
the abolishment of the direct election was endorsed by the PSD-Lisbon structure. 190  
According to a recent survey, there is still a 30% percent of party delegates that would prefer 
the election of the party leader by congress, vis-à-vis 53% in favour of the direct election 
(Sanches and Razzuoli, 2017).  
As chapter 3 has shown, the PSD is among the few centre-right parties to have 
adopted this method. The contagion effect is a key explication behind the adoption of this 
reform in the case of this party. The organisational reform has been triggered by the national 
context (the PS successful experience), the electoral defeat and opposition status, and the 
consequent campaign for the leadership. Still, factors such as ideology and party culture 
appear to make it considerably harder for this reform to be consolidated. 
 
One of the problems triggered by the direct election in the PSD has been highlighted by the 
former party leader, Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, as follows:   
«[before] the Party organised congresses, everyone defended his/her ideas, then 
we voted, and there was a winner and there were losers, who withdrew the 
candidacy. The problem of the Party in the last years is that, since the candidacies 
are kept until the end, that strain persists, and the division remains. This then 
perpetuates itself until the next term» (de Sousa, 2010: 6)191 
                                                          
190 “Público”: «PSD-Lisboa propõe fim das directas para a eleição do líder», 19/3/2012, p. 10. The proposal 
was withdrawn since it conflicted with the statutory revision proposed by the leadership. 
191 “Povo Livre”, n° 1635, 17/3/2010.  
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Accordingly, the Congress was a forum where internal divisions, emerging when more than 
one candidate ran for the leadership, were fixed. The former system inhibited the rise of 
more candidacies in favour of a unitary candidacy. The direct election would have made this 
process more difficult, with the result of exacerbating party instability and fostering internal 
strains, which highly characterise the PSD when in opposition.  
When asked about the effects of the direct election on internal power and party structures’ 
role, the district presidents interviewed for this study agreed on the fact that the reform has 
affected their influence.  
«The structures have lost influence indeed. They ceased to be centers where 
opinions were aggregated. With the direct election every militant expresses his 
or her opinion directly, it ceased to be necessary to have a local structure, a centre 
for aggregating opinions, to be heard, to be debated, and to define a common 
position of that group of people to be presented to the national party.  It was an 
innovation that turned out to be highly negative. It created a barrier to the 
anonymous member to be candidate to the national political committee. 
Nowadays, to run as candidate it is expensive, the campaign is very mediatic and 
it requires financial and logistic means to reach 140,000 members. In the former 
system the candidate needed only to focus the resources on those 1,000 
delegates. Paradoxically, the direct election made the system less democratic» 
(P. Pinto Luz, PSD-Lisboa, 2013).  
At the same time, like what has emerged from the interviews to the PS officials, the territorial 
structures are still able to exercise influence due to their proximity to the militants.  
«I think that with direct election the power is more open to the militants globally 
considered, thus the intermediate structures have their power reduced compared 
to the past. Before, we gave the delegates the power of electing the party leader, 
and the delegates were mostly those which emanated from the intermediate 
structures, i.e. the intermediate structures held the elections for their delegates, 
but we already knew that they (the delegates) were very conditioned by this. This 
is no longer the case, the role is now extended to all the militants. Even though 
today, and in the future, the intermediate structures are very close to the 
militants: a concelhia is very close to the members of the concelhia, and a district 
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structure is very close to the militants of several concelhias – i.e. in theory the 
power is diluted among all the members, but in practice the intermediate 
structures continue to have this power» (N. Serra, MP, PSD-Santarém president, 
2014).  
With the direct election, the congresses have lost relevance and dynamics. The populistic 
character of the direct election combined to candidates with populistic attitudes is perceived 
as potentially dangerous.    
«I preferred the former system. the PSD held congresses which were a permanent 
emotion. We went there without knowing who would get the leadership. The 
indirect election is not less democratic [than the direct election]. It could happen 
that the delegates were elected thinking of one candidate and then it changed. 
They had the mandate but, since the vote was secret, they would end up 
defending another candidate, thanks to the congress dynamic, and then they vote 
for the other candidate. With the directas, the congress is more proclamatory of 
the leader, the congress lost interest and dynamic and the directas opened a door 
that I would say… ‘populism’ is easier». […] «The direct elections withdrew the 
power from the apparatus, unquestionably. Nevertheless, afterwards, the 
apparatus is essential for a good performance of (leader) term. The apparatus 
keeps the party alive, meets with the people, keeps open the sections, manages 
the local office-holders…»  (Duarte Pacheco, MP, PSD-Oeste Lisboa president,  
2014).  
On the other hand, the leader of the PSD-Braga underlines a different perspective:  
«With direct elections, the local sections (concelhias) get more relevance, 
because now we have the task of convincing the militants to elect the leader, 
without  compromise (with the delegate)» […] «before it was a ‘blank check’ 
we gave to the delegates, the candidates to the leadership could emerge during 
the congress, the present system is largely more democratic». «The structures 
could have lost influence, but it was a bad influence» (P. Cunha, PSD-Braga 
president, 2014) 
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However, as observed by a member of the national executive, notwithstanding the enduring 
controversies within the party, the return to the system based on the congress seems 
unfeasible given that it would imply the withdrawal of rights, which would negatively affect 
the image of the party within the broader electorate.192  
In conclusion, to date, the IPD reforms adopted by the PSD have remained limited to the 
selection of personnel for party offices. The inclusion of members in candidate selection had 
been endorsed by Passos Coelho, together with the introduction of the ‘sympathiser', in the 
project of statutory revision drawn up during his first mandate. Accordingly, the adoption of 
closed or open primaries in the candidate selection would have been decided by the national 
council. Yet, the congress vetoed the proposal (together with the sympathiser statute). In the 
subsequent years under Passos Coelho’s terms, which coincided with party’s governmental 
incumbency, the issue did not re-emerge on the party agenda.  
 
Conclusion  
Focusing on the most recent years, this chapter has shown the trajectories undertaken by the 
two parties concerning the inclusion of ordinary members in decision-making processes, 
placing the emphasis on the territorial structures’ roles and perspectives. In both parties, the 
democratisation has mainly regarded the selection of party personnel, namely the party 
leader and, as shown in chapters 6 and 7, the territorial leaders. The emphasis on inclusion 
has been presented as a way to revitalise the rank-and-file and approximate the party to 
society. Still, the party leader’s (and territorial leaders) direct selection has contributed to 
enhance the leader’s position within the party and foster the leadership personalisation. The 
analysis of the more recent reforms confirms previous observations regarding organisational 
change, and the lack of thereof, in both parties, showing the instrumental reasons behind the 
reforms and attempt of reform, being mainly pushed by external and internal pressures and 
their interplay (Lisi, 2015a).  
Firstly, the chapter has shown the tendency of the PS for making its organisational 
boundaries from members and non-members less distinct. The experience of Prime 
Ministerial primaries in 2014 has paved the way for changing the formal rules and opening 
                                                          
192 Interview with MP and PSD vice-president, Nilza de Sena (2014).  
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decisional processes beyond the boundaries of the traditional membership. In this respect, 
the PSD has secured its organisational boundaries. More in general, in this party it seems 
more difficult aggregate consensus towards such reforms. Proposals to innovate, advanced 
in a phase of leadership change and opposition status, have been blocked by the congress. 
Secondly, the chapter has investigated the (failed) reforms carried out by the party at 
the opposition, under Seguro’s leadership (2011-2014), with the analysis of the closed 
primaries in 2013 local elections, and the consequences in party unity and electoral 
performance. This experience suggests that the party will be very cautious in opening the 
process in the more contentious arena of candidate selection.  
Notwithstanding the recent innovation introduced by Costa, the candidate selection 
seems to remain an affair managed by the party elites at the national and territorial levels, 
with the power of the latter preserved. More in general, it has shown that opening the 
selection for public-offices candidates may create severe problems to party cohesion and 
relation with the territorial structures, with negative effects for party image. Differently from 
the direct selection of the party leader (and territorial leaders), it appears more difficult to 
have the candidate selection process controlled, especially in a context of fragile internal 
loyalties and weak organisational strength.  
As for the territorial structures, their relevance has been effectively reduced by 
measures such as the direct election of the leader, notably in a context of campaigns’ 
mediatisation and personalisation. However, the territorial structures still seem to matter in 
terms of the mobilisation of active members and organisation of the consensus on the ground, 
especially if they manage to control a key organisational resource for intra-party disputed, 
such as the members. This may indicate that the party leader, or a candidate to leadership, 
still needs to enjoy support (or build support) within the territorial apparatus, especially when 
in vulnerable position. In this regard, the inclusion of non-members or supporters in internal 
processes may threaten this enduring relevance of the structures. Scarce resources and weak 
organisation reduce their influence capacity beyond the boundaries of active members, 
compared to other channels (e.g. mass media), notably when the elections are contested, and 
the candidates are competitive. However, while the selection of the leader seems to go in 
that direction in the case of the PS, this does not seem the case for the selection of candidates 
to public office in both parties.   
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis has examined party organisation and internal power distribution in Portuguese 
parties, focusing on the territorial structures and their relations with the party at the national 
level. As claimed at the beginning of this study, notwithstanding the direct effects of party 
transformation on the territorial structures, this dimension has remained under-researched. 
Therefore, the primary goal of this thesis was to cover this gap and to contribute to a more 
comprehensive understanding of Portuguese parties’ functioning, in the context of the 
current trends of party transformation. With this in mind, the research has explored the case 
of the two main governing parties, the PS and the PSD. 
The analysis has first explored the type of relations established between the party at 
the national level and the territorial structures, investigating the hypothesis of increasing 
reciprocal autonomy between levels. This hypothesis stems from party literature, which 
posits the replacement of hierarchical patterns and the emergence of stratarchical relations 
between levels. This argument has been explored through a dynamic perspective which has 
allowed us to consider the two parties under different phases, institutional status and 
leadership. As for the PS, the party started from a very hierarchical configuration, set during 
the formative years under Soares’ personalised leadership, and based on the leader’s 
unilateral control over the territorial organisation. With the leadership change in the second 
half of the 1980s (Constâncio) and party’s electoral erosion, hierarchy proved to be less 
functional and was loosened. The new leadership started to entrust competences to the 
peripheral structures (federations and local sections), ensuring some degree of autonomy in 
the management of local electoral processes. Concomitantly, the party set the basis for the 
empowerment of federation presidents within the territorial structures, which proved to be 
functional to the centre-periphery relations when the party is in government, enabling the 
national leadership to have a cohesive territorial organisation, mobilised ad hoc in support 
of the government by means of loyal agents. In opposition, under Ferro Rodrigues and 
Seguro, we detected attempts to strengthen the hierarchical control. Still, the opposition 
status was too short to show to what extent the configuration of the relations between levels 
radically changes in opposition. As for the PSD, stratarchical features are present since the 
outset, confirming previous studies (Jalali, 2006; Jalali and Lisi, 2009). This initial feature 
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has been incorporated in the party functioning and has contributed to shape the subsequent 
developments. During the long phase at the opposition and under high leadership instability, 
it has been difficult for the leadership to try to impose hierarchic measures. The local level 
has been able to keep its degree of autonomy by means of internal struggles which have 
taken place due to local elites’ penetration in the national bodies. At the same time,  it is 
worth noting that the ‘periphery’ has not taken advantage of this higher autonomy, and 
influence capacity, to improve its formal power in terms of allocation of resources and 
competences over time.  
In conclusion, hierarchy – understood as unilateral control from above – is not 
representative of centre-periphery relations in the two parties. At the same time, stratarchy 
– conceived as mutual separation –  does not hold true. The dynamic perspective shows that 
there are attempts to strengthen hierarchic control from the centre in both parties, in 
opposition and after a leadership change. This proves that the party organisation is an 
important source to be controlled, and that leaders (and new leaders) of electoralist parties 
could not easily neglect the organisation, especially in opposition and during difficult 
contexts. The nature of the party origin seems to contribute to explain the different paths 
followed by the two parties, and therfore the role of path dependency, in line with previous 
studies on organisational changes (e.g. Lisi, 2015a).  
Moreover, the analysis suggests that the autonomisation, entailed in the stratarchical 
solution, seems to regard power relations among party elites at various levels, i.e. the party 
leader and the territorial leaders who control the organisation on-the-ground (Bardi, 
Bartolini, and Trechsel, 2014: 8). As such it indicates the increasing relevance of individual 
linkages to the detriment of collective bodies. Territorial collective bodies level are mainly 
mobilised in support of the party in government, and as aggregators of the consensus on-the-
ground.  
The analysis carried out in chapter 6 and 7 seems to confirm this observation. In the 
two chapters the thesis has sought to respond to the research question regarding the 
emergence of processes of personalisation and democratisation at the territorial level. It has 
focused on  the selection of the intermediate leadership, resorting to an original database of 
intra-party elections. The process has been democratised in the second half of the 1990s, and 
the right to select the federation (PS) and district (PSD) presidents was attached to members.  
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This thesis contends that the shift from the assembly-based selection method to the 
direct selection has fostered the emergence of a model of leader-centric guidance and 
personalisation of the territorial organisation. It has enhanced the role of the intermediate 
leaders vis-à-vis the local assemblies, the autonomy in the formation of the executive bodies, 
and the legitimacy in leading the territorial structures. Furthermore, this model is functional 
to the intra-party relations for different reasons. Firstly, because it fosters the establishment 
of personalistic linkages for the control and ad hoc mobilisation of the territorial structures. 
As literature suggests, personalistic linkages tend to shore up the weakness of party 
organisation in new democracies. Secondly, the enhanced position of the territorial leaders 
within the structures serves to foster party cohesion and reduce the potential for internal 
conflicts within the organisation.  
The  empirical analysis of the internal disputes has shown important findings.  
Firstly, a general pattern of low competitiveness (i.e. more than one candidate running) is 
found, i.e. single-candidates races tend to characterise these contests. This pattern is slightly 
more pronounced in the PSD. Secondly, continuity rather than elites’ renewal is also 
apparent. The main features of these elections suggest a tendency towards elite-controlled 
processes and indicate the high degree of autonomy held by these elites in managing the 
territorial organisation. Therefore, they tend to confirm the expectation of personalisation 
processes at the territorial level. In comparison, formal rules assign to the PS federation 
presidents a stronger position. Moreover, the fact that in the PS the intra-party elections are 
held synchronically fosters the linkage with the developments at the national level. This 
feature should make it easier for the national leadership to rely on a cohesive and ‘uniform’ 
territorial organisation. At the same time, it indicates and confirms the higher centralisation 
of the PS. By contrast, in the PSD, the non-synchronicity of the intra-party elections indicates 
the higher degree of autonomy of the periphery, as well as district leaders’ room for 
maneuver regarding the management (and control) of the territorial structures. On the other 
hand, the non-synchronicity may contribute to make it difficult for a new leader to try to 
control or to encourage a reconfiguration of power at the territorial level. The features and 
dynamics of the internal elections within the PSD may contribute to explain the higher 
difficulty of the leader in controlling the organisation when the party is in opposition. 
Likewise, are consistent with the stratarchic features embedded in the party origin.  
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Within the general pattern of these elections, an interesting feature emerges.  
Low competitiveness is more apparent when the party is in government. The same is also 
true when legislative or local elections are upcoming, and the projection of unitary image is 
crucial. Hence, the institutional (incumbency) and electoral competition seem to be 
important factors discouraging the emergence of challenges within the territorial 
organisation and fostering the cohesiveness of the apparatus. The relevance of incumbency 
in reducing competitiveness is confirmed by studies on party leadership selection (e.g. Cross 
and Pilet, 2014). In this study we have confirmed that this factor matters also at lower level. 
The effect of incumbency on leader stability and capacity to consolidate his or her internal 
power is a factor that in turn contributes to reducing internal strains. By contrast, 
competitiveness tends to increase under leadership’s instability - which tends to coincide 
with the opposition status that in these parties represents a chief factor of vulnerability for 
the leader. Although the case of the PSD is rather difficult to assess due to the non-
synchronicity of the elections, we have found that on average competitiveness has been more 
pronounced during the long period in opposition, characterised by several leadership 
changes especially between 2004 and 2010. In the case of the PS, the change in the dominant 
coalition following Sócrates’ era, and above all, the national challenge between Seguro and 
Costa, caused the disruption of the low competitiveness’ and low renewal’ patterns.  
Still, more competitiveness does not go hand in hand with more renewal. It is worth 
emphasising that in both parties both competitiveness and renewal are rather low.  
As emerged from the review of the longitudinal relations, and from the dynamics of 
the internal elections, the  institutional status is an important factor for explaining power 
distribution within these parties, confirming previous studies on electoralist parties. 
Incumbency tends to foster the autonomisation of the national leadership on the one hand, 
and the cohesiveness of the territorial organisation on the other. By contrast, it is more 
difficult for a leader in opposition or a new leadership (the two generally coincide) to be 
autonomous from the party apparatus in difficult times.  
The two parties share features that affect in a similar way the internal power 
distribution, reducing the power of the periphery towards the centre. Firstly, an important 
element concerns the resource structure, namely party financing. Both the PS and the PSD 
are highly dependent on public funding and, more importantly, this resource is controlled by 
the national level. Of course this contributes to the importance of the incumbency for these 
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parties, being the public funding linked to the electoral results (beyond other resources as 
political patronage). By contrast, the resources of the territorial structures derive from active 
members’ fees, which are an irrelevant share of the party income. As such, this fosters the 
predominance of the party at the national level and  highly conditions the autonomy of the 
periphery. Nevertheless, members’ fees is related with the control of membership affiliation 
and mobilisation of active members, which are of crucial interest for getting party posts and 
influencing local processes.   
The second feature shared by the two parties, influencing the power distribution in a 
similar way, is the direct election of the leader by members. As mentioned, this measure has 
fostered the national leadership’ autonomisation from the territorial structures’ influence. 
Furthermore, as shown in chapter 3, in these two parties the leaders are comparatively 
stronger. As such, the internal system of accountability based on the collective bodies (e.g. 
the congress) has been weakened, although in the case of the PSD, the direct election appears 
to be less consolidated.  
 In this regard, the reforms of the democratisation experienced by the two parties 
have contributed to reinforce the position of individual actors, and thus the personalisation 
at both national and local level, to the detriment of collective actors. This appears to be the 
main effect of individual members’ inclusion in personnel selection. In this thesis we have 
mainly focused on the lower-level elections and, although it has not been possible to analyse 
participation rates, the main features of these competitions seem to indicate that, on average, 
members are called to rubber-stump elite-controlled decisions. 
There are different implications in the findings of this study. First, the thesis suggests 
that there is a need for a refinement of the idea of stratarchy as mutual separation, and as a 
static model separated from the changing context and internal actors’ pressures. As Cross 
claims (2016: 4) the stratarchical argument should be refined in the sense of ‘check and 
balances’ rather than mutual separation. Moreover, the Portuguese case suggests that local 
autonomy is a characteristic of the territorial elites rather than the local structures as 
collective entities made up of participative members. As such, Katz and Mair’s (1995, 2009) 
original argument of stratarchy as a solution for keeping active the party, since an 
autonomous local party attracts participation and enhances party legitimacy, seems not to 
hold true. Indeed, the main features of the territorial organisation in both parties seem to 
hamper members’ effective participation. Members’ mobilisation seems more instrumental 
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to the internal disputes or to the ritual and intermittent support for the party when in 
government.  
The low elites’ circulation may be gauged in the difficulty to put forward innovative 
policy proposals as well as in the quality of political representation. In some structures, the 
absence of competitiveness and ‘true’ renewal is a longstanding pattern that suggests the 
presence of oligarchies at the territorial level which manage the structures autonomously. 
The role of personalistic linkages may further weaken party organisations. These dynamics 
may have important implications for the functioning of local power that deserve to be 
explored by future studies. More in general, they may have external implications in terms of 
parties’ public image, fostering the diffuse perception of Portuguese parties as closed 
structures. The reduction of the power of local assemblies and the personalisation at the local 
level is a double-edge sword. While it makes parties at the local level both more predictable 
in terms of supporting the national leadership when necessary, makes them much less able 
to perform the fundamental linkage role with civil society at the local level. Future researches 
may adopt more sophisticated methods to explore in depth the relations between the national 
leadership and the dynamics of the territorial apparatus. Likewise, network analyses may be 
helpful for exploring the degree of elites’ circulation or ‘factional’ entrenchment within the 
two parties and its consequences.  
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Annex I 
List of interviews 
▪ António Gameiro: President of the PS-Santarém and Member of Parliament. Lisbon, 
July 2013. Duration: 35 minutes. 
▪ Cristóvão Crespo: President of the PSD local section of Portalegre and Member of 
Parliament. Former President of the PSD-Portalegre between 2008 and 2014. Lisbon, 
20 September 2016. Duration: 34 minutes. 
▪ Duarte Pacheco: President of the PSD-Área Oeste and Member of Parliament. 
Lisbon, 19 June 2014. Duration: 43 minutes. 
▪ Marcos Perestrello: President of the PS-Lisbon and Member of Parliament. Member 
of the PS National Secretariat of the PS (Organisation). Lisbon, 21 January 2014. 
Duration: 31 minutes. 
▪ Miguel Coelho: Member of Parliament, Lisbon municipal councillor, former 
president of PS-Lisbon council-structure. Lisbon, 8 November 2016. Duration: 35 
minutes. 
▪ Miguel Freitas: President of the PS-Algarve and Member of Parliament. Lisbon, 4 
September 2014. Duration:  
▪ Miguel Laranjeiro: Member of the PS National Secretariat (Organisation). Lisbon, 5 
November 2014. Duration: 56 minutes.  
▪ Miguel Pinto Luz: PSD. President of the PSD-Lisbon; vice-mayor of Cascais 
(Lisbon). Cascais, 18 December 2013. Duration: 25 minutes.  
▪ Nilza de Sena: PSD, Member of the National Council; MP; and vice-president of the 
National Political Committee (2010-2012). Lisbon, 19 June 2014. Duration: 42 
minutes.  
▪ Pedro Delgado Alves: Member of Parliament, Member of the National Committee 
of the PS. Member of the Secretariat of the Lisbon council-level structure. Former 
Secretary-General of the PS Youth Organization, Juventude Socialista (JS) between 
2010 and 2012. Lisbon, 10 March 2015. Duration: 54 minutes.  
▪ Nuno Serra: President of the PSD-Santarém and Member of Parliament. Lisbon, 25 
June 2014. Duration: 43 minutes.  
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▪ Paulo Cunha: PSD, President of the PSD-Braga and Mayor of Vila Nova de 
Famalicão (Braga).  Vila Nova de Famalicão. 24 June 2014. Duration: 40 minutes. 
▪ Pedro Nuno Santos: President of the PS-Aveiro and Member of Parliament. Lisbon, 
4 July 2013. Duration: 1 hour and 30 minutes.  
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Annex II  
Interview script - topics 
 
The semi-structured interviews to party elites cover the following topics: 
▪ Evolution of party organisational goals over time  
▪ Relevance and role of party members for the territorial structures  
▪ Influence capacity of the different federations/district structures  
▪ Relation with the leadership in opposition vs governmental status 
▪ Territorial structures’ financial resources  
▪ Communication between levels 
▪ Democratisation of party leadership selection and effects on territorial structures’ 
powers 
▪ Openness of organisational boundaries  
▪ MPs candidate selection process, functioning and relation with the national 
leadership 
▪ Local candidate selection, functioning and local autonomy 
▪ Statutory revision and 2013 closed primaries for mayoral candidates (PS) 
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ANNEX III 
List of PPDB countries  
 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
United Kingdom. 
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ANNEX IV  
Dataset of intra-party elections  
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Acção Socialista n° 1313, “Federações do PS escolhem novas direcções”, 15/10/2008, pp.13-19. 
Acção Socialista n° 1314, “Eleições internas confirmam estabilidade e consenso”, 29/10/2008, p.19.  
Acção Socialista n° 1315, “Federações: Listagem dos eleitos para os órgãos”, 12/11/2008, pp. 8-10.  
Acção Socialista n° 1353, “Lista de candidatos às Federações”, Setembro 2010, p. 18.  
Acção Socialista n° 1354, “Socialistas foram às urnas escolher direcções federativas”, Outobro 
2010, p.20.  
Acção Socialista n°1369, “Eleições internas”, Junho 2012, p.2.  
Acção Socialista n°1389, “Eleições federativas. Resultados”, Setembro 2014, pp. 6-7. 
Acção Socialista n°1403, “PS elege presidentes de federação” Março 2016, p.16. 
 
Party websites/social networks 
ps.pt: “Resultados eleicões federativas”, 10/10/2012 
https://ps.pt/index.php/2010/10/10/resultados-eleicoes-federativas/ (accessed 6/5/2014) 
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(accessed 4/3/2013) 
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(accessed 4/3/2013) 
Portal de Aveiro, “Alberto Souto novo líder do PS distrital”, 1/4/2003, 
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RTP - Rádio e Televisão de Portugal, “Maria Amélia Antunes e Vítor Ramalho disputam federação 
de Setúbal”, 10/2/2006 
https://www.rtp.pt/noticias/pais/maria-amelia-antunes-e-vitor-ramalho-disputam-federacao-de-
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RTP - Rádio e Televisão de Portugal, “Sócrates ainda sem críticos entre candidatos a presidentes de 
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https://www.rtp.pt/noticias/pais/socrates-ainda-sem-criticos-entre-candidatos-a-presidentes-de-
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Rtp - Rádio e Televisão de Portugal, “Pita Ameixa anuncia recandidatura à Federação Regional do 
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http://www.rtp.pt/noticias/pais/pita-ameixa-anuncia-recandidatura-a-federacao-regional-do-baixo-
alentejo-do-ps_n28569 (accessed 19/3/2013) 
Rtp - Rádio e Televisão de Portugal,  “PS/Guarda - Fernando Cabral reeleito presidente da 
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http://www.rtp.pt/noticias/pais/psguarda-fernando-cabral-reeleito-presidente-da-federacao-
distrital_n29341 (accessed 20/3/2013) 
RTP - Rádio e Televisão de Portugal, “Joaquim Barreto eleito pela 3ª vez presidente da Federação 
Distrital”, 22/4/2006 
http://www.rtp.pt/noticias/pais/psbraga-joaquim-barreto-eleito-pela-3-vez-presidente-da-federacao-
distrital_n29342 (accessed 20/3/2013) 
RTP - Rádio e Televisão de Portugal, “Oito das 19 federações socialistas mudaram de liderança”, 
24/4/2006 
https://www.rtp.pt/noticias/pais/oito-das-19-federacoes-socialistas-mudaram-de-lideranca_n29411 
(accessed 2/4/2013) 
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Público, “Deputados e autarcas dominam candidaturas à liderança das federações distritais dos 
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